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This thesis encompasses three different aspects of economic security – theory, 
history and practice and their inter-connection. Economic security has been a 
contested concept, but its importance and usage has been increasing. 2008 
Economic crisis and following ramifications invoked a new wave of concerns 
about economic part of national security. This thesis investigates economic 
security mechanism, revises conceptualization and operationalization for the 
framework of analysis. In order to understand exact economic security modus 
operandi institutions are the main target of investigation. As economic security 
concept is applied from individual to states, this thesis goes step further and 
explores its application to the regional economic integration framework. 
Historical analysis, following the created conceptual framework of economic 
security, portrays the environment, patterns and rationale behind creation of 
European Union (former European Economic Community) and how economic 
security has been envisaged as one of the main priorities and the purpose of 
the created and developed integration framework.  
Institutions have been playing the main role in the creation and development of 
European Union. Extensive political economy literature provides multifaceted 
insights into the importance of institutions, and how institutions and 
institutional frameworks affect the implementation of political and economic 
systems. Economic liberalism and democracies have been for long the main 
standard operating system. Created regional integration institutional 
framework – from free trade area to economic union in Europe – currently the 
European Union is one of the most institutionalized frameworks and as such is 
the best unit for the analysis. The development of the European Union was 
based on the inception of both political and economic institutions on top of 
existing its member states’ systems. 
This thesis also shows how institutions and the development can change the 
states’ performance in globalized world. The units – countries’ operation in 
economic globalization seemed to be predefined by the hardware – physical 
capacity like land, population and others, which, was perceived, do not change 
significantly over time and simultaneously obstruct the countries’ performance. 
The study reveals that operation of the hardware strongly depends on the 
software – systems and institutions. As vulnerabilities stem from physical base, 
achieved resilience – either as capacity to counteract or absorb exogenous 
shock – is the result of institutions and policies in place. The investigation of 
the effects of European Union on its member states' economic security comes 
at the time, when the whole Union is in question, showing that states' 
performance is very much related to created institutions.
 1 
 






Economic security or economic content of national security has been 
a focal point in security and political economy studies for long. This 
issue has been especially apparent for smaller states, defined by their 
cramped capacity to overcome the issues of subordination. The hey-
day of economic security and the studies on the outwards and 
inwards solutions for reducing the outcomes of structural constraints 
came in the 1980s1. The concentration on economic interdependence 
and development problems2, typically representing state’s survival 
issues, in small states studies coincided with emergence of economic 
security as a separate academic field of security studies, even if one 
can perceive it as such up to now.  
 
                                                          
1 See Barry Buzan, Håkan Wiberg, Peter J. Katzenstein, Christine Ingebritsen et al., 
and other works indicated in chapter 2. 
2 See Colin Clark, and Tony Payne, Politics, Security and Development in Small 
States (London: Allen/Unwin, 1987); Michael Handel, Weak States in the 
International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 220-229; Håkan Wiberg, “The 
Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences”. Journal of Peace Research, 
24:4 (1987): 339-363; Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: 
Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
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The period marked the culmination of numerous transformations in 
the international relations. Changing economy and economic 
relations have been accelerating the global economy, and increasing 
globalization and interconnection. Changing technologies have been 
bringing the ideas of democracy and independence even to the 
furthest parts of the globe. The appearance of new states and new 
forms of government have been driving the wave of unprecedented 
changes worldwide. 
 
Academic scholarship has been catching up with cardinal changes in 
the World. Buzan’s sectorisation model3 reaffirmed the 
metamorphosis in the security studies and suggested to perceive 
economic security as a separate field of security studies. The 
economic content of security4 was already a topic in the literature, 
but Buzan’s conceptual and influential work on the national security 
problems provided a fruitful background for an intensified and 
structured discussion. 
 
Regardless theoretical development of the field, economic security 
and it related issues have been already on top of the agenda for small 
states since 18th Century. Small states’ security directly depended on 
the physical states’ capacity, which was eventually directly 
represented by the economic powerhouse of states. The scholars, 
                                                          
3 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (2nd ed.) (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991). 
4 Charles L. Schultze, “The Economic Content of National Security Policy”. 
Foreign Affairs, 51:3 (1973): 522-540; K. Knorr and F. N. Trager (eds), Economic 
Issues and National Security (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1977); Frans A. 
M. Alting von Geusau and Jacques Pelkmans (ed.), National Economic Security: 
Perceptions, Threats and Policies (Tilburg: John F. Kennedy Institute, 1982); 
Giacomo Luciani, “The Economic Content of Security”. The Journal of Public 
Policy, 8:2 (1988): 151-173. 
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analysing the small states’ capacity to withstand subordination for 
bigger powers, were indirectly addressing also the small states’ 
economic security5. The process of integration, which was reaching 
the highest speed after the end of the Second World War, especially 
on the regional level, was also about maximizing the welfare and the 
benefits of mass economy on the larger scale, affecting the 
contemporary discussion on economic security and providing 
citizen-centric approach. The exceptional European integration level, 
its relative success and the proceeding enlargement waves spurred 
even higher scholarship attention to the cooperation frameworks, 
which were perceived as significantly affecting cooperating 
countries, especially, smaller ones’ economic security and it related 
issues. 
 
Membership benefits of these integration and cooperation 
frameworks have been also the main target and interest point of 
research. The following appearance of newly independent countries 
and the European Union’s enlargement have been tracked by a new 
wave of scholarly works, analysing the effects of the EU’s 
                                                          
5 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New 
York: Oxford Development Press, 1994); Commonwealth Advisory Group, A 
Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1997); Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, eds. Power, Production and 
Social Reproduction: Human In/Security in the Global Political Economy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); L. Briguglio and E. J. Kisanga, eds. Economic 
Vulnerability and Resilience of Small States (Malta: Islands and Small States 
Institute of the University of Malta; London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004); 
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh & Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and 
Implications (London & New York: Routledge, 2007); Lino Briguglio, Gordon 
Cordina, Nadia Farrugia and Stephanie Vella, “Economic Vulnerability and 
Resilience: Concepts and Measurements”. Oxford Development Studies, 37: 3 
(2009): 229-247; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development 
Report 2010 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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membership for small states6. However, economic security aspects 
have been rarely touched, and, even if so, only on the surface. Most 
of the literature highlighted that membership in the European Union 
brings democracy, economic growth, certain level of security, 
stability, and the most discussed and famous EU funds.  
 
Indeed, as numerous integration theories point, countries start 
cooperation because of positive ramifications, such as intensified 
trade or lower barriers leading to higher economic growth. In the 
case of the EU, which is perceived as one of the most successful 
economic integration frameworks, the provision of socio-economic 
goods for its member states is seen as the most valuable aspect of the 
membership. In the case of small states, the EU appears as a possible 
solution to overcoming their main vulnerability – smallness – in 
terms of economic security.  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide a complete perspective 
on the operation of economic security within the European Union, or 
in other words, how does the EU work as a promoter of economic 
security to its member states. In principle, to join the Europeanisation 
studies top-down approach to understand, what is the domestic 
impact of the EU. Buzan observes7, that EU’s characteristics 
correspond very closely to the ones of the national state, for this 
reason the same concept and methodology could be applied for 
analysing both – the EU and its member states’ performance in the 
area. This could not be the case of comparing economic security of a 
                                                          
6 See Roderick Pace, “Malta and EU Membership: Overcoming ‘Vulnerabilities’, 
Strengthening ‘Resilience’”. European Integration, 28:1 (2006): 33-49. 
7 Buzan, 371. 
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state and a citizen8, as citizen-centric approach of economic security 
is growing as well, and there could be a connection between the two. 
 
This thesis by analysing economic security of the EU and its effects to 
the member states deals with several issues. First, the ambiguity and 
heterogeneity of the concept of economic security are, indeed, 
making the concept difficult to apply for research and practice. For 
this reason, it is extremely important to pinpoint the economic 
security mechanism and clearly define the concepts in place. For this 
reason, there is a significant attention to the conceptualisation of the 
term. 
 
Second, the creation of regional integration and cooperation 
framework in Europe happened to be completely different from other 
integration forms elsewhere. The historical context and the different 
speeds and forms of integration by forming a community were, in 
truth, particular, and should be properly understood before being 
compared or replicated elsewhere. This context is covered to track 
down the consequences for domestic actors, policies and politics of 
the European integration, politics and policies. 
 
Third, it also important to identify the main instruments at work, 
which explain, how does the European Union directly affect its 
member states. For instance, democracy and economic development 
are extremely connected, or the impact of the institutions, like rule of 
law property rights, to economic wealth development, and their 
relationships are at the core of ongoing discussions in academia. For 
sure, these variables effects cannot be omitted from the whole 
                                                          
8 Comment: probably the most extensive body of literature on economic security 
usually relate to the individual level economic security, referring to the security to 
job, income, etc. For the space reasons, it is not overseen here. 
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picture, and without them, probably, the identified economic security 
institutions would not be performing in the same way as they do 
now. More interestingly, the period since 2008 economic crisis 
provides also another perspective of the European Union as a 
security community. The crisis measures and the changes in the 
institutional setup are very important for having a full picture of the 
EU economic security mechanism.  
 
Finally, the results of the economic security for the EU and its 
member states are the last finishing strokes of the picture. The 
uniform picture of the EU performance and of its member states has 
been never drawn, accordingly, the analysis and presentation of the 
whole picture is extremely important. 
 
Moreover, this introduction and the thesis is structured around the 
aforementioned issues. The interdisciplinary holistic approach is 
extremely important in understanding economic security and 
requires mixed methods research design following top-down 
Europeanisation approach. Thus, the thesis is constructed from 
standalone essays-articles on the most important aspects of economic 
security. The following paragraphs present the structure of the thesis. 
Each paragraph indicate what is the central focal point of each 
chapter, what is the rationale, the main question and objectives, 
theory, method, units of analysis and sources of data. Each paragraph 




Chapter 2 Economic Security Mechanism tackles the issue of the 
economic security concept. It presents the context of its development 
and main how it has been used, its slow detachment from the 
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military security and a strong connection with the small states and 
their problematique in power relations. I present various scholars’ 
ideas and input in defining economic security. The main goal is not 
only understand what does economic security mean, to place it in the 
bigger picture of scholarship, but also to make economic security 
more applicable in the research and properly conceptualised. The 
main question how to define and conceptualise the term is answered 
by applying Gerring criterial framework and at the same time re-
constructing the framework for analysis based on the existing input 
in the academic literature. 
 
Lino Briguglio, G. Cordina, N. Farrugia and S. Vella proposed 
economic vulnerability and resilience indices are taken as a reference 
point for reconstruction of the concept for its future practical 
applicability. This work is chosen because it reflects best the points of 
political economy in advanced capitalist economies, including 
attributes of social policy/welfare state, macro-economy, 
microeconomic institutions and governance. The choice is also based 
on the current discussions in human security policy-oriented strand, 
pinpointing various components, which are crucial for empowering 
and securing people around the globe. I reconstruct their model of 
approaching vulnerability and resilience by merging various inputs 
from various angles of scholarship – from security proponents Barry 
Buzan, Giacomo Luciani, Arnold Wolfers, Richard H. Ullman, Håkan 
Wiberg, Wolfgang Hager, Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, Jacques 
Pelkmans, Colin Clark, Tony Payne, K. Knorr, F. N. Trager and 
Liliana Curmi to Pace Roderick, Dorothee Bohle, Wade Jacoby, 
Richard T. Griffiths and Peter Katzenstein, representing more small 




In short, the second chapter revises the concept and provides up-to-
date model for understanding of economic security mechanism. The 
framework is created for assessment of economic security, suiting not 
only evaluation purposes, like to identify each country’s capabilities 
to withstand or absorb exogenous shocks, but also helping to make 
substantial future forecasts for countries’ behaviour, simultaneously 




Chapter 3 European Quest for Economic Security I: Historical 
Underpinings presents the historical analysis of the Europe after the 
end of the Second World War. As it is portrayed in this chapter, the 
whole construction of the European community was substantially 
affected by the East-West conflict, which developed into the Cold 
War. Contrary to the wide-spread view that the main interest for 
European cooperation has been avoidance of war, the analysis of 
various historical studies points out that economy played as 
significant role as a war, and, probably, even more important. 
 
The Cold War was not only a representation of two superpowers and 
their military arsenal, but also of two completely opposite economic 
modus operandi. Welfare and prosperity were the main driving forces 
for the cooperation in the war devastated Europe. The role of the 
United States of America has been substantial and should be 
properly evaluated. Eventually, it was the financial support from one 
of the biggest superpowers forcing Europe to become a unified body 





As a result, this chapter indirectly answers several questions. It 
reports about the conditions, in which security communities develop, 
and, in particular, the environment and playing forces, which have 
been crucial in the case of the development of European economic 
security community. The analysis briefly covers the institutional 
mushrooming within Europe over the period, and how this process 
paved the way and contributed to an advanced level of cooperation, 
which reached an unprecedented scale in comparison to any other 




Chapter 4 European Quest for Economic Security II: Path to 
Economic Security Community? continues analysing the 
particularities of European economic integration’s history. By 
pinpointing various perspectives and understandings of the 
European integration, cooperation, regionalism and regionalisation, 
it theorises, why the European Economic Community, later European 
Union, was a security community from its beginning. 
 
In order to do so, the whole concept of security community is revised 
and analysed in the light of European historical development since 
the end of WWII. As it is shown in this chapter, the building of 
security community and the processes of integration are interrelated, 
and actually important to each other’s development. Indeed, as the 
topic of security communities was overshadowed by integrationalist 
perspective, there is not enough literature, dwelling on the EU as a 
security community, especially, as an economic security community. 
 
Lastly, as it was shown, the creation of European economic security 
community happened automatically by the collective action and 
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shared institutions. In fact, the EU’s example proves Deutsch to be 
correct about the extreme importance of integration. European Union 
started as a regional bloc for customs union and emerged as the most 
complex, rich and elaborated form of regional cooperation and 
integration with unification of policies and institutions, which are 
thoroughly analysed in the following chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 5 Economic Security Institutions at Work: Evidence from 
the EU explores the actual economic security institutions within the 
Union. The created impaired European Economic and Monetary 
Union represents, seems, a perpetual issues dating back from the 19th 
century and earlier international relations theories – small versus big, 
and national versus European. This chapter reviews the mechanisms 
and institutions over time, their development and basic measures, 
which were enacted to ensure the EU and its member states economic 
security. There is a substantial attention to the crisis period, since 
then, especially, became apparent that continuation of constant fight 
between national and European is detrimental for both sides. 
 
The analysis of the most important economic security policies and 
institutions show that creation of the common currency and 
Eurozone only partially constrained member states. Monetary 
policy’s handover to the created system with the European Central 
Bank ahead only slightly exercised towards European and economic 
community interest. The most crucial and eventually turned to be 
complicated side – fiscal policies remain in the hands of national 
governments and eventually were the point of extreme measures in 
the face of crisis. National interest exercise, strongly related to 
democracy and sovereignty, as it is shown in the chapter, paved the 
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path to negative ramifications after the markets’ freeze since 2008 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse.  
 
In conclusion, prevailing national interest and uncompleted EMU 
(Economic and Monetary Union) did not help European Union to 
handle the crisis easily. The appearance of sovereign debt measures 
raised the concern of the whole Eurozone. Even at this moment, lack 
of solidarity and big powers’ national interest prevented the EU from 
immediate response to calm markets. The rescue packages have been 
arranged for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, meanwhile whole 
Eurozone had to introduce the measures incompatible with 
democratic legitimacy and accountability. At this time, the mandate 
of European Central Bank (ECB) formally and informally has been 
expanded. The ECB found itself as the last resort lender, received 
banking supervision responsibility and intervened in various policy 
debates, advocating European interest. Its plea for banking union and 
completing the EMU, seems, reached the audience and the European 
Union is awaiting its missing economic policies unification. 
 
 
Chapter 6 The Effects of European Economic Security: Stability and 
Development builds on the understanding what role does the EU 
play in facilitating economic security to its member states. After 
identification of the mechanisms, I employ statistical data9 on 
member states’ performance in vulnerability and resilience in order 
to understand the results and the effects of economic security 
community. It also analyses the crisis period setbacks and ways to 
recovery and their length. 
                                                          
9 The statistical data on the EU member states is obtained from databases, such as 
Eurostat, IMF, World Bank, UN (UNCTAD), National Statistic Centrees/Bureaus 




The analysis of statistical data shows that the effects of economic 
security community are not uniform among the member states. The 
division appears to be clear depending on the size of a state and the 
prior development before joining the EU. Smaller countries by 
joining the economic integration frameworks like the EU appear to 
increase their economic vulnerability in terms of economic openness. 
Actually, whole the EU average shows that the economic openness is 
steadily increasing over time recently, a clear indication of growing 
interconnectedness and interdependence within the members. Other 
two indicators show that there is only an “entrance shock” to new 
members, but ultimately member states come close to previous levels 
of performance. 
 
Last but not least, economic resilience section, divided in 
macroeconomic stability and flexibility-regulation provide more 
insights into the operation of the instruments and policies at work. 
The components of macroeconomic stability, which were subject to 
EMU and creation of Eurozone, show that there was a significant on 
member states’ performance in external debt and budget deficit, 
however, only for short. The play of national interest right before the 
crisis and already in the crisis years is visible by increasing spending. 
The calming effects of the EU crisis measures and intervention leave 
a market on members’ well doing too. The rate of inflation after the 
introduction of the EMU has been properly stabilised and even 
during crisis remained relatively stable.  
 
Flexibility-regulation side reveals that an economic security 
community without essential background in capacity to withstand 
the external shocks even if macroeconomic stability strongly 
performs at the beginning, in the case of such multifaceted crisis, it is 
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important that there mechanisms in place benefitting the social 
human development. Of course, one of the criteria of flexibility good 
governance is the core of the European Union. Democracy, rule of 
law and protection of property rights and their importance to general 
economic state’s performance are depicted elsewhere, but it is 
important to keep in mind that the EU member states maintain 
adequate levels as required and these factors influence the 
performance of other factors too. For sure, the EU can be seen as an 
insurer of human development – life expectation at birth in the EU is 
significantly growing since 1960. 
 
Finally, the recent financial crisis, or in Nassim Taleb's words “black 
swan”, depicted by Nouriel Roubini, Stephan Mihm, Carmen 
Reinhart, Rogoff Kenneth, Anders Åslund revealed the importance of 
economic security once again. The bacilli of financial illness were 
already in most of the European States before the crisis hit. The 
reasons why the crisis hit badly Europe stem from global imbalances 
and pre-crisis domestic policies-institutions, which in the face of 
“Euro Zone Death Trip” (Paul Krugman in “The New York Times”) 
need a revision and further analysis. The study of the EU economic 
security fulfil the existing gap in the collective economic security 
studies, presented by Joseph S. Jr. Nye several decades ago by 
evaluating economic security of EU countries over time period and 
revealing the most important factors for economic security on 
national and regional levels. Consequently, this thesis assesses the 
importance of the membership in the EU for countries' economic 
security and provides the analysis of the EU's collective economic 





Chapter 2  
 






”Throughout the history of states, each has been made insecure 
by the existence of others. The military and economic actions of 
each in pursuit of its own national security have frequently 
combined with those of others to produce economic dislocation 
and war. The intensity and character of the national security 
problem vary dramatically over time – sometimes exceedingly 
confrontational, sometimes, as in the nineteenth century and as 
at the time of writing, moving into periods of lower tension and 
increased cooperation. But despite these fluctuations, the general 
problem remains, along with all the uncertainties and fears that it 
generates”. 10 
 
Survival issue has been the core of international relations and politics 
for centuries. The concept of security, being primarily associated with 
military capacity, faced tremendous challenges and changes in the 
20th century. Realism, being dominant international relations 
theoretical tradition, primarily dwelled on physical (military) power. 
Throughout the Cold War, the power-interest realist dichotomy 
                                                          
10 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (2nd ed), 1991, p. 1. 
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evolved around the struggle for power and conflict and war.11 New 
developments during the Cold War period in the international arena 
appeared to be grasped better by other theories. Neorealism, which 
added more actors besides nation state, appeared to emphasize the 
economic issues and their importance to security concept even more 
than beforehand. National security problem, even diluted by other 
various aspects, persists, however, from 1990s it is perceived that the 
tension is lower and cooperation prevails confrontation between the 
states. 
 
As Buzan well noted12, historically states have been made insecure by 
the existence of others. Military and economic actions were usually 
combined by states to produce economic dislocation and/or war for 
ensuring their own national security. Various scholars explored13 
what were the main threats to national security and states’ existence 
for centuries, and, apparently, survival meant war and economy 
related issues. Paul Kennedy persuasively portrays in his book “The 
Rise and Fall of Great Powers” the direct connection between 
economy and military conflict back from the beginning of the 16th 
century. His economic history work uncovers how a slight change in 
economy or comparative advantage had been influencing power 
relations and national security. Two other economists Roubini and 
Mihm, meanwhile, explores the main threats and the main sources of 
crisis back from 1630s, when the speculation of the “tulips’ mania” 
severely affected the economic landscape. Before that, as Buzan 
                                                          
11 Hasan Ulusoy, “Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War: The 
Constructivist Perspective”, Perceptions, Vol. 8, 2003, pp. 161-196. 
12 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (2nd ed), 1991, p. 1. 




described the main threats to economic security were wars, piracy 
and trade policies14. 
 
Consequently, economic security as an economic dimension of the 
security is, indeed, probably the oldest and the most controversial 
among the other parts of national security15. The concept origins 
could be traced back from the end of the middle ages, where 
economic capacity was directly linked to power and state’s position 
in the World as showed beforehand. Before appearance of capitalism 
the treats to economic security were from a narrow range, and 
fluctuations and combinations of various actions to pursue national 
security have been changing dramatically since the 19th century, as 
their intensity. Since mid of 20th century some countries, in 
Friedman’s words, started plugging themselves into the globalization 
herd and by that became threatened by various and by that time 
unrecognised “black swans”16. 21st century globalized national 
economies and sophisticated financial systems are too well connected 
with all other spheres of a states’ functioning and even more with the 
processes in the neighbouring countries. The effects of the stateless 
economy – the skyrocketing shares in global economy of 
multinational and international companies and other actors or 
processes without borders – cannot be underestimated. The 
challenges and threats can come from anywhere – unexpected flow of 
migrants or one company’s bankruptcy.  
 
The recent economic crisis, following the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers on 2008 September, intensified economic and political 
                                                          
14 Buzan, 1991, pp. 7&20. 
15 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2 and 39. 
16 The term “black swan” was introduced by Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The 
Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007. 
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debate about the economic security and the main threats to it. The 
global chain of the events after the fall-down affected even the most 
powerful states worldwide. Both economic and military strong states 
faced uncertainty and instability shortly after the landing of the 
famous Nassim Taleb’s “black swan” to their horizons. Reality 
proved that governments’ capacity to turn crisis into an opportunity 
and “white swans”, as called by Roubini and Mihm, has been not so 
great. Without surprise at the moment of writing, 8 years after the 
breakdown, the economic issues of security, historically being 
primarily a borderline and reference point for mainly small states, 
continue being a priority of policy-makers’ agendas of even the most 
powerful countries’ governments worldwide. 
 
There were several theories and explanations supplied for economic 
security. Various terms and concepts were used interchangeably and 
former body of the literature did not provide substantial clarifications 
and the definitions and measurements of the terms. Buzan’s attempt 
to draw clear divisions between military security and other four sides 
of security – equally important – economic, societal, political and 
environmental has been an important step in the positioning of the 
different sides of the security. However, a conceptual description of 
economic security has not been substantially provided in the 
prominent work. The following years of scholarship continued to see 
various conceptualisations of economic security and its components. 
The “competing” theories and concepts did little to integrate 
previous research vocabulary and ambiguity of the concept 
‘economic security’ still persists.  
 
This part of thesis contributes to the existing literature in several 
ways. First, it analyzes and traces back the origins of the concept 
from the earliest academic literature available in the international 
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relations’ literature. Second, it juxtaposes various different aspects 
from different fields of political science, revealing intersection points 
and commonalities. Third, it provides an extensive theory building 
and conceptualization of economic security. Finally, it provides a 
complete framework for analysis and could be seen as a 
benchmarking tool for policy makers and researchers, 
conceptualizing economic security via vulnerability and resilience 
concepts. 
 
Thus, this chapter is organized as follows. I start with the literature 
review providing the in-depth insights from security studies and the 
analysis of the grounds for the crystallization of the concept. Third 
section defines economic security by combining the results from 
historical analysis and existing various definitions from other fields 
of studies. The following parts dwell on the most important 
components of the economic security – economic vulnerability and 
resilience. The conceptual discussion finalizes the conceptual 
framework for analysis of economic content of national security. 
 
 
2.2 Literature review: concept development and the context 
 
There were various developments in the area of economic security 
since the establishment of the small states back in 18th century. The 
mushrooming of the new and small states in the region attracted 
more and more attention to understand the underlying factors and 
components of power and its distribution. The academicians 
involved in the discussions around small states and their issues 
related to economic security naturally assigned them to small states 
studies. Security studies, in the meantime have been oriented around 
the power, especially the physical characteristics of it. Economic 
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powerhouse predominantly was used to empower war machine and 
to fuel military power.  
 
These both strands – security and small states studies - of 
international relations have been advancing historically for the past 
few centuries. The conceptual works carried out earlier did not 
necessarily use the terminology that has been employed in the last 
few decades. The definition of the economic security as of two 
different sides of the coin – vulnerability and resilience – appeared in 
both strands of economic literature. However, surprisingly, both 
strands remained quite isolated and have not been taking into 
consideration the previous theoretical discussions. Due to that, I am 
therefore inclined to discuss how economic security became relevant 
in the fields of security studies and small states and ended up 
progressing into probably the entire and separate discipline, 
including all other aspects of security17 by losing its former 
identification with financial security. 
 
Indeed, in the midst of the 20th century small states studies started to 
generate increasingly more attention worldwide than beforehand. 
Their importance has been growing together with the waves of 
decolonization, the promulgations of independence and the 
appearance of international institutions such as the United Nations, 
                                                          
17 I am not in favor of K. Marx’s ideas and the theory of Economic Determinism, 
but some researchers were arguing that all other areas of security, even the military 
one, are subordinates of the economic security. I am not questioning whether it is 
right or not to include other aspects of security under one economic security’s 
“umbrella”, referring to what L. Briguglio and other scholars did by complimenting 
the indices relevant for states’ economic security. Also, I think that in future studies 
it is important to dive deeper into the explanation of the shift of the economic 
security, which is still rather underdeveloped. Therefore, the connection between 
economic and military security is very tricky, and for this reason in this research the 
military factors are not included into the analysis of economic security. 
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which have been including more and more small states. 
Empowerment of smaller states to exercise other types of power than 
economy facilitated their voice’s increase in the political arena. The 
existing definitions of the smallness and describing criteria of small 
states have been changing, reconsidered and redefined. Various 
definitions diverge depending on the field of study for this reason the 
analysis is split into two parts. Small states studies’ development and 
the exploration of the role of economic security there follow the 
discussion of the emergence of economic security within security 
studies. 
 
The book People, States and Fear, published just after the main changes 
in international arena and system, illustrates Barry Buzan’s main 
idea, that security is one of the most important issues for humanity. 
In fact, “security studies have been on the top of scholarly agenda, 
and realism, with its focus on power, states and national interests 
emerged as the dominant theory of International Relations”18 since 
the end of 1940s. However, such a vital international relations 
discipline only during the last decades, after the end of Cold War 
entered into transformation period. Various scholars claimed that 
security studies became a very shifting discipline in the recent 
decades.19 Many years ago security was understood mainly in 
military sense, tied up with quite limited approaches and 
mechanisms. As a result, security studies got preoccupied also with 
other types of threats, such as terrorism, climate change, migration20, 
                                                          
18Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?“, in: 
Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Jessica Beyer, Small 
States in International Relations. Seattle: University of Washington Press and 
Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 2006, p. 9. 
19 See Buzan, Knorr and Tragger, Hansen and Janeliūnas. 
20 Tomas Janeliūnas, Komunikacinis saugumas. Vilnius: Vilniaus Universiteto 
Leidykla, 2007, p. 202. 
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etc., which were left out in terms of conventional security 
understanding beforehand. 
 
Most of the questions arising in the security studies’ debate were 
associated more with philosophy than with empirics. The definition 
of the threats, discipline’s object, and methodology were broadly 
contested among the scholars. Furthermore, security studies lost its 
predominant military orientation before the end of Cold War, but 
academically, they were sweepingly expanded by Barry Buzan’s 
sectorization model, which divided security agenda into five fields: 
military, political, economic, environmental and societal21. This is 
well illustrated by Buzan’s words: 
 
”It [security] encompasses several important 
contradictions and a host of nuances all of which can 
cause confusion if not understood. Major contradictions 
include that between defence and security, that between 
individual security and national security, that between 
national security and international security, and that 
between violent means and peaceful ends. Add to these 
difficulties of determining the referent object of security 
(i.e. what is it that is to be made secure) and the pitfalls of 
applying the idea across a range of sectors (military, 
political, environmental and societal) and the scope of 
the task becomes clear.”22 
 
The scope of the task might have seemed clear, however, the 
difficulties between contradiction and complication to define the 
object prolonged the process of theory building and 
conceptualisation in security studies. B. Buzan was not the very first 
                                                          
21 B. Buzan, T. Janeliūnas, p. 202. 
22 B. Buzan, p. 15. 
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who brought the economic security into the daylight. Richard Ullman 
much earlier has pointed out that security for a long time has lost its 
absolute value, and indicated the importance of “other dimensions” 
of security for welfare state23. Of course, B. Buzan’s contribution to 
the division of security, the description of security sectors’ objects, 
threats, etc. is unquestionable.  
 
Nevertheless, it would not be correct to state that distinguishing the 
role of economic security by Buzan was an original idea, since 
already in 1982, Alting von Geusau and Pelkmans published the 
collection entitled National Economic Security: Perceptions, Threats and 
Policies. The book as well raised the importance of economic content 
of security and what are the main threats to national economies, as 
the book was coming right after the two oil shocks and followed 
price boom of raw materials in the world24. Despite the fact that this 
work hasn’t attracted too much attention among scholars25, it seemed 
important for historical overview to cover the earliest scholarship 
entries on the concept of economic security regardless their 
popularity and spreading. 
 
                                                          
23 Richard H. Ullman, “Redifining Security”, International Security, 8(1), 1983, pp. 
129-153. 
24 Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau and Jacques Pelkmans (ed.), National Economic 
Security: Perceptions, Threats and Policies. Tilburg: John F. Kennedy Institute, 
1982. 
Comment: Two oil shocks and the price boom of raw materials in the world might 
not have made significant change, but the followed U. S. economic trauma, 
especially after 1973 Middle East oil embargo, forced security professionals to 
recognize economics as a key factor to national security. See Klaus Knorr and Frank 
N. Tragger, Schultze, 527-529, Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Collective Economic Security”. 
International Affairs, 50(4), 1974, Buzan and Hansen, 85&216. 
25 Even B. Buzan did not refer to the aforementioned authors either in 1982, or in 
1992 editions of his book. 
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Even though neither B. Buzan nor Ullman, nor Hager, nor F. A. M. 
Alting von Geusau and Jacques Pelkmans referred to each other’s 
writings, they had some ideas in common. They all raised the 
importance of securitizing agent in the “securitization” process for 
delineating the threats in economic security26. In unison scholars 
agreed that because of the different understanding and perception of 
the threats economic security cannot be conceptualised in a similar 
way as military security. Hager highlights the importance of 
consensus and collective opinion (awareness and ideas) in 
understanding the threats to economic security. As most of the 
scholars agree, this common “agreement” on what is perceived as a 
threat might be difficult to reach in economic terms. Hager sees also 
the importance of the past or history, which not necessarily is helpful 
in recognition of the threats: 
 
“Perceptions about economic security in times of calm 
thus tend to rest on shaky foundations: collective 
memories of the past linked to present by analogy, and 
guesses about the future which can only partially be 
submitted to interpersonal tests of plausibility“.27 
 
Hager adds that in the case of economic security, experts carry one of 
the most important roles. He sees experts as offering ”probabilities 
rather than certainties”28 and affirms: “plausibility of experts is 
enhanced the more they can rely on scientific evidence“29. On the 
other hand, at the same time he worries about the possibility of truly 
                                                          
26 Wolfgang Hager, “Perceptions of Economic Security” in: Frans A. M. Alting von 
Heusau and Jacques Pelkmans (ed.), National Economic Security: Perceptions, 
Threats and Policies. Tilburg: John F. Kennedy Institute, 1982, p. 19. 
27 W. Hager, p. 19. 
28 W. Hager, p. 19. 
29 W. Hager, p. 19. 
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significant scientific guidance. Buzan concludes that economic threats 
are “without doubt the trickiest and most difficult ones to handle”30. 
 
Threats’ problematique is not the only one in economic security field. 
The content of economic security is another defining feature of 
different understandings. The “old-fashioned” school sees a state as a 
main object of reference and proceeds with a top-down analysis. Top-
down analysis may include various social, political, energy or 
environmental issues of security, influencing the economic 
powerhouse of a state31.  
 
On the other side, the proponents of human security and Marxism 
align with individual economic security based on human insecurities. 
The research in this area include a bottom-up analysis of individuals’ 
socio-economic well-being and factors, influencing employment, 
labour market, income or skills32. As numerous human security 
studies indicate a state is a crucial factor for ensuring humans’ 
economic security, but in some cases in can work also as a threat. 
Buzan sees impossibility for a state to control the factors, directly 
affecting individual economic security, like protection against falling 
incomes or a right to a particular job33. Such protection for him 
corresponds to the Soviet Union model, where self-sustainability 
comes before the flexibility and market provided benefits. 
 
                                                          
30 B. Buzan, p. 123. 
31 Buzan, pp. 123-128, 241-2. 
32 See International Labour Organization, Economic Security for Better World 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 2004), or Jacob S. Hacker, Gregory A. Huber, 
Philipp Rehm, Mark Schlesingen, Rob Valleta, The Economic Security Index: A 
New Measure of the Economic Security of American Workers and Their Families 
(Rockefeller Foundation, 2010). 
33 Buzan, 237. 
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However, economic security cannot be associated only with an 
individual level, because as all scholars agree a state is a fundamental 
to security, including economic one. State’s domestic characteristics 
include (and project) international security problems, since economic 
security’s importance mostly comes from the international economic 
ties34. Klaus Knorr  seconds the idea by adding the significance of the 
flexibility35 in adapting to dynamic international market. According 
to him, such flexibility historically had an influence for economic 
security. Other scholars, like Giacomo Luciani in 1988, were among 
the first, talking about the importance of energy security, strategic 
commodities, economic growth and well-being or income 
distribution36 for ensuring economic security. On top of that, even 
Buzan agreed that international economic structure influences the 
economies as well as the relations between countries37, and nation's 
economic security significantly depends on political decisions. 
 
These state’s decisions are usually the main object of the analysis in 
economic security, since threats’ exploration is quite complicated and 
difficult to forecast. Earlier mentioned L. Burguglio et al.’s model 
provides a check-up of policy suitability (or even guidelines) for 
sustainable development for economic security. This model, as others 
beforehand, of course face the problem that knowledge field a priori is 
insular with previous experiences and prejudices. The coverage of 
the model or even suitability of the created guidelines, unfortunately, 
could be seen mainly retrospectively - after the shocks. After the 
                                                          
34 B. Buzan, p. 57. 
35 Klaus Knorr, “Economic Interdependence and National Security”, p. 4; in: K. 
Knorr and F. N. Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1977). 
36 Giacomo Luciani, “The Economic Content of Security”. Journal of Public Policy, 
8(2), 1988, p. 156. 
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crisis (in this case, economic) it is easier to measure the danger 
objectively, though, the time is lost. 
 
To conclude, neither B. Buzan, nor Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau 
and Jacques Pelkmans offered a strictly defined concept of economic 
security. The discussion about economic security is still 
heterogeneous and even the essence itself can be described using 
various words – from the economic content of security to national 
economic security. However, it is visible that the definition of 
economic security within security studies depends largely on the 
purpose: either to define threats, or to propose policy-making 
solutions in the case of possible crisis. 
 
 
2.2.1 Economic security and the size – Small states studies 
perspective 
 
In retrospect it seems surprising that in spite of the growing 
number of small states only a small number of sociological 
studies were devoted to this subject in the first two decades 
after World War II.38 
 
Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl present small states studies as 
‘undeservedly neglected topic’39, despite the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries – the time, when German-speaking scholars’ 
                                                                                                                                        
37 Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the 
Liberal Case”. International Organization, 38(4), 1984, pp. 597-624. 
38 Otmar Höll, “Introduction: Towards a Broadening of the Small States 
Perspective”, in: Otmar Höll (ed.) Small States in Europe and Dependence. Viena: 
Braumüller, p. 15. 
39 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 3. 
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works about small states are dated back40. At that time, the 
development of small states studies was mainly associated with 
political reality41 in the region and dwelt as a residual category, 
referring to “power”.42 So, “small powers”, at present alluding to 
“small states”, aforetime, in result of growing number of small states, 
were “<…> all those states that were not great powers, and that were 
not consistently insisting on being referred to as middle powers”43. 
Small states were mixed with weak states44 and lost its attractiveness 
for studies at the midpoint of the last century.  
 
After the First World War the changes in the international system 
and the newly emerged the League of Nations put forward new 
possibilities for small states45. However, after the Second World War, 
in general, “social sciences were preoccupied with emerging 
                                                          
40 I. B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 9. Authors reffer to Eduard Sieber work 
Die Idee des Kleinstaates bei den Denkern des 18. Jahrhunderts in Frankreich und 
Deutschland (Basel, 1920), Oscar Bernhard – Die Idee des Kleinstaats im 
Deutscland des 19. Jahrhunderts (Säckingen, 1923) and Eyvind Bratt - Småstaterna 
i idéhistorien. En studie i alder statsdoktriner (Uppsala, 1951). 
41 Because of extreme differences between studies in Europe and in the U. S., 
various scholars like R. Kirt, A. Waschkuhn and W. Christmas-Møller separate two 
schools on small states studies – an American (or Anglo-Saxon) and a European (or 
Scandinavian-German). This distinction is not further elaborated in this thesis, but 
could be found elsewhere, see more: Romain Kirt and Arno Waschkuhn, “Was ist 
und zu welchem Zweck betreibt man Kleinstaaten-Forschung? Ein Plädoyer für die 
wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit kleinen Nationen”, in: Romain Kirt and Arno 
Waschkun (eds.), Kleinstaaten-Kontinent Europa: Probleme und Perspektiven. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001, pp. 23-46 (25); and Wilhelm Christmas-Møller, “Some 
thoughts on the Scientific Applicability of the Small State Concept: A Research 
History and a Discussion”, in: Otmar Höll (ed.), Small States in Europe and 
Dependence. Vienna: Braumüller, pp. 35-53 (36). 
42 I. B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 4. 
43 I. B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 5. 
44 I. B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 7-8. 
45 William E. Rappard, “Small States in the League of Nations”. Political Science 
Quarterly, 49, 1934, pp. 544-575. 
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bipolarity and the Cold War”46 and only newly (re)born successive of 
the League of Nations – the United Nations prolonged the studies of 
small states’ position in the international organizations.47  
 
The peak time in the studies of small states was reached after the 
publication of Annete Baker Fox's book entitled The Power of Small 
States: Diplomacy in World War II48, “which marked the beginning of a 
genuine school of small states studies”49. The work, portraying the 
significance of small countries' neighbours, indicated the principal 
problem of that time – “survival of small states among bigger 
powers”50. Since, shifting consideration of small states, according to 
Otmar Höll, is seen as a result of the hasty transformations, inspiring 
political science in query, in the late 1960s and growing 
interdependence dredging up the puzzle of how countries with 
cramped capabilities combated with the expenses of subordination51.  
 
Subsequently, lots of studies focused on solutions (not only oriented 
towards foreign affairs, but also towards domestic policies), how to 
                                                          
46 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 9. 
47 Alan De Rusett, “Large and Small States in International Organization: Present 
Attitudes to the Problem of Weighted Voting”. International Affairs, 30 (4), 1954, 
pp. 463-474. (Cf. Thomas Fleiner, Die Kleinstaaten in den Staatenverbindungen des 
zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1966; and Joseph 
Markus, Grandes puissances, petites nations et le problème de l’organisation 
internationale. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1946.) 
48 Annete Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959. 
49 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 9. 
50 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 10. 
51 Otmar Höll, “Kritische Anmerkungen zur Kleinstaaten-Theorie”. Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 7(3), 1978, p. 260. pp. 259-273. 
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reduce the outcomes of structural constraints and what strategies 
could help halting or lessening the effects of smallness and scarcity.52  
 
“The structural “causal chain” maintains that scarcity due 
to physical smallness produces external economic 
dependence, which may lead to external sensitivity, which 
in turn results in the danger of foreign determination”53. 
 
In the 1970s as a result of persisting decolonization small states 
studies flourished in both economics and political science. Finally, 
first manifestations of the economic security importance emerged on 
the small states studies’ agenda coinciding with the security studies’ 
proponents talking about the effects of economic structure and 
international economy ties. 
 
The ideas of O. Höll, M. Handel54 and many economists are well 
summarised in Vogel’s words, which actually determine the main 
features of economic vulnerability widely accepted nowadays: 
 
“The size of a small nation determined its wealth due to 
its small domestic market, a low diversification of its 
economy, scarcity of natural resources, higher costs of 
production and lower economies of scale, a lack of 
competition, low research and development expenditure, 
etc. Small economies were assumed to be more dependent 
on external trade than bigger states, to tend to have trade 
deficits, to depend often on a single commodity of export, 
                                                          
52 This issue discussed Daniel Frei, Alois Riklin, Hans Vogel. Iver B. Neumann and 
Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 10. 
53 Originally Hans Vogel, 1983. Cited from Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, 
p. 11. 
54 Otmar Höll, 1978, pp. 265-270; Hans Vogel, 1979, pp. 32-35; Michael Handel, 
Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass, 1981, pp. 220-229. 
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and to export hardly any industrial goods requiring a 
high intensity of capital or research.55“ 
 
The same approach was embedded in political science because of the 
dominant neorealist view that physical characteristics (capacity of 
power) shape state’s actions in international politics. However, there 
was no agreement on concrete definition of a small state and the 
factors that should be taken into account: the size of population, 
state’s territory or gross domestic product.56 The definition problem, 
European contextualization, as Kramer affirms57, and “astonishing 
lack of accumulation”58, according to N. Amstrup, led to the 
stagnation of small states studies.  
 
In the 1980s academic interest in small states studies was upheld by 
economic factors. Colin Clark and Tony Payne59, as well as Anton J. 
Butter60 began to address economic development questions of small 
states. This branch soon was supported by P. Katzenstein’s61 work, 
analysing the continuance of small states in the global economy. 
Emerging neoliberal institutionalism, economic issues and relevance 
                                                          
55 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 11. 
56 Michal Handel, Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass, 
1981, pp. 9-65; and T. Crowards, “Defining the Category of ‘Small States’“. 
Journal of International Development, 14(2), 2002, pp. 143-179. 
57 Helmut Kramer, “Kleinstaaten-Theorie und Kleinstaaten-Aussenpolitik in 
Europa”, in: Arno Waschkuhn (ed.), 1993.  
58 Niels Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research 
Efforts”. Cooperation and Conflict, 11(3), 1976, pp. 163-182 (178). 
59 Colin Clark and Tony Payne, Politics, Security and Development in Small States. 
London: Allen/Unwin, 1987. 
60 Anton Butter, An Introduction to Mini-Economics. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 
Publishing, 1985. 
61 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.  
 
 31 
of international regimes and institutions increased academic interest 
in small states.  
 
On top of that, the mushrooming of new states across Central and 
Eastern Europe and Balkans, the EU enlargement and deeper 
integration in the EU62 has fixed permanent and stable attention to 
small states. For this reason, globalization and integration processes 
could be seen as positively influencing and promoting academic 
discussion on small states, despite the fact that in some weak states 
became even weaker than before. 
 
Notwithstanding, small states studies started including issues of 
Africa’s weak states, which were forgotten during the Cold War 
years’ focus on (military and political) security issues. The discussion 
about failing, failed and collapsed states in Africa was also supported 
by the United Nations and, actually, this organization pushed the 
evolution of studies promoting sustainable economic growth and 
development of such states. L. Briguglio et al.'s investigation about 
economic vulnerability is also part of UN programme, despite the 
fact that their indices cannot be applicable for the African states, since 
no reliable data of these countries used to be possible to be obtained. 
 
In the last decade of the 20th century, when social constructivism with 
its focus on ideas, identity and international norms entered into 
international relations theory, scholars as C. Ingebritsen63 and A. 
                                                          
62 For example, Baldur Thorhallsson, The Role of Small States in the European 
Union. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000; and “The Size of States in the European Union: 
Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives”, European Integration, 28(1), 2006, pp. 
7-31. 
63 Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World 
Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict, 37(1), 2002, pp. 11-23. 
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Björkdahl64 indicated new role for small states in global politics (crisis 
and conflict management, entrepreneurship of norms, etc.), opening 
a new window for smallness studies and shifting the attention from 
physical constraints like economy and military. The results of this 
research proved that physical capacity perception is not necessarily 
even across the countries and the common ideas and understanding 
of power plays an extremely important role in defining what is 
constraint or cramped capability.  
 
Consequently, small states research did not see much continuity in 
the centuries beforehand65. As O. F. Knudsen argues, small states 
literature could be divided into 3 categories-waves. While the first 
wave tried to solve self-determination problems, the second stream 
concentrated on foreign policy issues, such as neutrality or alliance, 
the last strand included policy formation, recession, national 
minorities and other questions.66 In Knudsen’s division economic 
questions did not attain special attention, but economic security 
issues were involved under security and/or policy formation topics. 
Finally, only in 1987 Håkan Wiberg combined all points of security 
into one corpus, indicating the modifications in both International 
Relations approaches – security and small states theories. His 
research, illustrating the changing reality and national security going 
“very far beyond military considerations”67 opened the field for L. 
Briguglio and others research on economic security. Wiberg, the 
same as other scholars, revealed the relationships between different 
                                                          
64 Annika Björkdahl, From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention. Lund: 
Lund University, 2002. 
65 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, p. 15. 
66 Olaf F. Knudsen, “Small States, Latent and Extent: Towards a General 




security sectors and claimed that despite the importance of military 
security, small states must care about other types of threats and be 
prepared to overcome them. 
 
 
2.3 Defining Economic Security Conceptual Framework  
 
We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute 
security. [D. D. Eisenhower] 
  
The previous sections revealed the long and ambigous road of 
economic security concept. As being one of the oldest and also 
controversial parts of national security, the term has been used in 
various contexts and for various definitions. Furthermore, many 
times the concept economic security was actually not used and instead 
was replaced by various other terms. For this reason, the author has 
seen an extreme importance to carve the conceptualisation of the 
term economic security as precisely as possible in order to have it of 
maximum utility in social sciences. In order to do that, the 
conceptualisation of economic security goes hand in hand with the 
check-list of a good concept, provided by John Gerring68. 
 
He argues that conceptual utility cannot be reduced to ‘clarity’, to 
empirical or theoretical relevance, to a set of rules, or to the 
metodhology particular to a given study. For him, conceptual 
adequacy has to respond to a standard set of criteria, which in the 
                                                                                                                                        
67 Håkan Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences”. 
Journal of Peace Research, 24(4), 1987, pp. 339-363. Excerption from p. 357. 
68 John Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for 
Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences”, Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3, 
1999, pp. 357-393. 
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social science concept formation is familiary, resonance, parsimony, 
coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility and field utility. 
 
To start from familiarity, the economic security is one of 69 among 
the oldest parts of national security. The academic audience 
sees the use of the concept already since 1980s, and there is a lot 
of scholarship beforehand addressing the concept as economic 
content of national security, or national economic security. The 
second criteria of resonance for sure qualifies for the term. 
Economic security has been used extensively since 1980s, but 
after the 2008 economic crisis the term turned into a 
“buzzword” in academia and outside.  
 
The third, parsimony criteria evaluates how short the term is 
and its list of defining attributes. Economic security is quite 
short term and its list of defining attributes is not long either. 
The main operating components are actually vulnerability and 
resilience, and threat is not included in definition, but works as 
a litmus paper. The coherence criteria asking about the level of 
logical relation between instances and attributes is satisfied by 
the concept too. Economic vulnerability and economic 
resilience are clearly related and consistent. 
 
The fifth criteria differentiation reveals some problematique of 
the concept. To begin with, there are various ways how to 
operationalize the concept. As it was shown in the literature 
review in the previous sections, few centuries ago the threats 
                                                          
69 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2 and 39. 
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were much simpler and clearly defined and it was easier to 
oversee the economy from being disrupted. Nowadays wars 
and piracy are no longer the only worries of governments to 
ensure economic security, which makes more factors to be 
included in the analysis of the economic security. Various 
indices’ review70 can show how non-exhaustive list it can be. 
There is also another layer of the problem. After the end of the 
Cold War and development of human security studies, 
economic security frequently refers to the individual security, 
as it was presented beforehand. Not to mention economic 
security can be operationalized in different ways with a unit 
reference a state, there is even more ambiguity, if the object of 
interest is individual. On top of that, the term is used 
interchangeably with economic content of national security of 
financial security. 
 
The depth of the concept is quite extensive and allows various in-
depth research to analyse the accompanying properties under 
definition. Penultimate criteria of theoretical utility is quite clear for 
the concept. Its usage within a wider field of inferences has been 
acknowledged and confirmed. However, the last criteria of field 
utility questions how useful is the concept within a field of related 
instances and attributes. It is important to note that economic security 
as a concept overlaps in various different fields of study – from 
security studies to political economy. Its attribution to security 
studies might be strong conceptually, but operationalization relies on 
completely different methods of inference and analysis. 
                                                          
70 Richard T. Griffiths, “Economic Security and Size” in Clive Archer, Alyson J. K. 
Bailes and Anders Wivel, eds, Small States and International Security, New York, 




To summarise, the concept has a potential, but it has not been still 
fully exercised. Following Gerring’s criteria, there is still a lot of room 
left for the proper conceptualisation of the concept, which is not 
intended to be done here, but concept’s popularity could be one of 
the stimulus for more extensive and advanced discussions on what 
actually the concept should mean. This chapter and section, author 
hopes, provide easier departure for more elaborative studies on 
economic security concept. 
 
Understood as a protection of economy of being disrupted and the 
sustainability of the acceptable welfare level71, economic security in 
this policy-oriented conceptualization is amplified as  
 
“the maintenance of [those] conditions necessary to 
encourage sustained long-term relative improvements in 
labour and capital productivity and thus a high and rising 
standard of living for a nation's citizens, including the 
maintenance of a fair, secure and dynamic business 
environment conducive to innovation, domestic and 
foreign investment and sustainable economic growth”72.  
 
Since economic security is not only about survival, a state cannot 
remain separated from the whole world, and as Paul Kennedy points 
out, even survival among other great powers is always about relative 
power and adaptation to changing environment73. In short, economic 
                                                          
71 Buzan and Hansen, 87. 
72 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Economic Security”. Backgrounder No. 
6, (February, 2004). 
73 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
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security’s conditions are like a system, where vulnerability, resilience 
and threats operate. 
 
Figure 1 Economic Security Model74 
 
As Figure 1 portrays, a threat is a catalyst, which identifies whether 
economic resilience meets the level of economic vulnerability, or in 
other words, whether government chosen policies match the inherent 
weakness and helps to overcome the effects of an external shock. In a 
perfect scenario of economic security (this is more applicable to bigger 
states, which have lower natural vulnerability75), via adequate policies 
a country obtains high level of adequate resilience which helps to 
overcome a threat. However, smaller states are usually highly 
vulnerable and their level of resilience is not appropriate. As a result, 
threat transformation into a crisis is a more typical problem for small 
states, which lack sufficient level of resilience. Furthermore, as Roubini 
                                                          
74 All figures and tables are created by author 
75 Ágúst Einarsson, “Introduction”, 2, in Griffiths and Magnússon. 
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and Mihm note76, in the face of crisis governments’ self-help packages 
(remedies in the Figure 1) not necessary result in higher resilience and 
real treatment of internal vulnerabilities,77 that is why there is no 
relationship between remedies and appropriate resilience in the future. 
Finally, economic security is a dynamic feature in general of a country 
depending on the obtained level of resilience, which could change over 
time.  
As the Figure 1 indicates, economic security can be seen as a system of 
vulnerabilities, resilience and threats. For this reason it is essential to 
clarify each component one by one.  
 
To start with, it is important to understand vulnerability. Disagreeing 
with Buzan, that it is difficult to distinguish threats from 
vulnerabilities78, I suggest seeing vulnerability as a permanent and 
inherent situation, referring to a state’s resources or natural smallness. 
Since a vulnerable state usually is weak in physical base and lacks 
area, population and resources79, the definition implies that 
vulnerability cannot change over time dramatically, unless additional 
physical characteristics are acquired. Furthermore, in the 21st century 
interdependence is inevitable and isolation cannot be seen as a 
possibility to eliminate vulnerability, since earlier defined essential 
conditions for development will not be possible obtained. Nowadays 
countries cannot be self-sustaining at the level important to maintain 
relative improvements and growing standards of living. Consequently, 
vulnerability stems from a state’s economic interconnectedness – 
international trade and finances, which results in structural 
                                                          
76 Roubini and Mihm, 133, ch. “Fault Lines” and “Conclussion”. 
77 Roubini and Mihm, 132-134. 
78 Buzan, 115. 
79 Buzan, 113. 
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constraints, especially for small states.80 Thus there is no country in the 
world, which could be called as invulnerable, as the question is to 
what extent a state is vulnerable and the answer varies in the spectrum 
of low vulnerability to high vulnerability81. 
 
Since economic threats are considered as “without doubt the trickiest 
and most difficult ones to handle”82, a threat here is understood and 
used as a synonym of external shock. The perception of a threat as 
any kind of exogenous factor or force which negatively affects 
government capabilities to maintain crucial conditions for rising 
welfare, efficient economy and development is also based on Hager’s 
study83, which indicated that the discussion about securitization and 
existential threats is not always plausible and does not bring 
scientific guidance, especially in terms of economic content of a 
state’s security. From this point of view, a threat does not influence 
economic vulnerability directly (see Figure 1), which is a static 
variable, but rather interacts with a state’s buffer – resilience. If 
countries did their “homework”, the shock is overcome, otherwise a 
threat transforms into a crisis, which usually brings recession and 
disease to other sectors. As Roubini and Mihm explain, the 2008 crisis 
affected the countries, which were not perfectly healthy economies84. 
It follows that an exogenous shock is not a cause of turmoil in a 
                                                          
80 Neumann and Gstöhl, 10; L. Briguglio, G. Cordina, S. Vella and C. Vigilance 
(eds), Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience, London and Malta: CS 
and ISSIUM, 2008, and L. Briguglio, G. Cordina, S. Vella and C. Vigilance, eds, 
Profiling Vulnerability and Resilience, London and Malta: CS and ISSIUM, 2010. 
81 Thorhalsson, 15. 
82 Buzan, 123. 
83 W. Hager, “Perceptions of Economic Security” in Alting von Geusau and 
Pelkmans, 19. 
84 Roubini and Mihm, 124-5, “Crisis rarely cripple perfectly healthy economies; 




country, but rather a catalyst, indicating the problem in a particular 
state's resilience85. 
 
The coping ability, which allows a country not to be adversely 
affected by external shock,86 is defined as resilience. Resilience 
represents how well governments' policies87 correspond to 
vulnerabilities or how well a state is prepared for lessening the effects 
of threats or the prevention of them88. The term “resilience” also 
synchronizes with what Buzan defines as ‘efficiency’89, which means 
efficient governance in order to ensure the conditions for sustainable 
development. In addition, smart governance helps to overcome 
inherent vulnerabilities, and, as Pace puts it, allows fulfilling the 
shortage in a physical base90. 
 
Resilience consists of two coping strategies. On the one hand, it is 
“shock-counteraction”, allowing rebound after affection of a threat. 
Such a flexibility to recover quickly most of the times is provided by a 
strong fiscal position. On the other hand, there is a “shock absorption” 
capacity, which means that the mechanisms, such as flexible labour 
force or ability to shift resources easily, are created to reduce or 
withstand the effects of shocks91.  
 
                                                          
85 The development of crisis and its effects are very well explained in Roubini and 
Mihm’s book's chapter “Global Pandemics”, 115-134. 
86 Briguglio et al., 232. 
87 As Briguglio noted, it is not only governments, but also other economic actors, 
who are building a state's resilience. However, here it is presumed that correct 
policies could influence and push economic actors for actions strengthening 
resilience. 
88 B. Sundelius, “Coping with Structural Security Threats”, 298, in: Otmar Höll (ed), 
Small States in Europe and Dependence (Vienna: Braumüller, 1983). 
89 Buzan, 236. 
90 Pace, 34. 
91 Briguglio et al. 233. 
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The spectrum of resilience is the same as of vulnerability from low to 
high. Low resilience also corresponds to wrong strategies and/or 
policy failures, which make a country more vulnerable and expose it 
more to threats. Despite the fact that usually bad governance is 
associated with contingent or self-inflicted vulnerability92 or even 
threats, domestic policies – as the subject to policy – remain under the 
analysis of resilience. 
 
 
2.4 Understanding Economic Vulnerability 
 
As was indicated beforehand, vulnerability is a feature of the state, 
indicating to what extent a state lacks physical base (natural, land, 
human or financial resources), which exposes a country to exogenous 
factors, not subject to its policy. Historically, this was associated with 
inherent weakness, smallness and dependency. The following 
paragraphs provide an overview of the causes of economic 
vulnerability nowadays. 
 
In the 21st century, when interdependence is inevitable and countries 
can no longer be self-reliant, every state has to open itself. The more 
an economy is open, the more it is exposed to external shocks93. No 
state is self-reliant and self-sufficient, thus each country has to open 
itself to the international market in order to obtain essential materials 
for its internal development. Small states have always been forced to 
participate in trade relations, allowing outsiders to play a significant 
role in a state's survival and, at the same time, making themselves 
vulnerable. Since small states are weaker and have smaller domestic 
                                                          
92 Pace, 34. 
93 See Buzan, Briguglio et al. (2009), Ingebritsen et al. 
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markets, they have no control over the bigger powers' behaviour and 
actions, but at the same time they cannot normally develop without 
being open. In brief, economic vulnerability arises from the level of 
economic openness. 
 
Another two factors, which also indicate inherent vulnerability (see 
Figure 2), are two types of dependency. Dependency can be seen as a 
two sided coin, where unnecessarily is a relationship between the 
sides. From one side, the vulnerability of a country, especially a small 
one, arises from a dependency on imports. If strategically important 
materials such as food, industrial supplies or energy94, playing a 
crucial role in a state's economic life, are not obtainable for a country 
by itself, a state's dependency on outsiders significantly influences its 
exposure in terms of goods' availability and price. On the other hand, 
a state could be dependent on exports. Such a dependency could be a 
result of high volumes of imports, but it could be also an effect of 
other structural economic factors forcing countries to set outward 
looking trade policies. In this case, small states have fewer 
capabilities to have diversified exports since they are constrained by 
their small economies on the one hand; and on the other hand, they 
tend to have less varied their exports' recipient countries. This feature 
is called “export concentration”95. In brief, these two dependencies 
                                                          
94 Dependence on strategic imports as a crucial factor of vulnerability was already 
indicated in J. Wells, “Composite Vulnerability Index: A Preliminary Report” 
(London: CS, 1996), L. Briguglio, “Alternative Economic Vulnerability Indices for 
Developing Countries” (Report prepared for the Expert Group on Vulnerability 
Index, 1997), T. Crowards, “An Economic Vulnerability Index for Developing 
Countries, with Special Reference to the Caribbean: Alternative Methodologies and 
Provisional Results” (Caribbean Development Bank, 1999) and L. Briguglio and W. 
Galea, “Updating and Augmenting the Economic Vulnerability Index”. OPISS, No. 
4 (Malta: ISSIUM, 2003). 
95 The importance of export concentration was already indicated in these works: 
Briguglio (1997); R. Chander, “Measurement of the Vulnerability of Small States” 
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 Constituents of Economic Vulnerability 
 
The framework of vulnerability represents the features of economic 
vulnerability found in the academic literature. Even L. Briguglio et al. 
in the latest edition of vulnerability index96 argue that only these 
three features, identified earlier, should be analysed in order to have 
a simple small number of variables'  framework, easily 
conprehensible and useful for comparison97. However, this model 
excludes various factors indicated in the past. The following passage 
presents very briefly which factors were not included and why; or 
simply put, why previous frameworks are not suitable for measuring 
economic vulnerability. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
(Washington: Report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996 April); J. 
Wells, “Composite Vulnerability Index: A Revised Report” (London: CS, 1997); J. 
Atkins, S. Mazzi and C. Easter, “A Study on the Vulnerability of Developing and 
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96 Briguglio et al. (2009). 
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Figure 2 The Constituents of Economic Vulnerability 
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Even though a significant number of authors from the 1990s 
suggested various operationalisations of the concept, two main 
problems could be identified. First, economic vulnerability is mixed 
up very frequently with a state's general vulnerability. For instance, 
the first investigation of exposure to foreign economic conditions98 
included population, land area or Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
which refer to a state's general smallness rather than particularly 
weak economic capabilities resulting in economic vulnerability. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether necessarily small population 
or GDP mean: first, an exposure to external factors and, second, are 
inherent and not subject to policy. The same logic could be applied to 
the inclusion of the risk of natural disasters99 into the framework. 
This factor is problematic too: neither it is possible to measure 
precisely, nor it is exactly covering the issue of an economic 
exposure. The second problem is that other previously included 
variables, such as the level of price volatility100, foreign sources of 
finance101, share of agriculture102, or dependence on tourism103 are 
again, from the theoretical point of view, not suitable for evaluation 
of inherent economic weakness. These factors could change very 
substantially over time because of certain implemented policies by 
governments. To conclude, the investigation of economic vulnerability 
                                                          
98 Lino Briguglio, “The Economic Vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing 
States” (The Study for Regional Technical Meeting for the Global Conference on 
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100 Cordina and Farrugia (2005). 
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covers the exposure to external factors, namely: economic openness, 
dependence on strategic imports and export concentration.  
 
2.5 Revising Economic Resilience 
 
Economic resilience indicating a country's coping ability with 
external shocks represents the efficiency of governance. Smart 
policies allow countries to overcome vulnerabilities and at the same 
time better handle with external threats. However, this part of 
economic security, in comparison with studies on vulnerability, has 
been quite a neglected research area and started to attract an 
attention just recently. Only a few studies dwelt particularly on 
economic resilience and the patterns of its evaluation. Furthermore, 
only the study of Briguglio et al. provided a systematic index for the 
measurement of resilience. Since there are several problems with 
their constructed framework already indicated in the introduction 
and elsewhere104, it is important to come up with a more adequate 
framework for better evaluation of economic resilience. 
 
Economic resilience, as indicated earlier, consists of two parts: so 
called “shock-counteraction” and “shock absorption”. Even though 
the terms were created by a Maltese group of scholars, the origins of 
such a division could be traced back to the dilemma indicated in 
Buzan's and other scholars’ works. Disagreeing with Briguglio et 
al.105, who argues that all four parts, namely: macroeconomic 
stability, microeconomic market efficiency, good governance and 
social development should be considered as equally important for 
                                                          
104 Monika Kokštaitė, “The Resilience Index Revisited: The Case of Small States” 
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measuring economic resilience106, the dilemma is always between 
either to have very tight fiscal policies, or to invest in social, 
economic or human development: or in other words, between 
obtaining stability or flexibility. Usually countries, especially small 
ones, have to choose between these two options, because they do not 
have sufficient resources and capabilities to have both requirements 
of economic resilience satisfied. 
 
 
Macroeconomic stability (see Figure 4), referring to shock-
counteraction, shows the healthiness of a state's economy. The 
stability materializes when there is an internal economic balance. 
Stability speaks of a balanced economy, where demand meets supply 
and vice versa, unemployment is near natural level, and ideally there 
is no price inflation. Furthermore, stability requires governments to 
                                                          
106 Such an argument also contradicts understanding that resilience consists of 2 
capacities – absorb and counteract shocks. In this case, despite the fact that only 
macroeconomic stability refers to shock-absorption capabilities, and other three 
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keep low fiscal deficit and external debt, which also indicate the level 
of macroeconomic stability inside a country. Policies ensure the 
conditions allowing a country to have a physical base from where to 
recover in case an external shock threatens a state's economy. In 
short, the components of macroeconomic stability are fiscal position 
(represented by the level of government spending and budget 
position), the rate of inflation, the level of unemployment and 
external financial account. 
 
The other part of resilience – flexibility – relates in general to other 
regulations (see Figure 5). Flexibility allows a country to absorb a 
shock by developing regulatory mechanisms when an external shock 
threatens. These include policies/institutions strengthening market 
efficiency, legal base, improving flexibility of the labour force, and 
other developments107, which together set a course for effective 
                                                          
107 Briguglio et al. (2009) provide the evidence for the importance of appropriate 













Figure 4 The Constituents of Macroeconomic Stability 
 
 48 




 5 The Composition of Flexibility 
 
Accordingly, in vindication of the analysis of the flexibility, hereby a 
very short overview of each group of factors, namely market 
efficiency, good governance, human (social) development108 and 
sustainability, is provided. The factor of market efficiency shows how 
well a country's market could adjust and how well it is balanced in 
terms of supply and demand. It also refers to the governments' 
regulatory policies of capital, labour and goods, which are essential 
                                                                                                                                        
could be found in the articles about “Europe 2020” strategy in section's “Forum” 
articles Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, 45:3 (2010), 136-
170.  
108 The terms are negotiable, but not to mix things very much I use for reference to 
governance and social efficiency Briguglio's et al. terms “good governance” and 
“social development” and they are used as synonyms. However, I have to mention 
that these terms refer more to the groups of mechanisms rather than the study by 














Figure 5 The Composition of Flexibility 
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for successful (or, in the case of bad policies, constrained) market 
operation, and identifies the level of government control and 
interference in markets. The assumption here is that a perfectly 
functioning market in the face of shock adjusts by itself in order to 
reach a new equilibrium by the reallocation of resources. 
 
The component of legal base or good governance (see Figure 5) 
indicates a general country's attractiveness to market entities and 
humans. This factor refers to a country's political, legal systems and 
the rule of law, concerning property rights. Despite the fact that these 
elements did not attract a lot of attention in the literature of economic 
security, they play a very important role in determining conditions 
important for foreign and domestic investors and a population as a 
whole. Lack of political stability or security of property rights is the 
main causes of contingent vulnerability or bad policies, strongly 
affecting markets and external players109. 
 
The third factor – human efficiency – reveals important information 
about the policies influencing labour force. The qualitative 
capabilities of labour allow the evaluation of capacity of a country's 
long-term economic resilience. Also, a significant amount of 
literature110, especially dwelling on the crises aftermath situations in 
the countries, indicates that social development and cohesion of a 
society in a state play an important role for a state’s ability to 
withstand crises and neutralize the effects of external shocks. 
 
                                                          
109 Liliana Curmi, “Governance and Small States”. OPISS, No. 4 (Malta: ISSIUM, 
2009). 
110 Kuokštis and Vilpišauskas; Dorothee Bohle, “Countries in Distress: 




The last element, sustainability, sheds light on the policies or 
institutions, influencing long term preparation to overcome possible 
future shocks. It includes regulation, which directly affects the 
conditions important for long-term development and financial 
stability111. A country, which sets a suitable course for investment, 
research and development, life-long learning or diversification, 
strengthens its flexibility, prepares itself for overcoming the effects of 
external shocks. 
 
To conclude, the economic resilience of a country combines the factors 
influencing macroeconomic stability, allowing a country to bounce 
back very quickly from a shock, and institutions, which affect a state's 
flexibility in order to neutralize or reduce the effects of external threats 





Numerous studies have been analyzing how countries with cramped 
capabilities combat the expenses of subordination, or inherent 
vulnerabilities. Recent scholarship has been examining the possible 
outwards and inwards solutions in reducing the outcomes of 
structural constraints. Structural constraints, as historical analysis 
presents, were always part of the survival problem and have been 
addressed by national security. Economic content of security is as old 
as military one, but conceptual discussions and empirical studies of 
solely economic content of security and/or economic security started 
mushrooming after Buzan’s influential work in 1990s. 
                                                          
111 Kuokštis and Vilpišauskas provides the empirical example from post-crisis 




The recent financial crisis, or in Nassim Taleb’s words “black swan”, 
quite well depicted by Roubini et all, revealed the importance of 
economic security again. The influential work and many others 
beforehand called into question the introduction of policies and 
creation of the institutions in the states, living in the ages of 
extremely high interdependence and prominent global imbalances. 
Of course, as Buzan and other scholars noted, there are still some 
countries, which are less connected to the worldwide economic 
system, but that could not be seen as an economic security per se. 
 
Economic security starts when existing state’s exposure to external 
shocks – vulnerability, arising from inherent features of the economy, 
is met by adequate coping ability – resilience. Resilience represents 
the created policies and institutions, enabling economy to withstand 
or bounce back from external shock. External threats are there as 
litmus papers, the catalyst, indicating whether and to what extent 
vulnerability is matched by resilience. 
 
As detailed reflection of the components of resilience showed 
beforehand, institutions and policies form the core of economic 
security. External shock and vulnerability are not subject to change, 
though, might have transformations, but economic resilience – the 
coping capacity are created and is the most important object of this 
analysis. There is a significant body of scholarship, especially from 
political economy and institutional analysis showing that institutions 
matter. From Douglas North and Ronald Coase to Daron Acemoglu 
and Alberto Alesina, scholars have been continuing to analyse the 
effects of institutions, and how they make a difference. As a result, 
the following chapter is going to dwell on the European experience in 
the past decades in obtaining economic security, and the results-
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Chapter 3  
 
European Quest for Economic 







Europe’s quest for economic security has been a long and 
complicated process. After World War Two the continent was 
severely wrecked, and the division between two different 
understandings of economic and political systems marked the 
development of the region. The confrontation between two 
superpowers on the European soil made survival – both economic 
and military security – a priority. 
 
Europe devastated in half of the century of two world wars and the 
Great Depression did not have much choice for choosing its recovery. 
Certainly, the recovery plan stressed avoidance of one of the main 
threats to economic security – war. The juxtaposition of two different 
perceptions of economic security, backed by emerging superpowers, 
eventually elaborated into the so-called Cold War. However, as it can 
be seen in the following analysis, the initial goal after the end of 
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Second World War was ensuring economic security, rather than 
avoiding military conflict. 
 
The appeared confrontation between two main superpowers and 
their ideologies generated the complicated environment112 for 
Europe's development since 1945. Divided into influence and 
occupation zones, split by iron curtain Europe remained for a long 
time on the margins of international politics. However, Europe's role 
on the global stage has been growing with the process of cooperation 
and integration, resulting in the creation of the European Union after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s. From world-history 
approach, the Cold War was a part of a long-term “Europeanization” 
of the world (or vice versa), “as period in which international rules 
and regulations were set up to preserve the global predominance of 
Europeans after they had taken control of the globe”113. 
 
As it was noted by Ludlow, the processes of economic and military 
security were quite interconnected, and affected one another’s 
development. It is important to note, that obviously, the question 
raised in this chapter addresses only one way of cause and effect 
relationship, leaving aside the importance of the environment and 
international politics as sources for a constructed European 
community. As it was mentioned beforehand, the Cold War 
definitely played a significant role in the re-creation of Europe, but 
the analysis how international politics have influenced the changes of 
institutions, norms and identities is not covered in this paper. Also, 
as Waltz would argue, the situations and interactions impact the 
                                                          
112 Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth 
Century”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History 
of the Cold War Volume 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3-
5. 
113 Westad, p. 7. 
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existence and continuity of the processes, but such a delineation of 
events is left for future research. 
 
This chapter dwells on the quest for economic security and how it 
developed in Europe. As connection between economy and politics 
(or military security) is rather strong, the following sections 
reconstruct the historical background and analyse the path 
development. It also covers the repercussions, which followed the 
institutional changes on European soil. 
 
In order to answer the question how did the change of institutions 
influence international politics on the European space after 1945, this 
chapter engages with the literature discussing the appearance of the 
institutional framework in Europe and how emerged cooperation via 
established institutions influenced the international relations on the 
European space after 1945.  
 
As a result, the chapter is structured as follows. First, the analysis 
introduces origins of the European institutionalisation. Second, it 
provides the process of the institutionalization of the European space 
after 1945 and how its changes affected the international politics in 
Europe. Fourth part presents how the ongoing institutionalisation 
was dividing Europe, challenging the US' presence in Europe and 
evoking the Soviets' response. Fifth section provides the overview 
how the same institutionalisation, which divided Europe after the 
end of the Second World War, brought together different parts of 
Europe for cooperation and mutual development. The final 
discussion and evaluation of Europe as a 'constructed community' 





3.2 The Origins of the Institutional Setup in Europe 
 
The end of the Second World War marked a new period of the 
European history. After two devastating wars there was a need for a 
“New Europe” and the last half of 20th century presented tremendous 
changes on the European space114. The development of new 
international relations in Europe reflected the awareness of the past, 
but at the same time were influenced by two competing superpowers 
in the global arena: the US and USSR. 
 
The war left whole continent quite devastated. France and the United 
Kingdom were severely deteriorated, Germany collapsed and 
Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union's influence. In such an 
aftermath of the Second World War, the first most dramatic and far-
reaching construction of Europe started with the United States 
proposed the European Recovery Plan (ERP), or in other words, 
proposed the Marshall Plan115. As Hitchcock points out, the language 
of the act that authorized the Marshall Plan became a part of the 
fabric of postwar international relations. “The act stated that the 
restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of 
individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests 
largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, stable 
international economic relationships, and the achievement by the 
                                                          
114 Westad, p. 9. 
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Twentieth Century”, p. 57, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The 




countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of 
extraordinary outside assistance”116. 
 
Although the plan was supposed to establish sound economic 
background for the revival of the countries devastated after the 
Second World War, the allocated approximately 2 percent of the US' 
gross national product were not enough to bring back the recipient 
countries' national income to the pre-war levels in Europe. By 1948 
Europe was still not recovered and following the European Recovery 
Program, authorised by the Economic Cooperation Act, which was 
implemented by the created the Economic Cooperation 
Administration117. According to Leffler, the Marshall Plan can be seen 
as the first mechanism, which strongly affected the creation of “New” 
Europe, influencing the European politics after the end of the Cold 
War and facilitated the “emergence of political and social conditions 
in which free institutions can exist”118. 
 
Numerous scholars' research supports Leffler's argument that the 
Marshall Plan was not necessary to restart the European economies – 
indeed, it was just a small fraction for the European states119, but it 
definitely gave the impetus for European governments to move 
Europe's economic life in a transformation, as a result, pushing the 
European integration. The European governments were free to 
choose how to deploy received aid according to their national politics 
and priorities. The Marshall Plan was much more important in the 
                                                          
116 William Hitchcock, “The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West”, p. 158, in 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War Volume 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
117 Hitchcock, p. 158. 
118 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-
1952”, p. 77, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War Volume 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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case that it helped to restore Europeans' political choices via 
economic recovery and growth120. 
 
Certainly, the Marshall Plan played a significant role in the 
promotion of European economic integration project, since from the 
initial stages it was clear that the plan was more than just a foreign 
aid program. At the first stages of the creation of the institution, it 
was obvious that, first, it will be constructing the “community of 
ideas, economic links, and security ties between Europe and the 
United States we know simply as “the West””121; and, second, from 
1947 surely Western European countries will be working together in 
order to reach the recovery of the continent. 
 
Nevertheless, without economic, political and cultural impact, the 
Marshall Plan contained very strong argument towards the role of 
Germany in the Europe's recovery. From the United States policy-
makers' point of view, European recovery was impossible without 
strong and vibrant German economy as an engine for European 
revival122. However, Germany was far away from the necessary 
engine. At that time Germany was a very crucial issue maintaining a 
possibility of crisis123. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
119 Hitchcock, p. 159-160. 
120 Hitchcock, p. 160. 
121 Hitchcock, p. 154. 
122 Hitchcock, p. 166. 
123 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944-1953”, p. 106, 
in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War Volume 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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The problems started with Germany's division, leading to the joint 
occupation's failure124. Since each of the four powers had to appoint a 
military governor for supervision of its own occupied zone, the 
Allied Control Council (ACC) was established in Berlin to coordinate 
Germany as a whole. It was supposed to be the institution allowing 
acting “jointly”, but because of very high governors' authorities and 
veto rights, the common decisions were inevitably postponed, 
leading to bureaucratic nightmare125.  
 
Also, the problem was in general disagreement between the great 
powers. The greatest impediment for the joint administration of 
Germany was the contradiction between Soviet demands for 
reparations and US and UK desires for a reasonable level of industry 
in their zones126. This resulted in the failures to reach an agreement 
on a peace treaty in Moscow and London in 1947. As a result, “the 
three western zones were merged into a viable economic and political 
entity”127. The appeared demarcation line between Soviet Germany 
and Western zones' entity symbolized divided Europe, and Berlin 
became a powder keg in the centre of the continent. Since Germany's 
economy was stagnated, it was clear that the occupied western zones 
of Germany have to be incorporated into the US' plans for the 
reconstruction128. 
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Reconstruction plans included France as well, but the country used 
economic support from the Marshall Plan for covering the dollar 
deficit, appearing from the implementation of the Monnet Plan. The 
Monnet Plan was strongly oriented in the recovery of the key sectors 
of the economy, such as steel and coal production, railway and 
transport, agriculture, etc. The proposed Marshall Plan allowed 
France to continue investing into obtaining raw materials for vital 
industrial production129 and proceed with further development. 
 
To conclude, in Michael Hogan's words, Marshall Plan was supposed 
to be “major reorganization of the European state system into a more 
viable framework for controlling the Germans, containing the Soviets 
and putting the continental countries on the road to economic 
recovery and multilateral trade”130, but as Hitchcok vividly described 
“the Marshall Plan's long-term ripple effects reached out beyond 
Germany and US alliance policies”131. The plan made a strong 
impetus for the development of international relations within 
countries - recipients and opened the windows for Americanization 
in Europe. Finally, the transferred economic model of production and 
consumption, and economic development processes shaped the 






                                                          
129 Hitchcock, p. 160. 
130 Michael J. Hogan, “European Integration and German Reintegration: Marshall 
Planners and the Search for Recovery and Security in Western Europe”, in Charles 
Maier and Günter Bischoff, eds, The Marshall Plan and Germany (New York: Berg, 
1991), p. 116. 
131 Hitchcock, p. 170. 
 
 61 
3.3 Institutionalising Europe 
 
As Ikenberry notes, in the Europe receiving Marshall Plan support, 
there was a need “of trans-governmental and international 
institutions that would bring government officials together on an 
ongoing basis to manage economic and political change”132, since 
economic revival was not as present as expected. After the end of the 
Second World War, Western Europe experienced a great amount of 
newly created institutions. 
 
To begin with, the European Payments Union (EPU) was established 
in order to help to reinstitute the relationships between countries and 
restore Europeans currency convertibility133. Simultaneously, the 
Recovery Program within Western Europe was organized through 
the new autonomous European Cooperation Agency (ECA) since fall 
1949, which called for an admittedly ill-defined “integration” among 
the West European recipients. The ECA had facilitated the emergence 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
then it transformed into the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order “to develop 
common Western criteria for measuring economic performance, 
including better national income statistics”134.  
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The dramatic initiative pushing for transformative thinking was 
replaced at the end of 1951 by Mutual Security Agency135 or Mutual 
Security Administration (MSA), which together with newly 
established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
supposed to help to strengthen the created community by the 
Marshall Plan, from of the fathers of NATO, according to Bevin's 
point of view136. As “Marshall Plan directly led to the creation of 
Western Germany and the division of Europe, thus, too it did spur 
new European security plans that would lead directly to the 
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”137. 
Britain, which was revived by the Marshall Aid programme138, 
played a major role in the creation of the NATO, binding together the 
United States and Western Europe. One of the main goals of NATO 
was not only to provide security, but also contain Communism 
behind the Iron Curtain139. 
 
As Milward claimed, “the true origins of the European Community 
are economic and social”140. The cornerstone of the new European 
Community became the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the successor of the Schuman plan141, since the Organisation 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) remained weak and 
without any possibility to impose common policies on national 
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governments142. The central concern of the ECSC Authorities were 
coal and steel industries, while the early EEC Commission was 
preoccupied with trade and tariffs, the establishment of a complex 
agricultural subsidy system and relations between EEC and its West 
European neighbours143.  
 
The Schuman Plan had not gained much support in the United 
Kingdom, although the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) was seen as an effective mechanism for preventing 
dangerous nuclear proliferation by the United States. Thus, Britain 
refused to join the community, fearing the Franco-German cartel in 
Europe, and the European Coal and France, Germany, three Benelux 
countries and Italy founded Steel Community (ECSC)144. 
 
The ongoing economic integration in Europe challenged American 
dominance in the region145, despite the fact that security cooperation 
within the Western European countries was not successful. The 
attempt for the political construction of the Europe, like the Pleven 
Plan, designed to create a European Defence Community, was not 
flourishing. EDC encountered several problems and never became a 
reality, since it was always problematic to arrange joint European 
approach towards security146. Since 1958 European integration was 
based on the European Economic Community. 
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Lastly, the 1957 Treaty of Rome finalized the emergence of “new” 
Europe and started the creation of genuine European integration 
institutions. Euratom, European Economic Community and 
European Coal and Steel Community were merged into one, which 
later on became the European Union with its independent 
institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
Council of European Union, the Court of Justine of the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Council. As a 
result, the consequences of the Europe's construction were actually 
much better than anybody could have imagined when George 
Marshall plan for Europe was announced. Europe became premised 
on democratic governance, based on economic liberalism and 
capitalism in a strong alliance with the United States147. 
 
 
3.4 From Economics to Politics: Europe Falling Apart, The 
Division and the Cold War 
 
The peculiarities of the ongoing integration processes within Western 
Europe to some extent facilitated the emergence of ideological 
bipolarity and serious confrontation and at the same time the 
beginning of the so called the Cold War. Since 1945 the competition 
between socialism and capitalism was “much about which system 
could deliver better health care as about principles of liberty or 
justice”148. As Ikenberry argues, “even if the Soviet Union had not 
slipped into history, some sort of new order would have been built 
across the Atlantic”149.  
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The main division appeared because of the issue of Germany. The 
establishment of West German state was perceived as a threat to the 
very existence of the Soviet state150. For Soviet Union, “the Western 
powers were [are] transforming Germany into their stronghold”151 
and the inclusion of Allies' Germany into the newly formed military-
political bloc, was perceived as directly in opposition to the Soviet 
Union and the new 'democracies' in Eastern Bloc. 
 
From Ikenberry's point of view, “the vision of a new order among the 
Western democracies predated the Cold War152”. As Ludlow 
identifies, at least three instances had an effect on the East-West 
conflict or the development of the Cold War. First, he says that 
successful EEC brought economic prosperity and political self-
confidence. Second, the created cooperation framework allowed 
Germany to regain independence in its policy-formation, especially, 
concerning foreign affairs. Third, the undeniable Western Europe's 
success had shaken the fixed stability of the Eastern Bloc. Western 
Europe manage to gain the image of the high quality of life, success, 
stability and prosperity brought by integration153, which pushed the 
Eastern European dissidents to start the chain of events, which ended 
in the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War. 
 
It is important to stress that the ongoing European 
institutionalisation divided Europe not only in a sense of East and 
West, but also within the European countries on the West side of the 
Iron curtain. In order to understand this division, first, it is necessary 
to understand that new integrating institutions were also dividing 
European countries, and, second, that as Pons indicated, “economic 
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initiatives in both sides of the Iron Curtain profoundly changed 
Europe's economic geography and its economic institutions”154. 
 
First, the appearing division between the European countries on the 
West side of the Iron Curtain is overviewed. After the end of the 
Second World War, the French were afraid of growing Germany and 
possible future rivalry. This pushed the process of European 
integration towards new methods of containment of Germany within 
Europe. For the United Kingdom the ongoing transformations in 
Europe's geography were also unacceptable and the UK's reaction 
towards institutional changes inside Europe was negative, resulting 
in the blocking of its own economy's integration into the European 
continent. 
 
The case of United Kingdom was even more problematic than it can 
seem from a first glance. In principal it decided to be separated from 
the institutionalisation process in Europe, whereas in the subsequent 
decades it was struggling to get admitted to the EEC. During the first 
years of the Cold War, the UK suspiciously observed ongoing 
supranational cooperation between Germany and France, but the 
policy-makers decided to stay aside155. The ongoing integration 
among Six changed international politics between the United States 
and Europe, as a result excluding Britain from international 
discussions' table. As Ludlow points out, the UK suddenly felt 
marginalised in European context, dominated by a more united 
Europe in its strategic partnership with the United States and totally 
powerless to affect ongoing processes in continental Europe.  
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At the same time, the United Kingdom was not ready to pursue 
economic and political policies that extended beyond an 
intergovernmental, Commonwealth-type approach. This drawback 
became apparent with the United States' role in Europe and Marshall 
Aid distribution. The United States initially had expectations that 
Britain would lead West European integration156. The UK had had 
other goals and expectations. Britain had not seen itself participating 
in the continental West European integration institutions, since they 
were perceived as nothing more than “'nested' institutions under the 
military security umbrella”157. Britain was concerned to see the US 
membership in NATO, what was supposed to be enough to keep 
favourable balance of power in the West European geography, and 
remain a global power with its “imperial responsibilities that 
extended well beyond the West European landmass”158. 
 
France was also complicating the ongoing processes within the area. 
French had nothing else just to accept the creation of the Federal 
Republic, however, their general disappointment with any 
institutional European development was always present. Charles de 
Gaulle's return to power marked hard times for both NATO and the 
EEC159. As Ludlow shows, Gaullist France needed to look for 
compromise for re-cooperation, since serious damages would have 
been fatal to the community system. Furthermore, initially the 
cooperation framework was created for the countries involved in the 
East-West conflict, and the states with neutral status, such as Austria, 
Sweden or Finland were kept out from the membership. 
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Consequently, multiple national interests were tied up in the 
integration process. It demonstrates how European integration 
affected the Cold War rather than vice versa160. 
 
Second, it is obvious that the impact of the development of Europe's 
institutionalisation affected the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. The 
ongoing European integration even more divided Europe. The 
created cooperation framework clearly indicated impossibility of any 
participation from the member of the Soviet bloc, although Marshall 
Plan aid was theoretically possible to be obtained by any democratic 
country.  As the example of the Czechoslovakia showed, being 
part of ERP was suicidal, since the country was punished and the 
Communists seized power in Prague in 1948161. Thus, Poland, 
Hungary or Czechoslovakia was excluded from being involved in the 
institutional development in Europe until regain of independence.  
 
To conclude, in Pechatnov's words, “the creation of NATO and a 
formal division of Germany solidified the split in Europe, leaving 
little room for further diplomatic bargaining”162. The division 
between Soviet Germany and created viable entity of Western zones 
in Germany remained complicating East-West diplomacy till the end 
of the Cold War and Germany's reunification in 1990163. The 
European Recovery Program (ERP) confirmed the division of 
Europe”164. The ongoing independent Western European integration 
made it to flourish even more, and following economic growth 
supported the final setting.  
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3.5 Creating New Europe: Bridging East and West 
 
Over time, however, the signs of Europe coming together were 
seeable. From the 1960s the UK was forced to come closer to the EEC 
in order to prevent the collapse of NATO after the French decision to 
leave the security 'umbrella' in case other countries would have 
followed the France's path. In 1961 London was already knocking on 
the EEC door asking for full Community membership165.  
 
Second, the ongoing transformation of European economic 
geography helped to restructure two major concerns: intensive pre-
war trade and investment exchanges between Germany and Russia, 
and the UK and the US. 
 
Third, the issue of German rearmament was solved and the most 
important security issues were left to the Atlantic-level institutions166. 
However, since the economic support from the United States was 
insufficient and the most important institutions were failing to bring 
expected advantages, in 1970s the EEC proceeded with further 
integration, including such issues as foreign-policy coordination and 
monetary cooperation under the established cooperation framework. 
 
Fourth, the European community enlargement facilitated the 
popularity of the liberal democracy and capitalism, which anchored 
countries on a voluntarily basis to move for liberal democracy and 
free enterprise establishment167. The possibility of being the part of 
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the developing European integration helped to stabilise new mid-
1970s' democracies emerged in Europe168.  
 
Fifth, the mid-1970s marked the time of appearing cohesion between 
divided East and West. 1975 marked the beginning of a new kind of 
East-West relationship in Europe169 and ended the Europe's post-war 
era with the conclusion of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)170. Also, the CSCE had a major long-
term significance by pointing the importance of human security as 
inevitable part of international relations171. The CSCE also provided 
the framework for economic discussions and cooperation between 
East and West in Europe and a vehicle to start talking about the 
necessity of rights of people. Properly CSCE appeared as an 
institution only with the creation of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and OSCE was one of the last ones 
developments in diminishing the division between East and West. 
 
Finally, the processes were followed by the revolutions in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, etc172, and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union173. Eastern Europeans countries had followed the 
same way of getting Community membership, when the Soviet 
Union fall down in 1989. Positive European integration results 
encouraged Central and Eastern European countries to proceed with 
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domestic reforms, which afterwards were awarded by new trade 
pacts and security partnerships174. As a result after 50 years of the 
Cold War, Germany was forced to be in a process of intensive 
communication and cooperation with its Western neighbours due to 
institutional links such as the ECSC or EEC175. European integration 
was seen as an essential element in order to reduce international 
alarm because of the reunification in 1990 and Germany continued to 
play an important role in expanding the constructed community 
borders including newly appeared post-communist Eastern 
European states. The processes commenced by European community 
construction started to merge the parts, which got so much divided 
by the beginning of European integration. 
 
 
3.6 The Revision: Historical Modus Operandi in Europe 
 
The whole construction of the European community was done and 
influenced by the overarching East West conflict. In Ludlow's words, 
“It was therefore inevitable that the Cold War had a substantial effect 
on the ways in which the countries of Western Europe co-operated 
with one another. There is also evidence suggesting that Western 
Europe's efforts to unite played a role in the evolution of the Cold 
War and especially in the way that the East-West struggle came to an 
end”176. 
 
Certainly after the end of the Second World War, European 
integration brought political and economic stability to Western 
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Europe177. “Indeed, it is no accident that the most ambitious era of 
international institution-building took place after 1945; these forms 
were bilateral, multilateral, regional, global, economic, political, and 
security-oriented. The democratic countries enmeshed themselves in 
dense institutional relationships”178. The new construction of 
integrated Europe in 1951 was done under the functional rather than 
federal principal basis179. Simultaneously, Europe's solution was 
challenging the existed bipolarity and ending with relaxation of East-
West tensions in Europe180.  
 
The integration in the EU, as historical overview showed, was also 
spurred by the interest of welfare and prosperity optimization. A 
possible recovery plan, including aid from the United States of 
America, demanded to cooperate for a shared action and a common 
voice. Welfare maximization was a common interest and most likely 
the main driving force of the economic integration and the creation of 
the collective economic security community. In addition to that, the 
strengthening of security through collective means was proving 
successful, since the member states were keen to proceed further than 
environment was forcing to. 
 
Both factors – war and economy played a significant role in the 
integration, regionalization and regionalism development within 
European states. Two different economic security systems were 
dividing the war-devastated region to make a choice, which way of 
ensuring economy protection and sustainability of the acceptable 
welfare level to opt for. As Buzan indicated in his ground-breaking 
study, there were two options – to close the borders and make 
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yourself self-sustainable, which in principle diminished the level of 
external threats, but reduced resilience and downgraded the 
conditions for development; or plug yourself in increasingly 
interconnected global net by increasing the level of vulnerability, but 
in response improving the resilience capacity by exploiting the 
common goods of the sharing market. 
 
There was certainly any immunity neither in European politics 
(including the Cold War period) nor in European integration from 
the interaction with each other. As Ludlow argues, although both the 
Cold War and European integration were autonomous processes, 
“their paths intersected at multiple points throughout the four 
decades of their simultaneous evolution”181. The US role in reviving 
Europe was certainly provoking the Soviet Union and leading to the 
complication of the two superpowers' relations. However, American 
provided assistance for economic recovery and security development 
facilitated the independent European institutionalisation in a long 
run, which later on helped to bridge two different sides of the Iron 
Curtain. As Ludlow described, the European integration processes 
brought the Cold War “to a peaceful end and has guided the 
destinies of both halves of the once divided continent in the years 
since 1989”182. 
 
To conclude, the analysis of the institutional change provides an 
important insight into the understanding of the integration 
development on the European space after 1945. For sure, institutional 
analysis reflects the best the dynamics of European community’s 
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construction. Their key role in community development partially 
explains the genesis of the European Union.  
 
However, the new European community was constructed not only 
through formal institutions. As various scholars argue, another two 
components are extremely important in order to understand the zest 
of international politics in Europe since the end of WWII. First 
Europe became a bastion for democracy, liberal values, human rights 
and environment protection. The Cold War period marked the 
emergence of particular norms and the community formation around 
democracy, human rights, equality, socio-economic development and 
others. Consequently, norms’ inclusion into analysis would provide a 
necessary insight, explaining how international politics have changed 
over time. 
 
Identity, the last component of the package, indeed, would have 
supplemented the institutional approach. The long-lasting 
discussions about European identity have been playing an extremely 
important role in European politics and for this reason would have 
shed a light on the understanding how Europe became a constructed 
community and what effect identity or identities had to European 
international relations from constructivists’ point of view. Having 
said that, identity studies forms a separate niche in European studies 
and numerous insights could be found elsewhere. 
 
Thus, the investigation of the impact of three components – 
institutions, norms and identities - allows tracing completely the 
changes in the European politics and portrays Europe’s path to a 
“constructed community”. However, due to the space constraints 




Chapter 4  
 
European Quest for Economic 







Since the end of the Second World War, there were many processes 
ongoing at the same time in Europe. As Mansfield and Solingen well 
noted183, regionalism was very much driven by the economic factors, 
generating a considerable amount of literature on the political 
economy of regionalism. This was also linked to the security analysis 
from a regional perspective184. Many economists were interested in 
the regionalism’s welfare effects and its repercussions to the stability 
of economic system(s) worldwide. As many scholars noted, 
integration itself is about welfare maximization for the integrating 
states, and the formation (including application) of (coordinated) 
common policies in order to fulfil economic and welfare objectives. 
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Indeed, as numerous integration theories point out, countries start 
cooperation because of positive ramifications, such as higher 
economic growth, intensified trade or lower barriers for exchange. 
Regionalism proponents see this as a result of the political process, 
marked by cooperation and policy coordination, institutionalized 
practices, reinforced by states. Regionalization advocators stress 
about bottom-up undirected processes of social and economic 
interaction driven by the private actors. Usually, regionalization is 
observed as rapidly growing measures of trade and investment 
within the region than with the rest of the world185. In brief, the 
majority of the research of regionalism has concentrated on its 
welfare implications. 
 
The exceptionality of the EU has been widely depicted in the 
academic scholarship. In fact, the distinction between the EU and the 
rest of the world is not without reason. In Telò's words, “the 
European continent still provides the most complex, rich and 
elaborated workshop of regional cooperation/integration in the 
world, namely of institutionalized integration”186, which continues to 
be the main the EU merit. As a result, this section dwells into the 
question what are those distinctive features of the EU making it more 
than just simple economic arrangement. This part also shows that the 
EU is more than an economic confederation or market organization, 
and the EU's distinction from the rest of the regional projects 
worldwide could be seen much before the community was perceived 
to become a totally integrated institutionalized organization. 
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In order to do that, I start from solving the conceptual problem of 
definitions, juxtaposing different conceptualisations and theories 
about integration and regionalism. I challenge classical 'Balassian' 
understanding of economic integration, by showing how different 
types and ways of integration overlap, especially in the stage of 
economic union. I question whether it is possible to have an 
economic integration without political integration, and where is 
demarcation line, when the regional organization would be seen as a 
political union. At the same time I argue that since Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1986, European Economic Community (EEC) has been 
functioning more than as an economic union and since then could be 
called as European Union (the term European Union is used 
interchangeably to EEC regardless of the time span). I claim that 1991 
Maastricht Treaty just continued the integration, which was started 
long years before signing the treaty. Ultimately, it is finished with 
representation of EU's exceptionality within regional arrangements 
and the analysis of different ways of overcoming negative effects of 
globalization and how this makes the EU as an economic security 
community. 
 
Thus, it is necessary to acknowledge the different patterns of the 
construction of European economic security community. The forces 
of integration, regionalism and regionalization, and different aspects 
of them are examined to understand the exceptionality of the 
European example. Furthermore, it is essential to understand the 
concept of collective security community and distinguish the exact 
elements of economic security in the development of the European 





In brief, this chapter is structured as follows. I start from the 
introduction of regionalism, regionalization and integration concepts 
and theories. This section covers various understandings of economic 
integration and different aspects of it. First sub-section provides the 
conceptual analysis of differences between economic arrangements 
and economic union, and questions, whether Balassian and other 
frameworks are still useful to analyse economic regional 
organizations. The second sub-section analyses the particularities of 
the creation of the economic union in Europe and how the process 
was done. In the third section I distinguish the EU’s differences from 
other economic arrangements mentioned beforehand and conclusion 
of previous subsections. Section four dwells on the theoretical 
background of collective security community, whereas in the 
following fifth section I argue why European Union should be seen 
as a(n) (collective) economic security community. The last part 
concludes the review of the Europe’s path to economic security. 
 
 
4.2 Regionalism, Regionalization and Integration 
 
Regionalism spread rapidly, fuelled by a “domino effect” 
driven by legitimacy and a quest for prestige. Countries joined 
regional projects as a way “to enhance [their] political or 
economic credibility” both within and outside of their 
geographical areas.187 
 
The end of the Second World War marked the new era of 
international relations studies. The increased patters of economic and 
political development across the world intensified globalisation and 
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the need to reduce barriers to trade. The mushrooming of regional 
and inter-regional formations worldwide took a pace unseen before, 
especially after 1980s fundamental changes in the world economy. As 
Gamble188 argues, the end of the Cold War and proceeding 
reunification of the world economy raised new issues, starting from 
borderless world, American empire and new medievalism with 
emerging clear regional blocs. The pace of globalization required 
collective action towards problem.  
 
Moreover, developments in Europe and successful negotiation and 
ratification of the North American agreements increased the salience 
of regionalism. Consequently, regionalism studies resurged in the 
world politics189. Numerous amount of studies have been pursued, 
various definitions and conceptualisations have been provided in 
order to explain arrangements' phenomenon itself and 
simultaneously different types, patterns and ways of integration 
appeared in the academic scholarship. 
 
However, suddenly became clear that arrangements between states 
cannot be so easily explained and defined. The discussions and 
disagreements in definitions what a region, integration and 
regionalism are; their types and categorizations still continue to be 
the epicentre of obstacles in analysing the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, as De Lombaerde et al190 pointed out, there is a little 
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agreement on what to study and how, usually resulting in the 
theories, which tend to focus on different or related aspects. Finally, 
there is a significant bias in favour of European integration, leading 
to the distinction between the European Union studies and the rest of 
the world regionalism. 
 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Considerations: Economic Union vs. Economic 
Arrangements 
 
The conceptualisation of the terms is one of the main problems in 
regionalism and integration studies. There is a wide range of 
definitions, starting from 'region', 'regional integration', 'regionalism' 
and others. Also, each of the concepts has different typologies and 
categorizations, frequently overlapping between each other. To make 
things worse, usually the same process is described by different 
concepts, leaving the room for ambiguity. Consequently, in this 
chapter I question how to understand economic union, what the 
features of the economic union are and what are the main differences 
between economic union and economic arrangements, and whether 
there is any agreement in academia regarding these issues. 
 
In order to understand what an economic union is, I start from 
analysing the distinction between political and economic integration. 
As Jacob and Teune191 emphasize, political integration starts when 
there is a relationship of community, which is seen through a 
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collective action to promote mutual interests. According to Nye192, 
the economic integration leads to the formation of transnational 
economy, whereas political – to the formation of transnational 
political interdependence. Political integration consists of 
institutional, policy, attitudinal and security community 
combinations, sometimes including jurisdictional and bureaucratic, 
which means that at the same time it affects other types of regional 
integration as well. As a result, someone would ask, whether it is 
possible to have transnational economy without the political 
convergence at the same time, and vice versa.  
 
From Balassa's193 point of view, economic integration consists of 5 
stages: free trade area, customs union, common market, economic 
union and total economic integration, which is perceived as the 
unification of policies and institutions. Free trade area is the basic 
stage of removing tariffs and quotas for trade. Customs union is in a 
way an upgraded version of free trade by introduced common 
external tariff. The upper stage – common market implies the 
facilitation of free flow of factors, and harmonisation of economic 
policies is supplementing the creation of economic union on top of 
the common market. Above all is only total economic integration, 
demanding the unification of policies and institutions. 
 
It is questionable, whether the last stage can still be seen as only 
economic integration, since it requires to unify policies and 
institutions, which needs not only economic cohesiveness via trade 
patterns and economic complementarity, but also common social and 
political background, at least in culture and ideology. From Higgott's 
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perspective, this matters a lot in the places worldwide, where market 
economy and liberalism are less firmly fixed, since such issues can 
continue to sustain massive policy shadows194. However, the other 
understandings of economic union and other stages are not less 
problematic and should be analysed more in depth here.  
 
Economic union, as defined by Balassa, is the harmonisation of 
economic policies. On the regional level it seems that it requires the 
process of both regionalism and regionalization at the same time. 
According to the Balassian definition, then there should be conscious 
policy of states to coordinate activities and arrangements designed to 
boost interstate collaboration and interdependence, simultaneously 
supported by market dynamics through natural economic forces 
and/or private sector actions195. Economic union demands both top-
down and bottom-up processes to be functioning simultaneously. 
 
Fabbrini196 provides a framework, where the differences between 
economic and political integration are more evident. According to 
him, the difference between political and economic regionalism is in 
supranational public authority, which plays the main role in building 
a polity and integration itself leads to polity. In contrast to Fabbrini's 
conceptualisation, economic regionalism is usually distinguished 
from political one by inter-governmental or trans-governmental 
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governance for building a common market or a custom union. This 
division might seem helpful to understand, when a project is only 
economic, and when it becomes already a political one. However, one 
might argue that there are several issues even with this framework. 
 
Obviously, the first steps of economic integration like free trade area 
or customs union could be achieved by following negative 
integration patters. Removal of tariffs or quotas, or in other words, 
national restrictions, is supposed to increase the free movement of 
the factors and at the end to create a common market. As Balassian 
definition of economic union shows, the process towards the 
harmonisation of economic policies requires removing the obstacles 
for open market circulation; here the introduction of the common 
rules in order to diminish regional and other inequalities by higher 
authority (representing a positive integration) is not necessarily 
included under the creation of higher authority. From Tinbergen's 
point of view197, even a transfer of some powers or joint exercise is 
already a positive integration, nevertheless, he agrees that in reality 
positive integration remains extremely formless in economic union, 
which, as a result, means that economic union could be perceived 
still as a part of economic integration and economic regionalism can 
be achieved with negative integration. 
 
Nevertheless, Balassian definition of economic union was never 
accepted without criticism. From Pinder's point of view198, economic 
integration was usually associated with European Economic 
Community, and the term 'economic union' was used to define the 
economic destination of the EEC. One of the most influential 
                                                          




arguments is again repeated here. Integration itself is about welfare 
maximisation for the integrating states, and the formation (including 
application) of (coordinated) common policies in order to fulfil economic and 
welfare objectives.  
 
According to Pinder, economic integration consists of both negative 
and positive integration, “whose end is economic union”199, although 
in theory it is about removing discrimination within the common 
market. The exception where negative integration is not necessarily 
supported with positive integration could be made only for a 
common market stage. Although, as the scholar points out, the 
example of the EEC after the Rome treaty just shows that the marks 
of positive integration are inevitable even at the earliest economic 
integration stages. 
 
The ambiguity of the term raises another conceptual problem. If 
economic union could appear without any positive integration in 
theory, then, how it could be possible to distinguish it from common 
market stage? And vice versa, even if there is positive integration, for 
some European integration analysts, only from Maastricht Treaty the 
EU really experienced a pure common market, since the required 
characteristics were not working without making the project a polity. 
Thus, it could be argued from the EU's case and theoretical 
considerations, that starting from custom unions the arrangements 
require some positive integration measures, which leads to the polity 
creation.  
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Finally, is it possible to reveal differences between economic union 
and other economic arrangements, if the term is so ambiguous? The 
academic scholarship does not provide necessary background for 
agreement on conceptualisation. On the one hand, either economic 
union is perceived as a rudimentary stage of political union, 
deviating from other economic arrangements with polity 
construction; or, on the other hand, economic union can be 
understood similar to other economic integration forms with 
difficulties in distinguishing, when is already an economic union, 
when it is only a common market. In order to see how exactly 
functions economic integration and how economic unions work in 
reality, the example of the EU is explored in the next sub-section.  
 
 
4.2.2 The EEC/EU as an Economic Union 
 
The economic integration in Europe exceptionally started from the 
customs union in 1957, with an agreement on European Economic 
Community. From some scholars' perspective, since the beginning it 
was more than announced in a customs union. It was already an 
organization, representing economic union even before signing 
Single European Act or Treaty of European Union (TEU) was signed 
in 1986 or 1992 respectively. One of the pioneers of this argument 
Pinder argues, that since the Treaty of Rome the EEC included some 
“'of the fruits' of positive integration”200, which means that EEC can 
be seen as an economic union from the beginning of its creation. 
 
Since its creation, the European Union was distinguished from other 
organizations with a high level of institutionalisation. The EEC was 
highly institutionalized via intergovernmental and supranational 
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governance, which continued to be supported over time through 
inclusion of more cooperation fields, as, for example, in 1986 signed 
SEA, was supposed to unify the markets for goods, services, capital 
and persons. However, as most scholars argue the full impact of the 
SEA was impossible to achieve with only introducing the common 
market strategy, and the full impact of the SEA was felt only after 
signing the TEU in Maastricht in 1992201. In a nutshell, from the start 
the EU had a quite integrated governance system, which became over 
time even more linking institutional structures, policies, etc, bringing 
together national and supranational levels of decision making. As the 
analysis of the EEC shows the most important difference is a high 
institutionalisation level. 
 
Among other French inspired EU integration model's peculiarities in 
achieving economic union, the EU governance was always based on 
the rule of law. For instance, the rule of law appeared in the 
community even before launching the European Customs Union. The 
European Court of Justice, open to anybody from the Union member 
states, was established in 1952, while the Treaty of Rome was signed 
just few years after. Since then, the Court has been playing a 
significant role in managing the Union's life and is one of the most 
important institutions in explaining and interpreting the EU law. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind, that The European 
Economic Community has had a long-lasting history of cooperation 
within the region, which according to Gaddis202 was strongly 
supported by circumstances after the Second World War. In the 
reconstruction and building of the EU, the role of the USA was 
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eminent. The USA was fostering closer cooperation and 
institutionalisation within the region. Also, the European Union 
formation was driven by inside factors, such as public-sector 
demand, which allowed creating a supranational structure, based on 
democratic legitimacy. Since its birth, the EU governance structure 
has been unique by trying to maintain the balance between national 
governments and supranational institutions, based on the prototype 
of a democratic country. 
 
On top of that, the European Union has never been functioning only 
as an economic welfare facilitator to its member states. Initially it was 
created for the preservation of a welfare state. Most of the countries 
already shared common social models and socio-economic 
convergence was forecasted to bring benefits for all member states, 
but, since the end of Second World War, re-emerging Europa was 
looking for its role in the world politics.  
 
Consequently, the EU has been creating, using and redeveloping a 
dense web of cooperative relations with a high diversity of various 
units including other regional arrangements and international 
organizations from other parts of the world. Of course, some of the 
cooperation patters have been due to former Europe's role around the 
globe. As a result, the observation of such a variety of institutions 
and mechanisms within European Union should not be surprising – 
the European Union was supposed to become one polity with 
regional political identity sooner or later. 
 
Besides, someone may argue that only the TEU added a very 
important aspect to the European economic integration, finalizing it 
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as a proper economic union203. However, as it was presented 
beforehand for the fulfilment of the requirements for being 
recognised as an economic union was not necessary to move towards 
monetary union, etc. It could be argued that European integration 
was never purely economic, since the start of the harmonisation of 
the policies, which by definition are one of the most important factors 
for the identification of an economic union, included not only 
economic means. 
 
The particularities of the EU actually show that it is not possible to 
explain effective economic integration with presented perspectives 
on economic union beforehand. Since its commencement, the EEC 
was more than it was supposed to be, and its exceptionality is not in 
a very successful economic integration, but at that time 
unexpected/unusual intensive political cooperation from the scratch 
leading to the political union and polity formation204.  
 
 
4.3 Review: Regionalisation and/or Integration? 
 
This section presented the conceptual discussion about the definition 
of an economic union. Different approaches are used to look for the 
answer, what are exactly the qualities of this economic integration 
stage and whether it is purely just economic integration, which 
makes economic arrangement to be called economic union. It is also 
shown that Fabbrini's framework for approaching regional projects is 
more useful and helpful to distinguish political integration projects 
from economic ones, but it is unclear where economic unions would 
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be positioned in presented conceptualisation; probably, in between of 
both regionalism ways.  
 
However, from different points of view, it is difficult to understand 
what arrangement should be called economic union and what 
characteristics should be ascribed to it conceptually and from 
empirical analysis. In brief, in these sections it was shown that 
economic union is neither purely a political nor only economic 
organization. 
 
The analysis of the EU revealed that the integration processes in 
Europe after the end of the Second World War have been pretty 
exceptional and much different from the ones in the rest of the world. 
Or it would be better to say, that there were nothing similar in 
cooperation patterns worldwide as it was in Europe. Economic union 
as such, and the EU example shows that integration has to be in both 
directions, combining economic and political regionalism. 
 
Finally, future studies should draw a clear distinction between 
different stages or types of integration in order to make it more 
applicable for analysis. Also, as Padoan205 suggests, maybe it would 
be much better to talk about economic aspects of regional 
agreements, in order to overcome the problematic conceptual 
division between economic and political integration, rather than 




                                                          
205 Pier Carlo Padoan, “The Political Economy of New Regionalism and World 
Governance”, p. 37, in Mario Telò, ed, European Union and New Regionalism, 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2007. 
 
 90 
4.4 Security Communities: the Concept and the Context 
 
In the post-Second World War era the relationships between 
countries had faced various challenges and changes. The assurance of 
state’s survival advanced in numerous directions. As threats’ 
perception since the end of WWII was incessant, a scarce commodity 
of security has been looked after in diverse ways. Acting together 
was the only way devastated European countries could strengthen 
their own security. In this timeframe the concepts of collective 
security and security communities evolved. As both concepts 
received extensive attention in the literature of international 
relations, this section only briefly presents the understanding of a 
security community as providing collective security for the states 
collaborating together, as it is needed for showing how the EU 
became economic security community in the following section. 
 
Security community by some authors is seen as a remedy for the 
insecurity of states in international arena. It is there to ensure the 
survival and provide support in the case of threat for its members in 
need. First used by Richard Van Wagenen at the beginning of 1950s, 
the concept is usually associated with Karl Deutsch and others 
groundbreaking study on communities. According to Deutsch206, the 
defining feature of a security community should be integration, 
which reaches the extent that any disputes are solved without 
physical fights. He also argued that these communities are 
recognised by stable peace, not just simple and stable order. 
 
                                                          
206 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burnett, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Less Jr., Martin 
Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van 
Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957). 
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Deutsch characterised two main types of security communities – 
amalgamated and pluralistic, which were differentiated on the form 
the states were expecting to achieve a peaceful change by formal 
unification or keeping their sovereignty. As the Cold War unfolded, 
the concept regardless its theoretical potential and practical 
importance remained on the margins of international relations 
literature. As some scholars argue, historical context in Europe was 
pretty problematic for any formal security community creation as at 
that moment security as such was mainly related to military matters. 
Also, the shortfall of the United Nations to act as a pluralistic security 
community affected the attention devoted to the area. In addition to 
this, the integrationist approaches and European integration 
overshadowed the idea of amalgamated security community. 
 
Scarce efforts to research security communities for Emanuel Adler 
seemed the result of the conceptualisation provided by Deutsch207. 
He insists that the old-fashioned concept comprised too many 
theoretical, conceptual and methodological problems, which resulted 
in the limited application of the concept in the academia. However, 
despite its rare and limited research agenda, the concept of security 
community made impetus for other future scholars. The revision of 
the concept, changing environment after the end of the Cold War and 
new developments in the international relations eventually brought 
back the concept of security community to the light again. Initially 
referring to the war-less region, it was further expanded by 
constructivists at the end of the century.  
 
                                                          
207 Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in 




“Security Communities” by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 
paved the way for the broader understanding what is security 
community208. The work examined various historical and regional 
contexts, where the conjunction of transnational forces, state power 
and international organisations facilitated the creation of security 
communities. By analysing these contexts – the relationships between 
international community and peaceful change - the authors unveiled 
numerous security communities, - their timing, existence and 
location.  
 
Adler and Barnett also redefined the concept. The upgraded version 
of security community included shared values, identities and 
meanings, multifaceted open interactions and joint long-term 
interest. As Adler put it, security community is “a community of 
sovereign states agreeing on the unbearable destructiveness of 
modern war and on political, economic, social and moral values 
consistent with democracy, the rule of law and economic reform, to 
provide their collective security through a process in which member 
states come together on the basis of shared values and identities”209. 
 
Identity and social learning supplements the importance of material 
environments in the new definition. Their importance brings back to 
the essence of economic security, which core issue is the perception 
of threat. As Adler argues, a common understanding of the threat is 
of crucial significance for the formation of a security community. 
Hasan Ulusoy210 corresponds to this by stating that shared identities 
                                                          
208 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
209 Adler, 1997, p. 258. Cited from Ulosoy, p. 4-5. 
210 Hasan Ulosoy, “Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War: the 
Constructivist Perspective”, Perceptions, Vol. 8, 2003, pp. 161-196. 
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and values are as important as shared understandings of threat 
perceptions for the creation of security community211. 
 
The concept of security community came back to fashion in the post-
Cold War era, when it seemed relevant to generate ‘blueprints for 
engineering a more peaceful and stable international order’. The 
constructivist approach took the lead in reviving the concept and 
expanding its endeavours from mainstream to the mode of 
constructivists’ “understanding”.  
 
In the highlight of the revival of security community, the concept of 
threat received a substantial amount of attention as well. Being the 
core of security community, threats to security are no longer taken 
for granted and arising naturally just from material capabilities of 
possible opponents. Constructivists claim that threats are created in 
the light of many factors, including history, ideology, culture or 
communication212. 
 
To conclude, the mainstream definition of security community was 
substantially revised by the constructivists approach. Both 
scholarships agreed on the importance of threat perception, power 
and national interest for states’ security. Mainstream “explanation”, 
relating to the question “how”, provides answers only about the 
origins of threat, the possible solutions ensuring security and the 
object of security. Constructivists’ “why” provides the 
“understanding” - “why” certain security communities appear or 
threats are being constructed. As Krause213 argues, both “how” and 
                                                          
211 Ulosoy, p. 5 
212 Ulosoy, p. 11. 
213 K. Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, Cooperation and Conflict, 
1998, Vol. 33(3), pp. 298-333, particularly, p. 318. 
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“why” are important and related: if constructivism envelops 
explanation, mainstream contributes with analytical understanding. 
 
Thus, the next section briefly explores the detailed elements of the 
creation of European economic security community, pointing to the 
elements of historical and integration developments in the region, 
and prepares the background for exhaustive analysis of economic 
security mechanisms at work in the up-to-date European Union. Not 
surprisingly, the main object of this thesis – European Union 
(European economic/regional cooperation) is perceived as one of the 
best examples of comprehensive security communities since its 
origins in the middle of the 20th century in the literature. 
Consequently, next section will briefly research the path of the EU to 
economic security community. 
 
 
4.5 The Construction of the European Economic Community 
 
As there are always two main questions ‘how’ and ‘why’, this section 
builds on the understandings of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ provided in the 
previous chapters and sections. Historical analysis and integrationist 
perspective placed an essential background for the in-depth 
exploration of the economic security institutionalisation and 
development in the European Union. Thus, this section uncovers the 
comprehensive institutions, enacted for the development of the 
community. More detailed economic security institutions are 
explored in the subsequent chapter, where they are examined in 
more detail and in the face of imminent threat – economic crisis. 
 
The upgraded version of security community includes shared values, 
identities and meanings, multifaceted open interactions and joint 
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long-term interest in addition to mainstream’s integrationalist and 
institutionalist approach. European Union is notably the best 
example of comprehensive security community and one of the main 
security community frameworks analysed worldwide. In the evening 
of the discussions of the EU as a banking union and more calls for 
independence, like in the case of Scotland and United Kingdom214, 
the question of the added value of economic community is extremely 
important.  
 
As Ulusoy215 argues, shared identities and values are as important as 
shared understandings of threat perceptions for the creation of 
security community216 as presented in the previous section. 
Constructivist take on security communities for sure is essential, and 
there are numerous studies, discussing European values and identity, 
for which reason, so perceived “why” mode of security community 
seems almost like common sense when talking about European 
Union nowadays. It also seems that “understanding” about the EU as 
a security community prevails rather than “explanation”, revealing 
how the EU became one. 
 
Indeed, security community creation around the threat has been also 
a relevant factor in the regional development in Europe. As previous 
chapters showed, the possibility of war was relevant during whole 
Cold War period. Nevertheless, as chapter 3 shows, European 
cooperation from the beginning was more about economy rather than 
politics, thus economic threats are the ones to be looked for to explain 
                                                          
214 At the time of writing, just a bit more than half of the United Kingdom citizens 
voted in the national referendum for option ‘leave’ rather than ‘stay’ in European 
Union, which raised even more attention on the added value and necessity of the 
European Union. 
215 Ulosoy, p.165. 
216 Ulosoy, p. 166. 
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the economic integration of Europe rather than military ones217. 
Institutions and their creation is the main object of this section for 
explaining the evolution of the EU as an economic security 
community. The analysis of institutions also corresponds to other 
existing paradigms’ interpretation, namely, structure, trans-national 
or supranational bodies’ erection218.  
 
The first major step in the creation of the European economic security 
community was the Treaty of Rome in 1957, launching the European 
customs union. According to Balassa’s framework, this is already the 
second stage of regional integration, introducing the common 
external tariff on top of existing free trade area. Though, this stage is 
perceived only as economic integration, however, here starts creation 
of the common institutions and policies. From Deutsch’s perspective, 
this union would be perceived of low intensity and little impact. 
 
Since the creation of customs union, it took almost 30 years for the 
member states to proceed with the upgrade to the higher level of 
integration and shared institutions and policies. The Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1986 established a single market and embraced the first 
– the most important features of positive integration. The free flow of 
factors meant a strong political cooperation, unifying institutions and 
policies for the collective good. This could be seen as a major step 
towards promotion of mutual interests and constructing the essence 
                                                          
217 This argument is also strongly supported by various scholars. For instance, 
Gaddis (1982), who argued that European integration was about economic 
reconstruction, and Nathaniel Copsey (2015), was advocating that integration was 
targeting prosperity promotion in addition to peace. 
218 Comment: indeed, constructivist approach would be also a very interesting take 
on the subject, since scholarship did not distinguish the different types of security 
communities even back in 1990s, for this reason the analysis of collective identity 
and values from economic perspective would be a substantial contribution to the 
understanding of the EU as an economic security community. 
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of economic security community. This step is one of the most 
important in ensuring market flexibility in the response of the crisis, 
where the different factors can freely move following demand and 
supply equilibrium. 
 
However, the major change and upgrade could be seen from 1991, 
when Maastricht Treaty paved the way for economic and monetary 
union, by introducing the single currency – Euro in 2002. The treaty 
targeted harmonisation of economic and monetary policies and 
institutions, ensuring coordinated action in macroeconomics. 
Macroeconomic stability, as presented in the chapter, is the main 
shock-counteraction capacity. Being as important as flexibility to 
withstand the external threat, obtained macroeconomic stability 
allows a member state and collective security community to bounce 
back quickly after the shock. 
 
Already then in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty represented 
acknowledgement of the total economic integration. As the following 
chapter is going to dwell deeper on the subject, it is important to 
mention that the treaty addressed partial unification of economic 
policies and institutions and highest possible to achieve integration 
level by Balassa was obtained already back in 1992. Pooled 
sovereignty and unification/increased harmonisation of the policies 
and institutions settled the core of the European economic security 
community, and the extensive unification and harmonisation 
afterwards are subject to detailed analysis for the impact assessment 
in the following chapters. 
 
To conclude, the institutionalisation of the European Union can be 
seen as the finalisation of the other layers, indicated by Deutsch for 
the formation of a collective security community. Already shared 
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economic history, the common perception of threat, similar values, 
though one might argue that the differences between EU member 
states still prevails on these matters, and day-to-day interactions 
facilitated smoother transition from customs union to the full 
economic security community with created full-coverage institutions 
and unified policies. 
 
 
4.6 Concluding discussion 
 
The world still awaits article X to bring out one unique theory 
to fully cover the post-Cold War theoretical debates.219 
 
There is no single theory, which could capture and explain the world 
after the end of Cold War. Gamble’s indicated collective action 
towards the problems of various processes worldwide after the 
Second World War resulted in the regional blocs. Karl Deutsch 
advocated that these blocs are security communities, where member 
states would strengthen their own security through collective 
security. These blocs or communities were a collective action towards 
the problems of globalization, which expanded the list of traditional 
threats to the level unforeseen beforehand.  
 
Europe, which lost its economic credibility during war, was a 
frontrunner in restoring its position in international relations. Nor 
surprisingly the extent to which regionalism took pace in the region 
made Europe exceptional. Built regional bloc emerged as the most 
complex, rich and elaborated workshop of regional cooperation and 
integration. European integration, which officially started from the 
                                                          
219 Walt phrase, quoted from Ulosoy, p. 22. 
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customs union, culminated into economic and total union, with 
unification of policies and institutions.  
 
As much as European Union and its predecessor European Economic 
Community was perceived as an economic union, it was rarely seen 
as an economic security community, though by definition it was 
created and served the purpose of security community from the 
beginning. Historical underpinnings and various theories and 
conceptualizations of integration overshadowed both collective 
action and security communities, but the changes in the international 
relations were forward-looking and continued shaping regions.  
 
The main points about the benefits of collective action and shared 
institutions might not have been the main driving force behind the 
European integration, but for sure, eventually, could be seen as a goal 
or end-result of the achievement of total economic union, which 
European Union currently is. The rule of law, norms, democracy and 
other institutions defined by the treaties orchestrated the 
advancement of the EU collective action towards its security and 
survival.  
 
Deutsch’s idea that successful security communities achieve the 
common goals and collective action via integration, indeed, 
happened to be correct. His classification of such communities, 
however, turned to be less useful for understanding the European 
security community development. The forerunner of the EU, 
European Economic Community enacted supranational structure, 
which was based on democratic legitimacy, but since its creation has 
been unique for trying to balance the functions of national and 
supranational institutions. If chapter three was providing historical 
context for the peculiar development of the EU, this chapter went 
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deeper on how the integration-regionalism and security community 
building happened in the region. These processes of integration-
regionalism and forming security community are not separated, but 
interlinked, however, as well noted beforehand, quite overlapping. 
 
After understanding in which conditions, basically ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
the economic security community developed in Europe in the form of 
European Union, it is time to examine the effects and direct impact of 
each economic security measure. As it is implied that the security 
community member states improve their security through collective 
security and the community facilitates the maximization of 
prosperity, the following chapters provide the exploration of the 
ramifications of the membership in economic security community to 




Chapter 5  
 
Economic Security Institutions at 






The crisis, or in some cases crises, since 2008, severely hit the majority 
of European Union member states in different periods of time and 
length. Experiencing GDP growth most of the EU MS have been 
pursuing pro-spending policies till the financial crisis hit from 
outside. Public finances problems with liquidity issues culminated in 
the appearance of sovereign debt crisis, which became well known 
Eurozone or European sovereign debt crisis. Measures have been 
taken, the old institutions or mechanisms have been revised and 
improved, new institutions created, and some of the EU MS managed 
to get on the more positive economic wave.  
 
However, the exogenous shocks not necessarily of economy origin 
can make an effect on economic security. Historically, politics and 
energy have been equally contributing to the reduced economic 
security. The last few years in the European Union, which just 
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seemed recovering from the multifaceted economic crisis since 2008, 
the migrant flows (refugee crisis) and the popular vote of the United 
Kingdom to leave the union (the famous “Brexit” case) have changed 
the scene. Additionally to Eurozone crisis, these both issues equally 
demanded a clear union’s response, revealing the most sensitive and 
complicated issues within the European integration framework. 
Consequently, the crises’ environment in the EU turned to be 
described as the “EU crisis”, for which new set of regulations, 
procedures and institutions, seems, came at the right time and place. 
 
The financial (economic) crisis definitely revealed the uncertainty of 
national public finances. Public debts and deficits rose sharply in 
most of the member states. The nationalization of financial 
institutions was followed by the creation of rescue plans and support 
funds, making governments intervene or resume intervention in the 
European economy in general. In 2009, the crisis was seen as ‘a 
golden opportunity’ to reorient European economy towards eco-
efficiency. However, economic recovery programmes and emergency 
measures paved the way for the abandoning the foundations of the 
EU economic security, and the new sovereign debt crisis came. 
 
The pre-crisis EU economic governance had been tailored to 
primarily reinforce stability rather than provide supranational 
intervention capacity within the Eurozone. The shortcomings of such 
architecture have become apparent when the crisis hit. This existing 
architectural gap has not been receiving any particular attention since 
its creation in 1992, when the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
has been established by the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union. 
The crisis response included the establishment of a set of regulations, 
procedures and institutions for monitoring, coordinating and 
sanctioning Member States and fulfilling the architectural EMU gap.   
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The main goal of this chapter is to analyse in detail the established 
economic security institutions, their rationale and the foreseen 
impact. To do so, it is important to understand, which elements of the 
new economic governance according to the theoretical framework 
presented beforehand contribute to the development and attaining of 
the economic security.  
 
Second, it is also essential to see the comprehensive EU response in 
the case of crisis – how the community was capable to outweigh the 
negative effects of exogenous shock and provide necessary 
instruments for bouncing back and/or absorbing external threat. 
Additionally, as it covered in the following chapter, the EU itself has 
been perceived as a guarantor of financial stability by the markets 
during the crisis period, even before it has introduced instruments in 
place to help Member States in the case of bailout or excessive 
deficit/external debt.  
 
Third, it is not enough to understand what has been created on the 
EU level. The domestic “impact” level is crucial, and particularly in 
the case of the EMU development member states’ interests played a 
significant role, which should not be overseen either. Finally, in this 
particular crisis’ management the European Central Bank has 
appeared as the main steward of economic security of the community 
and European interest. Hence, its actions and contribution should 
also be taken into account, since according to the Treaties such 
functions have not been envisaged. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter is structured as follows. First, I depict 
economic security institutions at work, exploring where the main 
concepts operate. Second, I compare institutions and mechanisms of 
two different periods of European economic governance. I start from 
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the creation of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
economic governance till 2008 Economic crisis. I present and compare 
the new economic governance from 2008 – its evolution, the main 
institutions and measures in order to understand the community’s 
response in the case of external shock. The fourth part dwells on the 
domestic level, or rather the intermediary layer between the EU and 
the domestic effects. It reveals the role of national interest in the crisis 
response within the EU, partly explaining, why the EU response to 
crisis was vague and slow and how the triumph of national over 
European interest created the context, where the need for 
supranational supervision was needed. Consequently, in the fifth 
section, I show, how the European Central Bank appears as filling the 
created vacuum of European interest. Its expanding role in the crisis 
management and in the finalisation of EMU is last, but not least, 
important for the understanding of the full picture of the economic 
security provision in the EU. Finally, the discussion of the operating 




5.2 Economic Security Institutions in the EU 
 
Just after the crisis a significant amount of literature appeared 
indicating that current Eurozone crisis, in particular, is the result of 
the “wrong” and not adequate economic governance measures. 
European Commission was strongly criticized by the policy analysts 
and scientists that non-compliance with already introduced EMU 
measures can lead to significant changes in the member states’ 
performance. Increased debts and public deficits soared as a result of 
an expansive budget spending by national governments. Such policy 
paved the way to the increased numbers of sovereign debt, and left 
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some of the governments completely unprepared to meet unexpected 
consequences of global effects of the crisis. Afterwards, the 
introduced austerity measures just skyrocketed the numbers of MS’ 
both public deficits and debts. Even 'non-spenders' found themselves 
in the vicious position of the actual and relative debt in relation to 
gross domestic budget (GDP). This discrepancy is extremely visible, 
when the member states' performance is juxtaposed before and after 
the crisis (see Figure 14 and 15 in the Appendix). This is especially 
visible in the line of the average EU external debt, where regardless 
the introduced austerity measures, the external debt has been 
growing and became stabilised only in 2014, but still much higher 
than it could have been before the austerity measures. 
 
As such the term ‘governance’ is not perceived as a field per se. It 
encompasses the aspects from many fields, like institutions, 
organizational behaviour, economic development and growth, 
political economy, comparative systems, and others220. Furthermore, 
it is widely agreed that the quality of institutions of governance 
significantly affects economic outcomes221, though discussions about 
the measures of quality of institutions and the details of the causal 
mechanisms by which they affect economic outcomes remain open. 
Dixit222 reminds very interesting part of the academic debate 
regarding political regime and economic performance. According to 
him, substantial freedoms and property rights are crucial for overall 
nation and human development. He argues that property rights are 
essential for having an incentive to save and invest, and together 
                                                          
220 See Dixit, 2008, pp. 2-3. 
221 H. De Soto, Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
222 Avinash Dixit, “Governance Institutions and Economic Activity”, American 
Economic Review, 2009, 99(1), pp. 5-24. 
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with contracts’ enforcement and collective action form the nucleus of 
good governance, necessary for economic development. 
 
There are also other significant entries on the topic. Persson’s study223  
as well tries to answer, which political environment provides the best 
conditions for economic development. He argues that there are 
precise combinations of government, which foster the adoption of 
more growth-promoting structural policies (he refers here to 
parliamentary, proportional and permanent democracies): 
parliamentarian vs. presidential, proportional vs. majoritarian.  
 
Binswanger and Prüfer224 show that economic governance, 
embracing the property rights and contracts’ enforcement facilitate 
the emergence and enlargement of the economies of scale, allowing 
to benefit from the gains of specialisation and the advantages of new 
opportunities, which condition sustainable long-term improvements 
and rising standards of living. 
 
European economic governance, frequently used to identify the 
overall package of institutions, regulations and directives in the 
European Union, as such is quite a contested concept. Its popularity 
in the academic texts and policy research, especially in the capital of 
the EU institutions, is unquestionable, however, its meaning and 
definition is more problematic question to answer.  
 
                                                          
223 T. Persson, “Forms of Democracy, Policy, and Economic Development”. 
Working Paper No. 11171. Cambridge, MA: NBER, 2005. 
224 Johannes Binswanger and Jens Prüfer, “Democracy, Populism, and (Un)bounded 
Rationality”, European Journal of Political Economy, 2012, Vol. 28, pp. 358-372. 
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As it was already noted elsewhere, it is difficult to carve one single 
definition, what does really economic governance mean225. 
Williamson was among the first ones to use the term, and 
conceptualized “economic governance” as the “study of good order 
and workable arrangements”226. Dixit also tried to answer this 
question in the face of economic crisis. His provided definition 
stressed “the structure and functioning of the legal and social 
institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions 
by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational 
infrastructure”227. In addition, he provided the explanation, where 
exactly economic governance fits in the field of studies. To him, it 
“studies and compares the performance of different institutions 
under different conditions, the evolution of these institutions, and the 
transitions from one set of institutions to another”.  
 
In the case of European Union, this term is usually used to refer to 
budget and fiscal rules that may sanction countries failing to control 
their public finances228 - basically the macroeconomic stability side of 
resilience, as discussed in the conceptual economic security model. 
The European Central Bank calls it the “guardianship of fiscal 
sustainability”229 with very strong emphasis on policies, institutions 
                                                          
225 “The Euro Crisis: But what would economic governance mean?”, The 
Economist, June 21st 2010. 
226 O. Williamson, “The Economics of Governance”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 95, 2005, pp. 1-18. 
227 Avinash Dixit, “Economic Governance”, University of Milan, Bicocca, 
Department of Economics, Conference on Endogenous Market Structures and 
Industrial Policy, June 5, 2008, p. 1. 
228 See Financial Times Lexicon. 
229 European Central Bank, “Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area”, 





and instruments targeting budgetary policies. Thus, the chapter 
analyses the European economic governance mechanisms from the 
“conventional” European point of view, consequently, dwelling on 
the evolution of the institutions, transition from one set of institutions 
to another, and their performance in the following chapter. 
 
In order to distinguish the so-called new economic governance from 
the “old” EU economic governance, I briefly review the most 
important agreements, developments and instruments within the 
created European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was 
launched in 1992 after the Maastricht Treaty of European Union.  
 
The introduction of a single European currency – Euro – provided 
benefits for participating members, simultaneously demanding a set 
of mechanisms for monitoring, coordinating and sanctioning within 
the newly created Eurozone230. It was clear from the beginning that 
not all joining member states were ready in the same way for 
monetary convergence, what urged for shared common monetary 
policies and other constraints to be put in place.  
 
National exchange rate risk was eliminated by the agreement to 
renounce the exchange rate instrument, requiring member states in 
the case of external shock or crisis to make adjustments internally. It 
meant in the case of need, the MS could opt either for an internal 
devaluation and/or mobility of labour, since the provisions of the 
treaty stressed “no bailout” clause231, encouraging Euro zone 
members to avoid moral hazard. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
                                                          
230 Christophe Degryse, “The New European Economic Governance”, European 
Trade Union Institute Working Paper 2012, No. 14, p. 13. 
231 Article 125.1, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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was created as a federal institution to implement the monetary policy 
of the newly created EU. 
 
Back in 1992, there were two different views on how does a monetary 
union should work and what kind of effects should be seen of this 
particular integration. It was expected that monetary union would 
facilitate the convergence of economic policies, even without created 
a true economic government. The real convergence of economies, like 
growth, productivity, competitiveness and unemployment would 
happen automatically. As a result, no government institution, the 
equivalent of ECB on economic side of the union, has not been put in 
place. Though, the proposal for harmonisation of economic policies 
was rejected, the Treaty introduced the coordination of national 
economic policies232 through Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG) and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
 
BEPG were usually seen as an historical outcome of the protracted 
development of the coordination of national economic policies. As 
the Article 103 of the Treaty of Rome identifies, member states shall 
consult each other and the Commission on economic policies. Only 
the Article 102A of the Single European Act stresses the 
‘convergence’ of economic and monetary policies, hence, BEPG was 
created to facilitate a mutual “consultation” on economic policies 
between member states.  
 
As the Article 121 of TFEU defines, the Council, as the main actor in 
creating the BEPG, ensures the coordination of Member States’ 
economic policies. The Council is also the one responsible for 
monitoring economic developments and consistency of policies 
within BEPG in each Member State, including the coordination and 
                                                          
232 Article 121, Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
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perception of economic policies as a matter of common concern. 
Adopted since 1993, BEPG covers macroeconomic, microeconomic 
and structural policies by stressing self-discipline, closer coordination 
of economic policies and a “sustained convergence” of economic 
performance.  
 
Nevertheless, from a legal point of view, BEPG remained just 
suggestions-recommendations for a course without any legal 
obligation. The European Commission and the Council remained the 
main institutions responsible for the surveillance of economic 
performance, policies’ coordination and convergence. Adopted 
annually since 1993, BEPG provided a reference point regarding 
economic stability, growth, budget and debt management, structural 
reforms, public finances and employment. In brief, the BEPG covered 
structural, micro and macro-economic policies without requirement 
for a harmonisation or convergence of taxation, wage coordination or 
investment policy233. Europe 2020 Strategy has accompanied this list 
with the guidelines on education, poverty and employment policies. 
 
In contrast, the other economic governance instrument, Stability and 
Growth Pact imposed legal requirements regarding a budget deficit 
(not more than 3 per cent of GDP), a public debt (below 60 per cent of 
GDP) and a control of the level of inflation (price stability). The SGP 
has been functioning as a control system with multilateral reciprocal 
surveillance, comprising legal constraints, and preventive and 
corrective regulations directly applicable to all member states. The 
preventive component required annual submission of stability 
programmes from Eurozone members and convergence programmes 
                                                          
233 Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels, “The New Governance of the Economic 
and Monetary Union: Adapted Institutions and Innovative Instruments”, 
International Affairs Institute Working Papers, 13|02, January 2013, pp. 2-6. 
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from others, whereas the corrective regulation has been designed to 
impose sanctions and fines. However, this corrective arm has never 
been used, even when four countries, namely Germany, France, Italy 
and Portugal, were noticed for excessive deficits. As a result, the SGP 
was suspended in 2003, with a new version of the SGP appearing in 
2005, where the coordination of economic policies have been no 
longer included. 
 
These two regulations – preventive and corrective arms – functioned 
as a control system for multilateral surveillance. Preventive 
instrument required annual submission of programmes, while the 
corrective arm was supposed to impose sanctions and fines, 
although, never used234. In the meantime, the Lisbon strategy, a 
medium-term programme, appeared targeting three issues under the 
‘open method of coordination’ (OMC): economic competitiveness, 
jobs and sustainable development. Despite the fact that the strategy 
laid down certain common objectives and guidelines, the absence of 
real management propelled it to a failure. In 2002 excessive deficits 
and disagreement on the common action have marked the de facto 
suspension of the SGP at the end of 2003.  
 
As it was shown beforehand, the EMU framework, created in 1992, 
constrained only a financial side of Eurozone members (also, just 
partially), leaving economic governance completely under national 
affairs. In other words, while monetary union’s side was based on 
federalism, the economic side was functioning on an 
intergovernmental cooperation.  
 
                                                          
234 Comment: Germany, France, Italy and Portugal were on the treat of sanctions for 
excessive deficits in 2002, as noted earlier. 
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Furthermore, “neither the BEPG nor the SGP put in place a true 
economic union between the Eurozone states, that is to say, involving 
real coordination of economic and public investment policies, 
financial regulation worthy of the name at the European level, 
harmonization of fiscal policies and better coordination of member 
states social policies in order to bring about a certain convergence of 
the member states economies”235. On top of that, one would argue 
that the period from 1992 to 2008 had been marked by deregulation 
policy – weak and ill-equipped the BEPG, the Lisbon strategy and 
limited short-term SGP, and a blind eye on Euro, its defects, and 
incomplete and inadequate rules.  
 
Finally, introduced “open method of coordination” (OMC) with the 
Lisbon Strategy, and the reform of the SGP in 2004, which was not a 
priority on the political agenda, were merged together with the BEPG 
and other strategies into 24 new “integrated guidelines”. The 
continuous rationalisation of the OMC and integrated guidelines 
marked deregulation period of the European economy. Neither the 
BEPG, nor the SGP put a true economic union between the Eurozone 
states, and in reality neither weak BEPG, Lisbon Strategy nor limited 
SGP functioned as an economic governance before the crisis in 2008. 
The asymmetry236 between a centralised monetary union, and inter-
governmentally coordinated (or even deregulated since 2004) 
economic union continued till the euro was called into question after 
2008 Economic crisis. 
 
 
                                                          
235 Degryse, p. 17. 
236 Comment: The asymmetry between a centralized monetary union and 
coordinated economic union was already observed in 1995. See Busch (1995), OSE 
(1995), or Pochet and Vanhercke (1998). 
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5.3 2008 Economic Crisis: Threat Rout and New Economic 
Governance 
 
The expected economic convergence did not happen, and the years of 
deregulation paved the way for a financial and economic disorder 
after the crisis. Public deficits and debts rose sharply in most of the 
member states: first, because of pro-spending governments; second, 
after the implementation of austerity measures and recessed 
economies the stagnation followed and repay of the debts became 
even more complicated.  
 
Most of the governments had to intervene in the economy, including 
nationalisation of financial institutions, providing support funds and 
rescue plans. The house of cards started to fall in the fall of 2008. 
Hungary, Lithuania, and then Romania, all appeared with significant 
balance-of-payments difficulties, which were covered by reinforced 
EU Balance of Payments facility, not to mention Latvia that received 
a loan from the IMF at the early stage.  
 
EU governments’ intervention in economy, finances and investment, 
which normally would have been targeted by the SGP, became wide-
spread in the following year, which then required an immediate 
action in a budgetary discipline and even more. Year later, the EMU 
was shaken by revealed forms of accounting sleight of hand237 and 
unpleasant numbers of real public deficits. Profound macroeconomic 
imbalances between Eurozone centre and periphery, regarding 
growth, productivity, trade, employment and competitiveness, 
became visible. 
 
                                                          
237 Degryse provides an extensive overview of ‘veritable hypocrites’ ball’, p. 20-21. 
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Rescue programmes, nationalization of banking sectors or special 
funds for financial institutions, and support programmes for national 
economies or rescue plans for industry were on all EU member 
states’ agendas238. All EU governments were intervening and 
increasing the measures of public investment, for which the EU 
Commission turned green light without ever considering them as a 
distortion of competition or like public subsidies.  
 
Normally, European institutions would have targeted such 
programmes as significant increases of public deficits and debts 
under the SGP framework, but this time, national interests were 
perceived as a temporary and necessary response to exceptional 
crisis’ circumstances. These measures impaired the theoretical 
construction of the EU economic policy, including the rationality of 
economic actors, the efficiency of markets, deregulation, free 
competition and state non-intervention into the economy. By this, the 
EU member states followed their national goals and exercised their 
national interest even more than they could, or ever had done before 
the creation of the EMU. 
 
It is important to note, that the necessity for rescue plans for the most 
struggling Member States can be seen as an additional economic 
security community capacity. Rescue packages for Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal became known as unprecedented austerity plans, 
imposed by the Troika (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In relation to 
this, it is also essential to mention that some Member States 
introduced additional austerity measures by themselves in order to 
escape themselves from the excessive deficit procedure and possible 
Troika’s intervention.  
                                                          




The rescue plans and individual austerity measures are not analysed 
in detail here (some, though, are covered in the following chapter). 
Obviously, their effects are extremely visible in the case studies of the 
countries, but the information of an each rescue plan is out of the 
scope of this text, and can be found elsewhere. Nevertheless, their 
importance in the new economic security capacity cannot be 
neglected, since, most importantly, these implemented rescue 
packages were not in accordance to the Treaties in place. 
 
 
5.3.1 The First Round of the Measures: the EFSM and the EFSF 
 
The first measures of New European economic governance, which 
came into effect for the whole EU after the crisis, were the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010. They ended “climatic Keynesianism” 
and were supposed to ensure a demanded budgetary discipline. The 
EFSM was created under the Article 122.2 TFEU and was followed by 
an intergovernmental agreement in the Eurozone to protect the single 
currency - Euro.  
 
This regulation allowed an intervention on both national and 
European level, and justified the ECB’s assistance for the countries 
with budgetary difficulties. The Member States were able to benefit 
from a loan or a credit, while ECB and the European Commission 
became responsible for the control of compliance with the aid 
conditions. A recipient member state had to provide an extensive 




The EFSF followed with 440 billion euros intervention capacity to 
provide aid for the countries in need. Consequently, the ECB started 
to intervene and buy back sovereign bonds on the secondary 
markets, contributing to the consolidation of member states’ public 
finances. As Degryse depicted, the introduction of the EFSM and the 
EFSF, or new economic governance, “plunged [whole Europe] into a 
spiral of austerity”239. 
 
As mentioned noted elsewhere, Germany required extreme loan 
conditions and a substantial increase in a budgetary surveillance 
within the Eurozone. In Degryse’s words, “Berlin and Paris began to 
dictate the measures they wanted to see taken by the other countries 
of the Eurozone”240. French-German duo’s requests resulted in the 
creation of the European financial stabilisation mechanism (EFSM) 
under the Article 122.2 TFEU, and an intergovernmental agreement 
in the Eurozone, which was intended to protect the single currency. 
 
The EFSM required an applying state to provide financial and 
economic recovery programme, describing measures for re-
establishing its financial stability, making the European Commission 
and the ECB the main watchdogs regarding compliance with the aid 
conditions.  
 
Months later, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
launched, as the last mechanism of the ‘new economic governance’, 
plunging whole Europe into austerity measures. The markets’ 
expected the EU support came under strict conditionality and 
compliance rules. 
 
                                                          
239 Degryse, p. 27. 
240 Degryse, p. 25. 
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5.3.2 Targeting Eurozone Crisis: Sovereign Debts and Six Pack 
 
The appearance of more significant problems within the Eurozone 
members initiated the second package of the measures. In 2010, the 
European Commission launched the so-called ‘Six Pack’ – the set of 
six legislative acts (five regulations and one directive), trying to make 
economic governance more rigorous within the EU. These 
instruments mainly targeted budgetary issues, reformed the SGP and 
macroeconomic imbalances in the EU and the Eurozone.  
 
The preventive and corrective arms were introduced for an adequate 
sharing of powers and responsibilities within the EU economic 
government. Nevertheless, disagreements on sanctions within the 
EU, Ireland’s ‘downfall’, and the continuous reduction of countries’ 
rankings by rating agencies pinpointed the second stage of the EU 
crisis management and new economic governance. National interests 
did continue to play a role in the formation of the EU economic 
governance, but the new mechanisms left even less room for national 
interests of affected member states. 
 
After the Greece bailout, the European Commission, and not the 
member states, proposed a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In general, the Articles 5 and 136 of TFEU allowed specific measures 
to reinforce the coordination and surveillance of the budgetary 
discipline of Eurozone members241. Article’s 352 TFEU flexibility’s 
clause authorized a transfer of additional powers to EU institutions, 
if they prove to be necessary to attain the objectives set out in the 
                                                          
241 Roberto Gualtieri, “Safeguarding the stability of the euro area and the enhanced 
instruments for crisis intervention: political and institutional dilemmas”, p. 42, in 
European Commission and Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 
European Economic Governance in an International Context, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2013 
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treaties. The ‘Six Pack’ six legislative acts comprised of improved 
preventive and corrective arms, sanctions, budgetary frameworks 
and macroeconomic imbalances, aimed at reinforcing the EU 
economic governance and the financial stability in the region.  
 
The procedure of “European semester for economic policy 
coordination” (shortly, European semester), a part of Six Pack, came 
into force for preventing excessive imbalances and the coordination 
of member states’ economic policies. In 2011 it received new 
functions as the formulation and surveillance of both the BEPG and 
the employment policy guidelines, presentation and evaluation of 
stability and convergence programmes.  
 
The evaluation of member states’ National reform programmes 
(NRP), initiation of procedures to correct possible budgetary or 
structural imbalances, Annual growth surveys (AGS), Country-
specific recommendations (CSR), and control over national budgets 
also fell under the new procedures of the European semester. In 
comparison to the pre-crisis SGP, the European semester received a 
much wider area of action. From 2011 it has been concerned not only 
with fiscal imbalances, but also macroeconomic ones. By this, it 
became much easier to impose sanctions or convert them into fines in 
comparison to previous regulation. Lastly, it became ex ante 
surveillance, which meant the evaluation of stability and 
convergence programmes should take place before major actions can 
be taken on national budgets in the EU member states. 
 
In the aftermath of Greek and Irish rescues, during the meeting of the 
European Council in 2011, it was agreed to make the European 
Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). The heads of states and governments 
decided to revise the Lisbon Treaty and create the ESM as a 
 
 119 
permanent measure, replacing both the EFSF and the EFSM in 2013. 
European Stability Mechanism was signed by 17 Eurozone states and 
national ratification processes followed, when the European 
Parliament approved the treaty’s modification. 
 
However, a sufficient basis for dealing with any possible future debt 
crisis in the Euro area have not been created. In Baltas’ words: “the 
rules based framework for fiscal policy created by the excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was 
insufficient to prevent a debt crisis despite its emphasis on keeping 
public deficits low and strengthening forward-looking budgetary 
planning242”. The process of the Six Pack adoption took a year in the 
EU Parliament. In the meantime, Ireland had to rescue three banks 
and its public deficit tripled from 11.6 to 32 per cent of its GDP. The 
merry-go-round between the ‘Celtic’ tiger and financial markets did 
not receive a prompt response from the EU.  
 
In a nutshell, although European Commission’s proposed measures 
on how to strengthen both the EDP and the SGP were not all 
approved, Six Pack adoption did significantly improve the SGP and 
made it more binding243. As Baltas put it244, the crisis intervention 
was based on ad-hoc manner and on temporary basis’ responses, 
which did not complete the EMU. Neither pro-solidarity proposals 
for the EU finance minister and the EU debt agency245, nor the Euro 
                                                          
242 Nikolaos Baltas, “Safeguarding the Stability of the Euro Area and the Enhanced 
Instruments for Crisis Interventions”, p. 46, in European Commission and 
Directorate-General for Education and Culture, European Economic Governance in 
an International Context, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2013 
243 Gualtieri, p. 41. 
244 Baltas, p. 46. 
245 Gualtieri, p. 42. 
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bonds246 were accepted by Germany, because of moral hazard and 
the increase of German bond rates. Although at the end of the year, 
the EU member states agreed on the creation of the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), replacing both the EFSF and 
the EFSM, international rating companies again downgraded 
Ireland’s ranking, paying little attention to new commitments.  
 
The last stage of ‘new governance’ continued a multiplication of 
regulations, treaties and instruments, challenging national interests 
and social cohesion within the European Union. These issues are the 
main objects of the following part. 
 
 
5.3.3 The Last Upgrade for the Economic Security Capacity 
 
The first and second packages of the instruments targeting the crisis 
did not work. Governments were forced to stop economy-boosting 
programmes and introduce austerity measures because of 
unsustainable public finances, soaring public deficit and debt. 
Increasingly stringent austerity measures were laid down on 
indebted peripheral European states – such as Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece, in order to receive financial assistance by the Troika. The 
appearing shortcomings of previous measures were ‘corrected’ by the 
implementation of another set of institutional innovations in 2011. 
 
The SGP was reformed by the adoption of Six Pack. Six Pack itself 
‘received’ additional ‘Two Pack’ and European Semester packs, 
which was supplemented by a Euro Plus Pact. ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
finalized the upgrade of the new European Economic governance in 
2012. The difficulties to meet the required austerity measures have 
                                                          
246 Degryse, p. 35. 
 
 121 
shaken social background of the EU, including solidarity. Social 
unrest and protest against national parliaments, especially in harshly 
affected countries, raised awareness about democracy and 
relationship between national interest and the EU’s perspective. 
 
First, the introduction of European Semester within Six Pack 
consolidated structural reforms, investments, ex-ante budget 
surveillance and economic policies’ coordination. Three main 
components were introduced: the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), the 
National Reform Programmes (NRP) and the Country-specific 
recommendations (CSR), which established EU intervention before 
member states’ national decisions on budgets.  
 
The Euro Plus Pact or, in other words, the Competitiveness Pact, 
proposed an intergovernmental initiative, thus, supplementing 
European Semester and attacked national performance regarding 
competitiveness, employment, tax coordination, viability of public 
finances and financial stability. Five non-Eurozone EU states joined 
project ‘Euro+’ Pact, which is compulsory for the Eurozone members. 
The European Commission had to accept just minimal evaluation 
role within this measure. 
 
Second, finally adopted the ‘Six Pack’ was also upgraded with the 
‘Two Pack’, allowing additional control over national budgetary 
policies by a ‘common budgetary calendar’, proportionality clause 
and loosening adjustment and orientation of investment.  
 
Third, in July 2012, Germany and France proposed a permanent 
financial stability mechanism as an escape for the Eurozone. The 
European Stability Mechanism was signed by 17 Eurozone states and 
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national ratification processes followed, after the European 
Parliament approved the treaty’s modification. 
 
The EU’s ‘exhaustive response’ to crisis, including rescue plans and 
aforementioned measures, was not enough to terminate the downfall 
of Portugal. Lisbon committed itself for a deficit reduction 
programme, based on wages’ cuts, raising taxes and extended 
privatisation, for 78 billion Euro Troika’s rescue package. 
 
Another set of institutional innovations came in 2011. Six Pack itself 
received additional ‘Two Pack’ and a Euro Plus Pact supplemented 
European Semester. Two Pack allowed additional control over 
national budgetary policies by a ‘common budgetary calendar’, 
proportionality clause and loosening adjustment, and orienting on 
investment.  
 
Euro Plus Pact or, in other words, Competitiveness Pact, as an 
intergovernmental initiative, targeted national performance 
regarding competitiveness, employment, tax coordination, viability 
of public finances and financial stability. Five non-Eurozone EU 
states joined project ‘Euro+’ Pact, though it was compulsory only for 
Eurozone members. Competitiveness Pact was also complemented 
by the “Compact for growth and jobs”, consisting of 120 billion euro 
budget. 
 
The “Fiscal Compact” finalized the upgrade of the new European 
Economic governance in 2012. It required the governments to include 
the “golden rule”, or “balanced budget rule” into their laws. The 
proposed treaty on stability, coordination and governance was 
supposed to improve budgetary rigour, discipline and surveillance, 
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5.4 Handling Crisis: States’ National Interest247 
 
Every nation determines its policies in terms of its own interests/F. 
Kennedy 
 
In the evening of the European Union as a banking union and more 
calls for independence, like in the case of Scotland and United 
Kingdom, the question of national interests comes as an extremely 
important. The (post) crisis EU’s performance is far away from 
expected, and an economic recovery is still in the process. Further 
extension of the crisis made the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the EU member states to take serious measures for 
solving indebtedness and insolvency. Most of the measures taken 
during the crisis were not in accordance with the European treaties 
and have not brought the expected results. 
 
This section appears not without reason. The European Union is a 
very particular organisation of the Member States willing to 
cooperate and integrate with each other. It is not officially a state, 
though, some elements are simply transferred and made equivalent 
as in the Member States. Thus, the particularity of the EU’s course – 
be it regulations, directives or any other measures – at the end is the 
result of various players, mainly the Member States itself. 
                                                          
247  This section is based on the paper “Post-crisis EU Economic Governance: No 
Room for National Interest?” presented at the Conference on The national interest 
in European Union law and governance, organized by Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences Lendület-HPOPs Research Group. The author is grateful for audience and 
other panelists’ comments and questions. 
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Additionally, the domestic impact of the EU also varies greatly across 
its Member States. 
 
There has been a lot of discussion, especially during the crisis about 
the lack of democracy (particularly, accountability) within the 
European Union and its institutions. This perceived asymmetry of 
power and accountability has been complemented with a union-wide 
elected European Parliament for several decades and the European 
Citizens Initiative since 2011, where citizens themselves can propose 
legislative acts directly to the European Commission, where the EC 
has a competence to act. In this way, the created institutions act on 
the interest of the Union and its citizens, but with a strong approval 
of national governments. 
 
The role of national governments, seems, to play a crucial role in the 
actual domestic implementation of the EU laws, but they also 
significantly affect the general EU’s stand and decisions. This 
influence is very important for the EU economic governance and 
economic crisis response. To understand the interests, I start from a 
brief overview of the theoretical considerations, putting the term in 
the historical perspective. 
 
The national interest, as I argue in the following subsections, happens 
to be the explanatory factor for the economic governance set up and 
particular crisis decisions. Its existence also partially explains, why 
the EMU has never been fully completed. The existing room for 
national interest continued to take place even at the beginning of the 
crisis. The diverging interests of EU’s member states in a way 
prevented the EU from common and immediate action to handle 
crisis from the beginning.  
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If one had rationally expected a strong and quick calming of the 
markets from the EU institutions, the agreement to be reached 
between Member States had turned out more complicated to reach. 
As much as supranational institutions felt the need to step in to 
defend European interest in the whole Eurozone plunging into the 
crisis (this is covered in the following section on the European 
Central Bank as a key player in the scene), the on-going interplay 
between big power national interests kept on shaping the institutions 
and economic governance decisions. 
 
 
5.4.1 Theoretical Considerations: National Interest 
 
Nowadays, the concept of ‘the national interest’ became 
indispensable from modern political life. This term appears in nearly 
every discussion among politicians and political scientists regarding 
policies. Sometimes, ‘the national interest’ is presented as an accepted 
fact to support one or another opinion regarding state’s actions or 
policy change.  
 
The concept of ‘national interest’ has a long history. Its roots can be 
traced back to at least the Renaissance Period from the 15th century, 
starting with Nicolo Machiavelli in Italy, who argued: “states may 
take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their 
survival”248. According to him, “nothing could be more moral than 
the interest of the Italian state”249. In the 18th century Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau concluded that the main focus of national interest is 
                                                          
248 Michael G. Roskin, “National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy”. May 20, 
1994, U. S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute, p. 1-2. 
249 Roskin, p. 1. 
 
 126 
people, rather than ruler or ruling class250. Carl von Clausewitz 
claimed that all states’ behaviour in international arena is based on 
their needs to survive and prosper251.  
 
Over half of millennium of the national interest tradition, the 
usefulness of the term has been as often contested as defended. Being 
central to theories of international politics, the concept’s role in 
explaining states’ actions was thoroughly revised since the end of the 
First World War, when an extensive amount of studies on national 
interest emerged. Realist approaches appeared with national interest 
as a primary issue in the field of study. Their proponent, Hans 
Morgenthau, bridged the ideas of Machiavelli and Clausewitz. 
Morgenthau 252 emphasizes the importance of power and suggests 
defining national interest in terms of power. Roskin delineates that 
national interest does not refer to power, but it’s linked to feasibility, 
which is then defined by power253. Subjectivists Furniss and Snyder 
provide a complete definition for the decision-making approach in 
international politics: “The national interest is what the nation, i. e. 
the decision-maker, decides it is”254. 
 
Alexander Wendt puts it even clearer by explaining state interest as 
the “inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and 
                                                          
250 Yan Xue-Tong, “Chapter 1. The Concept of National Interest”, p. 16, in Xue 
Tong, Analysis of China’s National Interests. Montenerey U.S.: James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002; & Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social 
Contract. The Business Press, 1980, p. 27. 
251 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed, and trans. By Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 80-81, 87-88, and Roskin, p. 2. 
252 Clausewitz & Roskin, p. 3. 
253 Roskin, p. 8. 
254 Edgar S. Furniss and Richard C. Snyder, An Introduction to American Foreign 
Policy. New York: Rinehart, 1955, p. 17. 
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interests’ of states”255. He re-conceptualized the concept as an 
outcome of intersubjective processes of meaning creation. Another 
constructivist, Jutta Weldes, argued that the content of the national 
interest “is produced, or emerges out of, a process of representation 
through which state officials (among others) make sense of their 
international context”256. Then it becomes a meaningful object, 
representing the shared meanings of understanding of the world, 
international system and state’s place in it. 
 
From definitions and conceptualizations presented beforehand, the 
idea to draw the line between two different strands and broad 
categories no longer seems too much extreme. Terence J. Kersch257 , 
who proposes division between employing and understanding ‘the 
national interest’. He suggests distinguishing these two strands by 
practice vs. theory orientation. According to him, the “employers” 
are interested in how does/should a statesman conduct his business, 
whereas the “understand-ers” care what does the concept mean. 
Employing national interests are identical to national objectives, like 
security, wealth, etc. “The national interest” is an intrinsic principle 
of human action – “an internally embraced motive”258, which does 
not refer to a state of affairs. For George and Keohane, irreducible 
(vital) interests comprise physical survival, liberty and economic 
subsistence259. Following Beard, Rosenau reaffirms that there are 
                                                          
255 Wendt, 1992, p. 401. 
256 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, European Journal of 
International Relations, 1996, 2(3), p. 277. 
257 Terence Joseph Kersch, “The Idea of the National Interest: A Conceptual 
Analysis in the Context of the Gulf War”. PhD thesis, 1995 April. P. 43.  
258 Kersch, p. 84. 
259 Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, “The Concept of National 
Interests: Uses and Limitations,” in Alexander L. George, ed., Presidential 
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 217-237. Particularly, p. 224. 
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neither self-evident factors nor conditions, which could be the best 
for a nation, and the decision always depends on subjective 
preferences260 in the understanding group. 
 
It is difficult to define the right approach to the concept. Different 
conceptualizations, varying classifications and more, tend to make 
concept meaningless. Different definitions of the national interest 
lead to observable division in different types, layers or variations of 
it. As Roskin noted that “one can make as many gradations and 
subdivisions in the national interest as one wishes”261. In order to 
proceed further and to be able to pinpoint national interest’s place 
within new economic governance in the EU, I draw two main 
concluding remarks for the conceptualization here. 
 
First, I follow ‘people sovereignty’ approach, since all the EU 
countries are democracies. As Nye claims, in a democratic state, “the 
national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding 
relations with the rest of the world… [a definition] does not accept 
the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based 
foreign policy”262. In addition to that, public opinion cannot be 
denied and elected officials are the ones who play a key role in 
national interest. Therefore, in this particular work, national interest 
is not seen as an indicator or analytical tool, which helps explaining 
states’ foreign policies. Following Roskin’s263 explanation, the object 
should be called a/the European Interest or European Order to make 
it analytically useful, which is not the case here. 
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Second, I agree with both Roskin and Nye Jr. who argue that there 
cannot be identical national interests and that even objective threats 
are not obvious. In Roskin’s words, ”the best one can hope for is that 
their [states’] interests will be complementary”264. Also, I follow 
Roskin’s point, that it is not possible to anticipate how “another 




5.4.2 National Interest at Work within the EU: EMU and Crisis 
Measures 
 
Despite the fact that there are many authors arguing that European 
integration is not compatible with national interest, such as Henrik 
Larsen, supplementing the position with an argument that there 
cannot be consistency between national interest and commitment to 
European integration, the EMU was driven by the belief that 
convergence would happen of its own record. Milzow also claimed 
that European integration was “an attempt to prevent precisely the 
foreign policy excesses the notion of the ‘national interest’ was seen 
to encourage266”, which again would not really hold regarding 
economic governance till 2008. As it was shown beforehand, EMU 
framework, created in 1992, constrained only financial side of 
Eurozone members (also, just partially), leaving economic 
governance completely under national affairs. In other words, while 
monetary union’s side was based on federalism, the economic side 
was functioning on intergovernmental cooperation. Consequently, 
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both EMU measures – BEPG and SGP – can be seen as friendly for 
EU member states’ national concerns.  
 
From the legal point of view, BEPG were just suggestions-
recommendations for a course, without any legal obligations. 
Adopted annually since 1993, BEPG provided a reference point 
regarding economic stability, growth, budget and debt management, 
structural reforms, public finances and employment. In brief, the 
BEPG covered structural, micro and macro-economic policies, 
without requirement for harmonization or convergence of taxation, 
wage coordination or investment policy267, which, as a result, meant 
complete performance of national interest. Thus, the convergence 
never took place, since member states followed their goals and 
interests. 
 
After the fall of Lehman Brothers, as the initial stage of the crisis 
reveal, most European governments were following national interest 
in the Keynesian way. Rescue programmes, nationalization of 
banking sectors or special funds for financial institutions, and 
support programmes for national economies or rescue plans for 
industry were on all EU member states’ agendas268. All EU 
governments were intervening and increasing the measures of public 
investment, for which the EU Commission turned green light 
without ever considering them as distortion of competition or public 
subsidies. Normally, European institutions would have targeted such 
programmes as significant increases of public deficits and debts 
under SGP framework, but this time, national interests were 
regarded as temporary and necessary response to exceptional crisis’ 
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circumstances. These chosen measures impaired theoretical 
construction of EU economic policy, including the rationality of 
economic actors, the efficiency of markets, deregulation, free 
competition and state non-intervention into the economy. This 
allowed EU member states to follow national goals and to exercise 
national interest even more than they could, or ever did, before 
creation of the EMU. 
 
Even at the peak of Greece crisis, national interests were playing the 
main role in the EU institutional and member states’ responses. 
While aid mechanism was under consideration, both Germany and 
France were publicly denying possible rescue packages and 
demanding the reinforcement of budgetary discipline within the EU. 
Moreover, Germany was the first one demanding that intervention in 
Greece should be done only in cooperation with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF): together with Austria and Netherlands, they 
demanded to treat aid as loans, not ‘subsidies’, with harsh interest 
rates. Eventually, the Troika – the Commission, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the IMF – imposed an unprecedented austerity plan 
on Greece, making Athens and later, the whole Eurozone, thrown 
into turmoil. The requirements to increase VAT by 2 per cent, raise 
taxes on fuel, alcohol and tobacco by 10 per cent, freeze wages and 
pensions in public sector, and postpone the minimum retirement age, 
spread protests and social unrest everywhere in the country. 
 
Strengthening of Euro Area’s economic governance, which followed 
the continuing turmoil and downgrading of other Eurozone 
countries’ public debts, was expected put an end for ‘climatic 
Keynesianism’. The EFSM and EFSF marked the new stage of the EU 
economic governance. Although it might seem from the first sight 
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that all these mechanisms were introduced due to EU objectives and 
‘European interest’ in fighting ‘slow’ recovery and public finances’ 
problems, which is not exactly the case. It has to be noted that partial 
responsibility for the overwhelming turmoil in the EU falls on the 
national interest of the member states, particularly, Germany and 
France, which did not prevent fear and its effects on stock markets 
worldwide. Solidarity maintenance in the EU would have probably 
led to less fear and negative prognoses of countries’ performance269. 
 
As mentioned beforehand, Germany required extreme loans 
conditions and substantial increase in budgetary surveillance within 
the Eurozone. As Degryse depicted, “Berlin and Paris began to 
dictate the measures they wanted to see be taken by the other 
countries of the Eurozone”270. French-German duo’s requests resulted 
in the creation of a European financial stabilisation mechanism 
(EFSM) under the Article 122.2 TFEU, and an intergovernmental 
agreement in the Eurozone, which was intended to protect the single 
currency. In addition, ECB started to intervene and buy back 
sovereign bonds on the secondary market, whereas the Eurozone 
governments had to consolidate their public finances. EFSM required 
an applying state to provide financial and economic recovery 
programme, describing measures for re-establishing financial 
stability, making the European Commission and the ECB the main 
watchdogs regarding compliance with the aid conditions. A month 
later, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was launched, 
as the last mechanism of the ‘new economic governance’, which 
plunged the whole Europe into austerity measures.  
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Disagreements on sanctions within the EU, Ireland’s “downfall”, and 
sustained rating agencies’ reductions of countries’ ranking, 
pinpointed the second stage of EU crisis management and new 
economic governance. National interests did continue to play a role 
in formation of EU economic governance, but the new mechanisms 
proposed by Commission – the “Six-Pack” and the reform of SGP – 
left even less room for national interest of affected member states. 
The “Six Pack” set’s six legislative acts comprised of improved 
preventive and corrective arms, sanctions, budgetary frameworks 
and macroeconomic imbalances, aimed at reinforcing EU economic 
governance and financial stability in the region. 
 
As for the role of national interest, it was German government that 
was asking for a treaty changes regarding the main limits imposed by 
it. They considered it insufficiently binding character of the 
provisions concerning Stability and Growth Pact, and the excessive 
deficit procedure. According to Gualtieri, once again it was Germany 
asking powers (supranational institutions) to intervene in the 
national budget procedure for European Commission, and to allow 
Court of Justice of the European Union to handle excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) in order to enforce EU decisions271. However, 
automatic penalties, one of Germany’s national interests supported 
by the European Commission, ECB, Austria and the Netherlands, 
was confronted by France, Italy and Spain, asking for a room of 
interpretation. Eventually, French president Nicolas Sarkozy 
convinced Angela Merkel to drop automatic sanctions, which raised 
ECB frustration and deactivated European Commission and the 
Council’s expectations for stronger and more rapid sanctions. 
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The EDP and SGP were insufficient to combat the sovereign debt 
crisis. In the meantime, Ireland had to rescue three banks and its 
public deficit tripled from 11.6 to 32 per cent of GDP. Inexistence of 
EU prompt response thrust Ireland to financial markets’ negative 
response. As in the case of Greece, the EU in general and, in 
particular, Germany, put a very strong pressure on Ireland, such that 
even a joint mission by “troika” was organized to the country. 
Similar path to Greek one followed - Irish government was accused 
of selling national sovereignty and austerity plan of extreme 
spending cuts, which was supposed to bring the public deficit below 
3 per cent by 2014. Irish national interest was preserved only in the 
case of corporation tax, which remained unchanged, whereas, 
besides cuts and reductions, the government introduced new taxes 
and increased tuition fees for students. As a result, compared to a 
previously bailed-out Greece, Ireland did manage to preserve a part 
of the national interest. However, the electorate’s point of view might 
not have been the same as of the government 
 
Proposals for EU finance minister or EU debt agency272, or Euro 
bonds273 were rejected by Germany, concerned of its bond rates. 
Ireland only partially managed to escape from complete capitulation 
in front of ‘troika’, compared to Greece, which failed to do so. 
Eventually, at the end of the year, EU member states agreed on the 
creation of the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
replacing both EFSF and EFSM, international rating companies again 
downgraded Ireland’s ranking, paying little attention to new 
commitments.  
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“Two Pack”, European Semester, Euro Plus Pact and the Fiscal 
Compact (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the EMU) had to correct the shortcomings of the previous measures. 
These measures, introduced mainly by France-Germany alliance 
(“Merkozy”274), significantly affected EU member states’ national 
interests. In principal these measures introduced additional EU 
intervention to member states’ national decisions on budgets. Euro 
Plus Pact (or Competitiveness Pact) was created for better viability of 
public finances and financial stability via competitiveness, 
employment and tax regimes. In July 2012, European Stability 
Mechanism, proposed by Germany and France as a permanent 
financial stability mechanism, was signed by 17 Eurozone states and 
approved by the EP. 
 
The measures taken did not prevent the Portugal’s fall. Lisbon 
committed itself for a deficit reduction programme, based on wages’ 
cuts, raising taxes and extended privatisation, for 78 billion Euro 
Troika’s rescue package. After Portugal’s agreement with Troika, 
“Merkozy” proposed the final measure for completion of new 
economic governance – the “Fiscal Compact”, requiring governments 
to include the “golden rule”, or “balanced budget rule”, into their 
laws. The proposed treaty on stability, coordination and governance 
was supposed to improve budgetary rigour, discipline and 
surveillance, where “Euro summits” would function as European 
economic government. The proposition was made to be adapted 
                                                          
274 Initially French press dubbed Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy for entering 
the “unlikely marriage of convenience”. See “Merkozy: marriage of convenience 
between French and German leaders becomes internet search term”. The Telegraph, 






without compromise. Publicly, United Kingdom and Poland rejected 
the suggested treaty, but eventually, only Czech Republic and United 
Kingdom did not sign the agreement, which could also be seen as an 
expression of national interests. 
 
Over the years of these EMU upgrades, European economic growth 
was euthanized by generalised austerity. This period was marked not 
only by growing popular discontent in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Romania and elsewhere. Numerous dramatic turns of events 
highlighted new economic governance. As Degryse noted, 
“resignation, falls of governments, unexpected announcements of 
referendums or early elections, revelations of secret letters, 
challenging of agreements reached, reports of urgent decisions, 
demonstrations, riots, strikes”275, show the other side of the reforms, 
implemented to strengthen the European Union.  
 
Germany and France were the main players in defining what the 
‘European interest’ is and what should become ‘national interest’ for 
each member state. Beforehand described public reaction showed 
that, although “Merkozy” were successful in convincing the states’ 
leaders in Brussels what are the objectives of their national security, 
the masses living in 27 EU member states had different perspectives 
on the issue. Both leaders managed to introduce or to reject the 
measures from the new European economic governance, as they 
wanted. In addition to the measures “Merkozy” “imposed” together, 
there are some other cases to mention. Euro-bonds option was 
incompatible with Merkel’s understanding of German national 
interest – the strong epithets can be found recorded in the media – 
and, as a result, completely out of discussion. France, on top of 
everything, received desired “Compact for growth and jobs”, 
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consisting of 120 billion euro. This idea also corresponded to 
Belgium, Spain and Italy’s national objectives. 
 
The remaining EU member states, seems to have been lost during the 
period of the crisis in the process of multiplication of regulation, 
treaties and instruments of new governance. There are only few 
exceptional cases, where some member states raised their voices 
regarding new measures and publicly rejected them because of 
national interest. This passivity of most of the EU member states can 
be explained by one of two possible scenarios. First, remaining 
member states’ national interest completely overlaps with the EU 
institutions and big powers’ expressed European interest. As such, 
regardless of the fact that measures are introduced without 
discussion with all member states, the new institutional framework 
is, right on the spot, perceived as necessary and corresponding to the 
member states’ national interest. This appears to be highly unlikely, 
though. Second, most of the representatives of the member states still 
did not grasp how much intervention from Brussels became possible, 
and what are the future ramifications of the new economic 
governance framework.  
 
To conclude, the national interest played a significant role in the last 
stage of new EU’s economic governance. Two countries - France and 
Germany, were able to bring their national interest on the table. 
Proposed ESM, Euro Plus Pact and Fiscal Compact left no room for 
European debate, and despite ECB’s objections, were directly 
implemented into economic governance. However, remaining 
countries either did not see any clashes between new economic 
governance and their national interest, or were simply not able to 
exercise necessary power to bring the national needs and objectives 
on the table. Thousands of the EU citizens felt left behind the border: 
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regardless of how do people vote and what do they think is 
necessary for their country, Troika, Brussels, or Merkozy will decide 
how the country should be governed, making even social democrats 
to implement austerity measures. Democratic accountability, as a 




5.4.3 Review: National Interest vs. European Interest 
 
The hey-day of the ‘national interest’ passed when the concept was 
considered useful as a guide for the conduct of foreign policy and as 
an analytical tool for the analysis of international relations. In 1990s, a 
resurgence of national interests appeared in the public statements of 
European Political leaders276. The discourses of national interest had 
spread even in the countries such as Germany and France. The 
uncertainties of generational transition made the concerns of states’ 
post-Cold War European and international roles quite apparent. 
Roskin argued that “the national interest approach is terribly old-
fashioned”277 and some thinkers argued it should or must be 
superseded by “world interest” or “world order” approaches, which 
go beyond the inherent selfishness of national interest.  
 
Larson defined the paradox between an emphasis on ‘national 
interests’ and devotion to European integration as ‘irrational 
consistency’, a concept by Robert Jervis. Their critics argued that 
national interest could still predict the strategy of the state better than 
world order. One of them, Milzow, argued that the concept of 
national interest remains relevant to the understanding of European 
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politics278. He suggested integrating the concept of ‘national interest’ 
more fully into the analysis of European politics279. By analysing the 
interplay between the national and European interest, he sees  ‘the 
national’ and the ‘European’ are closely connected and work as 
parallel frameworks, “whose relationship is not necessarily 
competitive and which may indeed support each other”280.  
 
In brief, all the EU’s countries used the spacious room for national 
interest in between 1992 and 2008, even if in some cases the punitive 
measures were supposed to be introduced for not complying 
member states. The appearance of the first signs of multifaceted crisis 
started to change the rules of the game for most of the countries. If 
BEPG and SGP were perceived as constraining the EU member states, 
the measures of new economic governance that followed raised 
significant issues of accountability and social unrest around, with 
many still arguing that EU did not manage to reach the level of fiscal 
union.  
 
In the case of new economic governance, there are several concluding 
reservations to be made. First, it is not possible to talk about a 
common European economic interest, if there are more than three 
completely different opinions regarding the same issue. The new 
governance framework broadly revealed the possibilities of 
contradicting and opposing each other national interest, and showed 
whose national interest were taken into account the most. Therefore, 
even if the European interest were theoretically possible, while 
complete convergence did not happen, there should be many 
different ways how to proceed with its implementation. This was 
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also particularly mentioned regarding harsh austerity measures and, 
especially, obligatory public cuts on spending in rescued countries, 
since public spending took different forms in different countries. 
Milzow’s study also showed that member states’ national interest 
differed in three policy fields that he analysed. 
 
Second, this section captured the interplay between different national 
interests during different stages of new economic governance. The 
crisis-management regulations, treaties and instruments were 
treating national interests as less and less important in most of the 
cases. Imposed harsh austerity measures for rescued countries made 
governments to be Troika’s marionettes. Strikes, riots, and other 
kinds of forms of social unrest that followed, did not have any effects 
on national governments, since Brussels or, to put it more explicitly, 
German-French alliance, was pulling strings behind the scenes. 
Democratic governments were no longer accountable to their 
electorate. From Rousseau’s point of view, either the government was 
no longer a sovereign of the country, or the country was no longer 
able to exercise its national interest. 
 
Third, Germany and France, with some other occasional countries, 
managed to put their priorities on the agenda and contribute to the 
changes in European economic governance. Germany and France, or 
‘Merkozy’, managed to create the economic governance for the rest of 
the Union, as they thought was suiting the best their national interest 
or their perceived European interest. Removal of automatic sanctions 
in French case, and no discussion about Eurobonds represented a 
strong national interest of Germany. The introduced surveillance, 
regulation and intervention mechanisms, including new treaties, 
were also the expression of ‘Merkozy’ club’s national interest of 
survival, which, in most of the cases, did not allow any discussion, or 
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objection from other EU member states, and was negatively 




5.5 The Role of the European Central Bank 
 
Multiple directions Eurocrisis, including banking crisis, government 
debt crisis and economic recession, paved the way for a new role to 
the European Central Bank (ECB). ECB originated from the EMU, 
which centralized monetary policy with the creation of the European 
System of Central Banks and the ECB itself. All Eurozone members 
allocated monetary policy to the centralized system, where ECB, 
completely independent from the EU’s institutions and member 
states, solely would decide and implement the common monetary 
policy for the Euro club. 
 
As created EMU was characterized as “incomplete and open-ended 
mechanism”281 by uneven integration of macroeconomic policies, 
strongly centralized monetary policy with ECB ahead was placed 
side by side with negative financial market integration and 
decentralized fiscal policy. Inexistent fiscal or financial union has 
been complicating the EU’s reaction in the case of fiscal difficulties. 
As mentioned beforehand, Articles 123 and 125 TFEU constrained the 
ECB from allocating credit to the EU or Member states and prevented 
the EU from taking responsibility of its members’ undertakings. 
 
European Union faced several institutional changes within the crisis 
period. Despite the fact that national governments, seems, played the 
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main role in managing the crisis, some supranational institutions 
have seen their power increasing to some extent. The ECB in this case 
jumped as the only European institution, which could prevent credit 
disturbances, since intergovernmental funds were neither established 
nor possible to use for buying government bonds and support the 
countries like Italy or Spain. During the crisis the ECB provided 
liquidity, took additional supervisory roles and got involved in the 
creation of new institutions like EU banking union. 
 
ECB succeeded in calming down the markets and relaxing outside 
pressure on indebted countries, stimulating the gravitation of power 
from national to the supranational level. ECB was also a leading 
character in the institutional change in the EU. Its proactivity to fight 
inflation in the Eurozone and maintain the stability of prices, as 
defined in its mandate, made the ECB to fight for the existence of the 
euro itself as well, eventually providing stability to the Eurozone. 
 
Furthermore, the ECB intervened in the areas where the Bank was 
not authorised by its mandate. The Bank expressed its opinion in the 
areas as privatisation, centralisation of financial supervision, a 
framework for bank resolution, product and labour market reforms, 
“true oversight” of national budgets among others282. Buiter justifies 
ECB’s intervention into the wider economic policy debates, which are 
not defined by its mandate and competences, as necessary in the case 
when political power challenges the ECB’s role and expertise. These 
areas of intervention, where the bank was calling for the sound 
policy and structural reforms, were in the epicentre of euro area, 
which was affected by the sovereign debt crisis. As was noted earlier 
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by others283, the ECB has seen itself as the main source of stability 
and security within highly fragmented political system. The 
fragmentation issue became even more problematic in the face of 
crisis, when a complex structure of EU multi-level governance could 
not provide timely and uniform solutions to the problems. In this 
situation the ECB saw itself as a strategic player in extraordinary 
circumstances. As next section shows, the ECB has had also a 
strategic political role in between the Council and the EU member 
states. 
 
From the ECB’s point of view, EU member states policies should 
contribute to the development of the common EU policy and action 
(Article 120 of the TFEU), which should be coordinated by the 
Council. As noted elsewhere, the member states and the EU’s 
responses to the crisis since the failure of the Lehman Brothers in 
2008, were worse than the problems themselves and continued 
damaging relations between the states and the markets’ trust. 
 
Consequently, the ECB had to intercede in several episodes to 
provide comfort to highly beholden countries and banks. In the 
context of security markets ECB gas bought more than 200 billion 
Euro worth of bonds of countries in difficulties since May 2010. By 
December 2010, ECB doubled its capital stock. In December 2011 and 
February 2012 ECB provided banks with more than 1 trillion euro in 
long term cheap credit for buying government bonds. 
 
In July 2012, ECB President Mario Draghi asked to “do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro” Implicating that ECB would provide 
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unlimited liquidity to keep Eurozone government afloat284. With 
Outright Monetary Transactions program the ECB has been prepared 
to buy unlimited bonds from the countries, receiving EFSF or SMP 
assistance and complying with financial conditions. Formally the 
ECB mandate was not changed and the ECB has seen itself acting 
within its mandate, these acts and devotion have been substituting 
the no bail-out provision in the treaties285. 
 
In 2012 the ECB also announced it is going to impose strong 
conditionality on the member states and the states were supposed to 
be ready to start the EFSF/ESM following the established guidelines 
for effectiveness286 via OMTs in secondary sovereign bond markets. 
OMTs (Outright Monetary Transactions) substitute the SMP by 
changed price formation process in the euro area bond markets. The 
ECB received also monopoly in deciding when and how 
macroeconomic adjustment and precautionary programmes can be 
started, continued, suspended or even terminated if goals are reached 
or there is a case of non-compliance287. 
 
The ECB, also as a part of the Troika, supervised the member states of 
the rescue packages and plans. It was counterbalancing the 
International Monetary Fund in the created ‘Troika’. Beforehand the 
ECB was strongly involved in the aid program to Greece and had to 
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closely monitor the country regarding the conditionality measures 
imposed after the Greek debt was accepted as collateral288. In 
addition to this, the bank was also involved in shaping the reforms in 
some Eurozone members, like France, Spain and Italy. Recent 
operation of quantitative easing in June 2014, also announcing cheap 
long-term funding of European banks prolonged indirect ECB’s 
assistance to EU economy. 
 
Since introducing fiscal surveillance via ex-ante control of national 
budgets, following the “Six-Pack” (December 2011), and the “Two 
Pack” (March 2013) and the Fiscal Compact (The Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the EMU), the ECB has been 
assisting financially only the countries, which followed the 
established procedures. 
 
Buiter argues289 that the ECB as a truly operationally independent 
central bank lacks substantial accountability, for which reason 
unfavourable political reactions affect the ECB’s credibility and 
output. As Torres claims, “the ECB is not a mere agency responsible 
for the implementation of monetary policy but also an actor in the 
political equilibrium of the entire EU cum EMU governance construct. 
Such a strategic role is particularly important in a crisis setting.”290 
 
As Torres shows, the ECB has been behaving strategically, 
incorporating the interests of individual member states and the 
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Council, and at the same time achieving its objectives and sustainable 
development of economic policy in its mandate. It also showed 
support to general economic policies of the Union, as indicated in the 
Article 127 of the TFEU, and by following the EMU objectives did 
anything to secure the common currency of the Union. Torres 
concludes that the ECB safeguarded the EMU, which forced the Bank 
to introduce extraordinary measures and intervene in the wider 
economic policy debates291. 
 
In this period of crisis, the bank converged with the European 
Parliament on the issues regarding the monetary policy of the EMU 
and the bank’s role within. Sharing a common supranational nature 
they found themselves representing the same interests of EU and the 
people of Europe rather than particular EU member states. They also 
agreed on new economic governance institutional architecture and 
the importance of synchronised economic policies within the EU. 
 
In 2013 March the ECB also received the supervision of important 
banks via the Single Supervisory Mechanism, as agreed between the 
European Parliament and the Council. The Council later on agreed 
also on Single Resolution Mechanism, regarding progressive 
mutualisation of national bank resolution funds superior than 10 
years. 
 
SGP and the Lisbon Strategy, continued by the Europe 2020 Strategy 
since 2010, did not provide sufficient sustainability for the EMU in 
the face of crisis. New institutions, such as the European System of 
Financial Supervisors, ESFS, the European Financial Stability Facility, 
EFSF and the ESM, and non-standard policies, like the Securities 
Market Programme (SMP), the Long Term Refining Operations 
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(LTRO), and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) have been 
created and authorised for the purpose of crisis management. These 
measures significantly enlarged also the role of the European Central 
Bank. The ECB’s role as a lender of last resort has been strengthened 
and the bank’s role in supervising the European financial system has 
been expanded. Previously under national competences, these new 
non-standard policies of the ECB extended the powers of 
supranational organisation and, seems, have been changing the 
nature and degree of economic and political integration as agreed in 
the Maastricht Treaty292. These current ad hoc changes still have to 
become part of the treaties in order to become permanent and 
efficient instruments in the European Union. However, the ECB’s 
performance during the crisis showed that the created EMU guardian 
managed to step in and lead the exceptional policies, pushing for a 





The post-crisis EU’s economic performance has been far away from 
expected, and economic recovery has been in the process. Some of the 
EU member states were among the first (and the worst) hit in the 
world, starting in 2008. Few years afterwards, unsustainability of 
national public finances swept away another share of the EU Member 
States. Further extension of the crisis made European Commission, 
European Central Bank and the EU member states to take serious 
measures for solving indebtedness and insolvency. Through various 
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forms, such as Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), 
European Council, Euro Group and Euro Summit, EU member states 
sustained the situation of the countries in difficulty by various 
mechanisms, however, as it can be seen not at once, but in several 
rounds. Most of the measures taken during the crisis were not in 
accordance with the European treaties and have been a difficulty to 
implement. 
 
The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 stated that neither 
European Union, nor Eurozone, could provide any aid for a country 
(or countries) in budget difficulties or insolvency. As the Treaty 
affirms, the principal idea behind non-existence of ‘bail out’ clause 
was a self-discipline and avoidance of moral hazard.  
 
The idea about a certain form of European economic government has 
been present, but there was an expectation that the entrance to the 
EMU might automatically provide real convergence of economies in 
terms of growth, productivity, competitiveness and employment. 
Also, it was imagined that member states’ independence in effective 
convergence would allow avoiding asymmetrical shocks. 
 
The idea of harmonization of economic policies, or common 
European economic government, was rejected due to the expected 
optimal development of the Eurozone economies and national 
interests, as one can see from the crisis management measures. This, 
according to monetarists’ point of view, should have been ensured by 
a free market mechanism.  
 
On the other hand, Keynesian economists were raising concerns, 
arguing that increasing monetary integration will demand even 
tighter coordination of economic policies. The Maastricht Treaty was 
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followed by monetarists’ expected way of economic development, 
and monetary union, with a federal institution to implement 
monetary policy – the European Central Bank, being established as a 
result. Though criticisms appeared, pointing to the asymmetry 
between a centralized monetary union and barely existing 
coordination of economic policies within the EU, the actual change 
did not happen until the last years. 
 
Pochet294 claims that all actors had a very clear view of the social 
stakes of the Economic and Monetary Union, leading to economic 
convergence ‘via the market’, rather than via ‘guided’ economic 
convergence. 2008 Economic crisis and following Euro crisis revealed 
the shortcomings of the 20 years ago created EMU’s framework and 
structure. In the face of the crisis, only the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG) and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were 
reminding of the supposed-to-be Economic and Monetary Union.  
 
It is important to mention that deregulation followed the EU 
economic governance until the Eurozone entered the crisis in 2008. 
The existing financial regulation was equipped with weak, short-
term or limited instruments and procedures (or it was seen and 
perceived by some in that way), since the Lisbon Treaty promoted 
open coordination and rationalization of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic processes within the Member States. Eurozone crisis 
undoubtedly revealed lack of instruments for coordination, from 
fiscal to public borrowing policies, from wage to investment 
regulation. The belief of the authors of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
about convergence happening ‘of its own accord’ did not get 
materialized. 
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The measures taken in the meantime of the crisis were coming in 
several rounds. The three packages varied in terms of time taken, the 
extent of intensity and intervention. First, only two instruments were 
created to fight “slow” recovery after the crisis – the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). Short afterwards, the second package of 
measures followed due to the appearance of more significant 
problems within Eurozone Members. In 2010, European Commission 
launched the so-called “Six Pack” – the set of six legislative acts (five 
regulations and one directive), trying to make economic governance 
more rigorous within the EU. These instruments mainly targeted 
budgetary issues, the reform of the SGP, and correcting 
macroeconomic imbalances in the EU and the Euro zone. Thus, 
preventive and corrective arms were introduced for adequate sharing 
of powers and responsibilities within the EU economic government.  
 
The first and the second package of the instruments targeting the 
crisis did not provide the needed results. The appearing 
shortcomings of previous measures were corrected by the 
implementation of another set of institutional innovations in 2011, 
when The European Semester and the Euro Plus Pact were 
introduced. “Six Pack” was supplemented by “Two Pack” 
combination, and “Fiscal Compact” had upgraded the new European 
economic governance in 2012. 
 
In the meantime, most of the European governments had to stop 
economy-boosting programmes and to introduce austerity measures, 
due to unsustainability of public deficit and debt. Increasingly 
stringent austerity measures were laid down onto the indebted 
peripheral European states - such as Ireland, Portugal and Greece – 
in order to receive financial assistance by the Troika, a group of 
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international lenders consisting of the European Commission, 
International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank. However, 
difficulties to meet the required austerity measures have shaken 
social background of the EU, including solidarity. Social unrest and 
protests, especially, in the harshly affected countries, raised 
awareness about democracy and welfare, and the relationship 
between national needs and the EU’s perspective. 
 
The national interests were playing a significant role in shaping the 
political agenda on EU economic governance. Also, there was a room 
for exercising national interest. However, Morgenthau’s point about 
the importance of power in national interest fits the best to describe 
the EU crisis politics. The analysis of new European economic 
governance shows that some big countries, like Germany and France, 
were able to use the opportunities to exercise their power (even 
before the crisis).  
 
Some authors even explicitly put down that Berlin, in return, 
received new economic governance and austerity measures for its 
concession regarding rescuing Greece, the creation of the EFSM and 
the ECB interventions in the markets. However, smaller (or 
economically weaker) countries, like Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
had to face an opposite situation – completely neglect the national 
interests and act against popular will by accepting and implementing 
extremely harsh conditions.  
 
Consequently, the European Union reduced state’s autonomy in 
budgetary policy, centralised financial market supervision and 
introduced unprecedented collective liabilities. Technocratic in 
nature reforms inaugurated significant changes in the EMU. These 
revisions increased the role of the European Central Bank. The ECB 
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became responsible for the European financial system and appeared 
as a lender of last resort. European Commission’s role in fiscal 
supervision also expanded, whereas the institutional package 
enlarged with a new intergovernmental organization, such as the 
ESM. 
 
SGP and the Lisbon Strategy, continuing as the Europe 2020 Strategy 
since 2010, did not provide sufficient sustainability for the EMU in 
the face of crisis. New institutions, such as the European System of 
Financial Supervisors, the ESFS, EFSF and the ESM, and non-
standard policies, like the Securities Market Programme (SMP), the 
Long Term Refining Operations (LTRO), and Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) have been created and authorised for the 
purpose of crisis management.  
 
Previously under national competences, these new non-standard 
policies extended the ECB’s mandate formally, which in practice 
changes the nature and degree of economic and political integration, 
as agreed in the Maastricht Treaty295. However, these current ad hoc 
changes should be part of the treaties as voted and ratified 
constitutional changes in order to become permanent and efficient 
instruments in the European Union. On top of that, the ECB played a 
proactive role in the crisis intervention programmes in highly 
indebted countries and banking supervision. 
 
The main crisis response solutions were intergovernmental, since 
from the beginning the EU was not equipped with crisis management 
mechanisms. New institutions were enacted and additional 
                                                          
295 Francisco Torres, “The EMU’s Legitimacy and the ECB as a Strategic Political 
Player in the Crisis Context”, European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013, p. 288 
from pp. 287-300. 
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responsibilities expanded already existing ones. These changes 
helped governments to maintain the track of financial and economic 
affairs within the countries. The new measures should also deepen 
the EU integration. As a result, the European Union showed that it 
could design new treaties, further empower supranational 
organizations and expand already existing ones’ mandates 






The Performance of European 







European economic security community is for sure one of the most 
complex and comprehensive security communities in the world. Its 
outreach almost equals state provided benefits with a multiplication 
effect. As small states were joining the EU in 2004, there was an 
extensive wave of scholarship, explaining how much the EU helps to 
overcome vulnerabilities, and increase resilience296. Most of the 
literature did not analyse the causal relationships, nor exact effects, 
because the improvement effect was simply too obvious, or to 
uncover the processes within a black box between the EU and the 
domestic impact, seemed, too complex and multifaceted to do. 
 
                                                          
296 See Roderick Pace, “Malta and Eu Membership: Overcoming ‘Vulnerabilities’, 
Strengthening ‘Resilience’”. European Integration , Volume 28, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 
33-49, or Dorothee Bohle and Wade Jacoby, “Flexibility Revisited: International 
Markets and the Small States of East-Central Europe”, paper presented in the ISA 
Convention Montreal, Quebec, 2011. 
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In the face of crisis, things started to get worse. Complexity of 
economic governance became a burden, convergence and cohesion 
seemed to be absent and disappointment has been growing. As it was 
shown in the previous chapter, some states were left without a choice 
to proceed with the policies, which seemed demanded by the citizens 
or national governments. Recent “Brexit” vote “no” for the EU, 
waves of turn-arounds in the elections and a growing gap between 
the EU and its member states are important signals not to be missed. 
For this reason, the understanding of what are the exact effects of the 
European Union, as an economic security community, for the EU as a 
whole and on individual member states, is crucial. 
 
In this section I analyse to what extent an economic security 
institutions have affected economic security via vulnerability and 
resilience measures in the EU. Economic resilience, as conceptualised 
in the chapter 2, is divided into two categories of measures, namely, 
macroeconomic stability and flexibility-regulation. Such division 
stems from Buzan’s early work on non-traditional security in the 
early 1990s297.  
 
He points out that economic security cannot be obtained completely, 
since none of the states can have stability and flexibility at the same 
time, especially in democratic regimes. Being vulnerable for being 
exposed to the global markets and other economies is the main 
defining factor. According to him, only the closed economies like the 
former USSR, could reduce vulnerability at the expense of resilience 
and general economic development. Nowadays, vulnerability aspect 
is even more accurate, since globalization increased 
interconnectedness and interdependence.  
                                                          





In theory, both economic globalisation and integration (regionalism 
and regionalisation) should have contributed to the increased levels 
of vulnerability across the EU Member States. The 2008 Economic 
crisis, even if it does not seem at first glance, has been affecting 
sharply the most vulnerability countries in the EU. 
 
Macroeconomic stability and flexibility-regulation – both important 
arms of economic resilience are going to be analysed also in this 
chapter. Though Buzan did not conceptualize further flexibility and 
stability for empirical research, there are already a significant number 
of studies employing these concepts. The economic security 
mechanism, constructed in the chapter 2, is followed here for the 
empirical investigation of the EU Member States’ performance over 
time in terms of economic security. 
 
Indeed, macroeconomic stability factors are extremely important, 
since they correspond to the expected direct effects of European 
economic governance, as analysed in chapter 5. Here, the term 
“European economic governance” refers to budget policies, thus, 
making the budget a central object for the study. The fiscal condition 
of the budget, being one of the main issues and causes for Eurozone 
debt crisis, as one of the most important factors for macroeconomic 
stability, is going to be analysed in depth as well. 
 
Public debt and inflation, remaining two variables for analysing 
macroeconomic stability, are connected to each other and to a budget 
deficit too. Both measures indicate quite well the health of state’s 
public finances and economy, and are usually acknowledged in 
economic studies. Moreover, all three factors form the core of the 
euro convergence (or Maastricht) criteria for joining the third stage of 
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the European Economic and Monetary Union, what makes them 
extremely important.  
 
On top of that, all three measures were the main target of the whole 
new economic governance, as described in the section 5.3. 
Consequently, a high level of macroeconomic stability should 
indicate a good performance of shock counteraction capacity, which 
is measured in the study by inflation, budget and public debts. 
 
Flexibility-regulation refers to other institutions, empowering states' 
markets to absorb exogenous shocks. As was noted in the chapter 2, 
there are various approaches to analyse the institutional quality and 
their results. Various scholars raised the importance of market 
regulation, democracy related institutions (the so-called good 
governance), investment to human development298 and approaches 
towards sustainability.  
 
Of course, there are various existing measures of economic outcomes 
and institutional quality.  Economic outcomes are usually measured 
by the actual level (absolute numbers) or growth of GDP (relative 
numbers), though this measure of institutional quality faces many 
conceptual and econometric problems. Institutional quality alone is 
measured by even wider combination of variables. For example, 
World Bank looks at six measures: voice and accountability, political 
                                                          
298 It is essential to mention that in most of the previous research and even 
conceptualization here, unemployment has been perceived as a macroeconomic 
stability factor. However, analyzing better the level of unemployment indicates 
much more market flexibility and investment in human development, rather than 
exact results of economic policies, targeting fiscal performance. For this reason, 
unemployment is analysed as part of flexibility-regulation, rather than 
macroeconomic stability factor. 
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instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
burden, rule of law, and control of corruption299.  
 
These measures are here combined into “flexibility” section. Of 
course, there is extremely wide selection of measures, but in this 
study I will employ only openness and participation as a 
representative of general (or also known as good) governance 
qualities300, and convergence criteria - investment and 
unemployment301. The latter two variables are at the core of 
European Union’s Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS), and 
are chosen here as the main indicators of sustainable socio-economic 
development.  
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is usually among the most important 
indicators while referring to economy. In the analysis of economic 
security GDP has been used extensively, as extensively its usage has 
been criticised. For sure, GDP is the first indicator to look at, but it 
has its own limitations to reveal information about exact economic 
performance. Since economic security mechanism does not include 
GDP performance over time, the short overview in Figure 6 (see 
Appendix) depicts the patterns of economic growth in the EU 
Member States since introduction of the Euro. 
 
Indeed, there was economic growth before the crisis, and strong 
economic contraction in 2009, but simultaneously, it is visible that EU 
                                                          
299 D. Kaufman, A. Krayy, and M Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters IV: Updated 
Governance Indicators 1996-2004”. Washington, DC: World Bank research paper, 
2005. 
300 Comment: it is also planned to include government effectiveness from the World 
Bank as an indicator to the good governance. 
301 Comment: There are obviously even more factors, important for this study, 
however due to scope limitations, they had to be omitted. 
 
 159 
Member States did not get locked at the bottoms of the crisis’ years. 
Majority of the countries did not manage to come back to the pre-
crisis growth levels, but most of them made to put the growth back 
on track. This brief insight into economy already reveals that 
economic security community effect worked and the EU countries 
showed substantive level of resilience. 
 
While GDP growth shows one picture, GDP per capita (Figure 7, see 
Appendix) portrays a different side of the growth and the years of 
integration within the EU. Interestingly, the crisis effect on GDP per 
capita is just very slight and decrease is not so visible, in comparison 
with the Figure 6. However, the welfare gap within the EU did not 
change much: Luxembourg is an extreme outlier and Bulgaria is the 
lowest performer. It shows that convergence did not happen in the 
EMU as it was expected, and member states have still very different 
economic powerhouses, when controlled by the number of citizens. 
As a result, tenfold discrepancy between the lowest GDP and the 
highest signal that cohesion and structural funds operation will need 
to be in action for many years in order to achieve “catch-up” of less 
developed regions. 
 
To conclude, this chapter provides the empirical part of the effects of 
economic security, created by the treaties and institutions. As much 
as institutions speak about themselves, whole EU and its Member 
States’ operation and achievements are equally paramount. The 
empirical part provides the evidence that the effects of economic 
security capacity, created by the establishment of the community, are 
not only in the treaties and institutions, but make a difference in 
obtained well-fare and economic development. The following 
sections (6.2, 6.3 & 6.4) showcase the general effects of European 
Union on its Member States’ vulnerability, macroeconomic stability 
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and flexibility, and provide more in-depth exploration of different 
outcomes of pre- and post-crisis economic security institutions at 
work. Section 5 revises the crisis’ performance and the measures 
results for member states. The final section summarizes results and 




6.2 Vulnerability in the EU 
 
Economic Vulnerability, as described in Chapter 2, has been 
perceived historically as a constant and stable feature of the country. 
Inherent lack of the physical base, like natural, land, human or even 
financial resources was seen as not subject to policy and subject to 
change. Many researchers beforehand would not even recalculate it, 
since inherent weakness, smallness and dependency, especially 
before the Second World War was constant. The end of 20th century 
and economic globalization challenged this view, and the following 
analysis just confirms that vulnerability is subject to policy and policy 
change and global environment, and, as Friedman once wrote, the 
system in which you are logged in makes a huge difference and 
nothing is stable in economic globalisation. Thus, vulnerability 
cannot be taken for granted, and has to be analysed the same way as 
resilience. 
 
Economic openness – one of the main reasons why some of the 
countries were extremely hit by crisis – has varied over time in the 
European Union Member States. As Figure 8 (see Appendix) shows, 
the integration process within the Community facilitated 
significantly the increase in international trade, and we can see the 




For sure, some countries even before joining the European Union had 
already significant levels of openness, and this could be seen 
especially for the new member states, which joined the EU in 2004. 
The small states, as dwelled in the second chapter, are naturally more 
prone for the higher levels of economic openness, and the Figure 8 
confirms it. 
 
In general the cumulative effect for the whole European Union could 
be seen in the Figure 9 (see Appendix). The economic openness in the 
member states has been constantly rising with some fluctuations, and 
only in 2009, during the crisis, there was a slight contraction. For this 
reason, it could be said, that single market strategy and its 
development as part of the integration process is getting its pace. In 
brief, EU could be seen as a slight contributor for the increase of this 
vulnerability, however, available UNCTAD and World Bank data 
shows that majority of world states had to open their economies and 
increase their participation in the international trade. 
 
The second factor of economic vulnerability – export concentration – 
did not change so much over time (Figure 10, see Appendix). The 
enlargement results are also barely visible. Most of the countries’ 
performance is stable, however, the data was not available before 
1995, and for this reason it is difficult to make far-reaching 
conclusions. 
 
On the other hand, the calculated EU average (Figure 11, see 
Appendix) shows a different pattern of the change within the 
community. Indeed, one would think that enlarging the Community 
should positively contribute to the Member States’ export 
concentration and provide bigger possibilities for diversifying the 
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exports market, however, the effects are minimum. To summarise, 
most of the EU countries are doing relatively well in terms of export 
concentration. The index, where “0” means no dependency on 
exports concentration, the EU on average and individual member 
states are doing quite well. Of course, some individual member states 
still have where to improve their dependency on exports. 
 
The last indicator of economic vulnerability – the dependence of 
strategic imports – the accumulated index302 depicts (Figure 12, see 
Appendix) very interesting patterns of EU Member States 
performance over time. The general pattern is that majority of EU 
Member States rely on strategic imports, and this could be seen 
together with economic openness as the main vulnerabilities of the 
Community members. However, there is one very important data 
limitation in this case: the calculated index does not allow excluding 
the dependence on strategic imports from other EU Member States. 
Taking into consideration the volume of intra-EU trade, dependency 
on strategic imports from outside the EU would be much lower. 
 
The EU average of dependence on strategic imports (Figure 13, see 
Appendix) just confirm the pattern visible in the individual states’ 
performance. A sudden drop in 1960s, and then increase in 1980s, 
and very slight decline from 2000. It has to be mentioned, that new 
millennium was not only a change point for UN Millennium goals 
and development agenda, but also raised the hot debates within the 
EU on the importance of sustainability and diversification. For these 
reasons, it could be expected that dependence on strategic imports 
                                                          
302 The author calculated DSI (Dependence on Strategic Imports) as percentage of 
imports of food, agricultural raw materials, fuels and manufactures imports as 
important for states’ survival. 
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might lessen by some percentages in the future, however, not 
significantly. 
 
To conclude, economic vulnerability of the EU as a community and 
its member states have been changing over time. The increased 
economic openness made the EU member states extremely 
vulnerable to the exogenous shocks. Their reliance on strategic 
imports show that individually member states (without excluding EU 
dependency) are quite vulnerable here as well, but data limitations 
should be taken into account before making strong conclusions. 
Nevertheless, export concentration shows very positive stance of all 
EU member states. Finally, it should be noted that the relationship of 
the membership in economic security community on the states’ 
performance in economic vulnerability is quite low, and the 
participation in the EU only slightly increases economic vulnerability 
of its member states. 
 
 
6.3 Macroeconomic Stability Performance 
 
The effects of economic security community for the European Union 
are under-researched. Scholars were analysing the supporting 
programmes, funds allocation and various policies with occasionally 
estimated effects. This and next section of the chapter presents the 
evaluation of the development of EU economic security and impact 
on Member States. As was indicated earlier, economic resilience, 
consists of two parts – shock-counteraction and shock absorption.  
 
Shock-counteraction is achieved by sound macroeconomic stability of 
the states. Macroeconomic stability, in this study defined as a budget 
surplus or deficit, public debt and inflation, are the most important 
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factors, indicating the healthiness of a state’s economy. 
Macroeconomic stability or member states capacity to withstand a 
shock has been the main target of European economic governance 
since the creation of the EMU. In the face of crisis, as was analysed in 
chapter 3, European Union collectively introduced even stronger 
oversight and control over the member states’ fiscal endurance.  
 
Fiscal endurance here is analysed through the lenses of the external 
debt, budget balance and inflation rate. These three criteria’s 
importance dates back to the Maastricht Treaty and forms the core 
requirements for entering the Euro zone. As a result, the collected 
data covers quite substantial period, providing substantial insight 
into the effects of economic security community on the 
macroeconomic stability within the EU. It is important to note, that 
crisis period is as well covered as much as data was available. 
However, the author thinks it is too early to evaluate the crisis effects 
and member states’ performance, for this reason, the conclusions 
drawn here should be taken with precaution on the matter of the 
effects of new economic governance. 
 
External debt and its relation to the gross domestic product is one of 
the main indicators of the state’s economy. As it is visible from the 
graph in the Figure 14 (see Appendix) that the old member states, 
even before the introduction of the Maastricht criteria, had very 
different fiscal position. However, even after the crisis majority 
member states managed to keep their public debt below the 
threshold of 60 per cent. It is important to note that for some member 
states, like Bulgaria and others, the years before and after the 




On the other hand, graph in the Figure 15 (see Appendix) clearly 
shows that all the countries’ external debt has been growing since the 
economic crisis, and that since introduction of Maastricht criteria, the 
EU average debt was steadily decreasing, showing that additional 
supervision measures actually worked. 
 
The budget balance, being the second indicator of the withstanding 
capacity of external shock, provides completely different picture. The 
effects of the introduction of new institutions on balancing the 
budget within the EU clearly had a resonance in the member states’ 
budget balances. As graph in the Figure 16 shows (see Appendix), 
the old members of the economic union had the most trouble before 
Maastricht to put their budgets on positive track. Majority of the 
countries had budget deficits up to minus 16 per cent, not counting 
the crisis period, when most of the governments experienced 
difficulties. 
 
In regard to post 2008 EU member states’ performance, it is clearly 
visible that only very few countries managed to keep the budget 
balanced since then, and majority still experiences problems in 
keeping the targets of new economic governance and golden rule of a 
balanced budget met.  
 
The EU average, as Figure 17 shows (see Appendix), the same as for 
the EU average of external debt, since the EMU, there are positive 
changes in the EU as an economic security community. It is visible, 
that the EU average budget deficit decreased by 5 per cent in between 
1993 and 2000. Moreover, similar pattern of balanced budgets is 
visible after the introduction of new economic governance measures, 
targeting budget deficit and demanding the implementation of 
“golden rule” of balanced budget. It is important to mention, that 
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average clearly portrays also the period of formal suspension of EMU 
rules on balanced budget (SGP as mentioned beforehand). 
 
Inflation, similarly as balanced budget for majority states was an 
extremely difficult task. Especially, the new member states’ 
performance before joining the EU show how much additional 
discipline countries had to obtain within the EU. 
 
While deficits and debts did not improve much since the new 
economic governance institutions were introduced, inflation 
measures (as HICD – Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices), as 
visible in Figure 18 (see Appendix), came back to the pre-crisis 
fluctuation levels. Even outliers beforehand, seems, found the 
instruments to keep price stability in control. 
 
The overall EU average of inflation (Figure 19, see Appendix) 
strongly supports the effects’ correlation with institutional 
development within the EU over time. The EU member states since 
2000 managed to control price stability, and even during crisis it did 
not reach the peaks as beforehand. 
 
To conclude, macroeconomic stability criteria set in the EMU and 
later reinforced by new institutional packages, seem, positively 
affected the EU as an economic security community’s performance. 
All three criteria on the EU level had improved over time, and even 
in comparison with the post-2008 economic crisis period, the EU 
maintained obtained macroeconomic stability, and as a consequence 
could be seen as quite resilient in shock-counteraction. 
 
 




The other part of economic resilience, frequently found in the 
literature as governance efficiency, regulation, flexibility and other, is 
equally important. In most cases, since macroeconomic stability is 
extremely difficult to obtain, the states’ survival and performance 
very much depends on the labour market, citizens’ development, and 
existing good practises in sustainability and good governance. Not 
without reason, this capacity is called “shock-absorption”. 
 
The level of unemployment portrays market efficiency in this study. 
Microeconomic market efficiency affecting business, capital and 
labour market are perceived having an effect on the level of 
unemployment. 
 
Unemployment in the EU member states, as Figure 20 shows (see 
Appendix), has been fluctuating significantly in most of the EU 
member states. Various institutions were enacted for tackling this 
problem EU-wise, but labour market inclusion has been significant 
problem in the countries. EU single market (the free move of capital, 
people and goods) still lags behind the expectations. However, it is 
visible from member states’ data, and even more expressive in the 
Figure 21 (see Appendix) of EU average, that whole EU 
unemployment was slightly decreasing since 1994 till the crisis hit in 
2008. 
 
To summarise, market efficiency is still the area, where significant 
improvements have to be made. The effects of 2011 Competitiveness 
pact and the Pact for jobs and growth did not have a significant effect 
on employment results – only very tiny drop is visible in the EU 
average. Positive patterns of working institutions are there on the EU 
scale, but since the 2008 economic crisis only minority of individual 
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member states managed to achieve the pre-crisis level, and 
accumulated EU data shows, that employment is extremely 
important issue to tackle in the future.  
 
The second part of the flexibility – good governance indicators, 
democracy, rule of law, property rights or corruption forms the core 
of the criteria for the EU Member states to join the Union and remain 
there. The so called Copenhagen criteria ensure that the states are 
complying with the minimum requirements of democracy and 
provide equal opportunities for development of citizens, business 
and other units in the country. The importance of these institutions 
and relationships with economy was already analysed extensively 
beforehand elsewhere, for this reason these aspects are not explored 
in more detail here. The performance graphs of the good governance 
in the EU member states’ is provided in the Annex, showing that all 
members sustain more or less similar levels of property rights, fight 
with corruption, and most importantly the rule of law. 
 
The social human development is frequently analysed as healthiness 
of the citizens and measured by the life expectancy at birth, indicate 
that the quality of life in the EU member states has been significantly 
increasing over time with exception of few observations over time as 
Figure 22 depicts (see Appendix). 
 
The whole EU picture, however, reveals that on average life 
expectancy got slightly decreased with enlargement, but in the last 
years continues catching up with the development path since 1960s 
(Figure 23, see Appendix). It is important to note that since 1960 the 
life in the EU member states increased from 70 years to 79, which is a 




The last factor of flexibility sustainability is frequently analysed 
through the lenses of the investment to the future, new technologies 
and research and development. EU encourages member states to 
allocate at least 2 per cent of GDP to Research and Development, 
however, not all the EU countries invest similar amounts for 
sustainability and development (Figure 24, see Appendix). Some of 
the members barely invest more than 0.5 per cent of GDP, whereas 
there are performers capable to allocate even more than 3 per cent for 
R&D. 
 
However, the average EU real investment strongly declined, as 
pictured in Figure 20 (see Appendix), since the 2008 Economic crisis. 
It dropped from 27 per cent to as low as 20 per cent on average per 
EU member country, which also related to general performance of 




6.5 Economic Security and Crisis Performance in the EU 
 
The multi-year economic crisis has started in 2008 and has been 
evolving since then. Financial crisis started with smaller and 
relatively new EU Member States, like Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, reaching its climax significant insolvency problems in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal (PIIGS countries as referred in the 
media). The reasons for the crisis within the EU varied greatly, 
leaving majority of MS with soaring budget deficits and skyrocketing 
external debts. 
 
It is important to note that in vast majority of the countries, the 
problems have started from the private borrowing. Most private 
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debts were coming from the housing bubble, which has been 
observed for quite several years before the Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse. Banking system collapses across Europe and the bailouts 
transferred private debts to government ones. In addition, the 
governments have been pursuing pro-growth policies and 
investment in the post-bubble recession economies. In this way, both 




6.5.1 Crisis in Greece: 3 Bailouts, Austerity Measures and Not a 
Single Bank involved 
 
The Greek financial and economic crisis has been particular in 
comparison to other EU Member States, which had experienced 
significant difficulties and/or reached for international/European 
financial institutions support. Being one of the most corrupted 
countries in the EU based on the perceived corruption index, 
collecting barely two thirds of taxes and suffering from about ¼ of 
shadow economy, continuous trade deficit and general structural 
weaknesses. 
 
The problem of Greece could have appeared even earlier. Since 
joining the EU, Greece has been experiencing negative peripheral 
effects of joining the bigger market. The increased vulnerability via 
economic openness and dependence on strategic imports resulted in 
the continuous trade deficit and growing external debt. Additionally, 
Greece faced harshly increasing labour costs after the introduction of 
the euro. However, due to fraudulent statistics these problems have 
not been well highlighted. The data credibility problems have been 
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noted since the creation of the euro, when EUROSTAT could not 
forecast GDP growth, country’s deficit and debt accordingly. 
 
The Greek government spending beyond its means came under 
magnifying glass only after the economic recession swept across the 
EU in 2008. A shortage of investment in international markets 
reached also Greece. A sudden drop in private funding and soaring 
government debt, which appeared to be miscalculated and poorly 
estimated for years, could have been solved with depreciation of the 
currency. The “Grexit” (Greece exit) option has been widely 
discussed. Indeed, the coming back to former currency drachma, its 
depreciation would have helped to facilitate investment and pay 
back the debt in a cheaper currency. Due to negative ramifications for 
the EU itself, IMF and some Member States in particular, this option 
was not discussed in depth. 
 
Greece exceptional case of having a sovereign default without a 
bailout eventually needed 3 bailouts by the Troika and several 
austerity packages. Poor GDP growth, government debt and deficits, 
budget compliance and data compatibility were indicated303 as the 
main causes of the economic problems for the country. The structural 
economic reforms and permanent and temporary austerity measures 
were put in place already in 2010, but the positive results of the 
reforms would not have been achieved on time. 
 
The Greece debt foreseen to be 120 per cent for 2010, was actually 
closed with 150 per cent ratio after the bailout. However, even with 
the first 110 billion euro loan for 3 years, the country’s performance 
plunged. The expectation for debt to GDB ratio came to 198 per cent 
                                                          
303 “Stability and Growth Program 2010”, Greek Ministry of Finance, European 
Commission, January 2010. 
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for 2012, which lead to debt restructure agreement and a significant 
“haircut” of Greece loans. 
 
As a result, the government had to reduce significantly spending and 
improve tax collection. With revenues falling 15 per cent in 2009, the 
government introduced structural reforms in both directions. To fight 
tax evasion a major reform was needed in the ineffective tax 
collection system. The promotion of electronic payments was 
expected to reduce the share of the “black” market and improve the 
government revenues. The VAT increase also followed and reached 
23 per cent - the same as in other countries with difficulties in the EU. 
Additional taxes have been also put in place. 
 
Public sector was also reformed. The privatisation has been on full 
speed by reducing public owned companies’ number from 6000 to 
2000. The salaries have been cut and the bonuses and additional 
salaries either reduced, or completely abolished. For this reason, in 
general salaries fell by 20 per cent between 2010 and 2014 in Greece. 
Pensions have been significantly reduced and the retirement age 
prolonged from 60 to 65 years for women. Unemployment fell to 25 
per cent (youth even more than 50 per cent), not to mention 
estimation of almost half of the population living below the poverty 
line in 2014. 
 
In brief, Greece economy, as one would have expected from the other 
examples in Europe, did not respond positively to bailouts and 
austerity measures. The need for deficit to decline to a level 
compatible with debt-to GDP-ratio was apparent, but deficit 
reduction did not prevent a debt increase since 2009. Three loan 
packages did not provide a significant improvement to Greece 
economy, and following austerity measures had damaged the 
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economy. Wages’ deflation, jobs’ reduction and less collected taxes 
made it even harder to pay the skyrocketing debts. 
 
The popular response to the crisis, government measures and 
austerity packages have been enormous. Due to space limitations it is 
not going to be covered here, as it also received extensive media and 
academia coverage in the past several years. The economic turmoil 
reinforced political changes, however, the strong Troika’s 
intervention did not leave different governments much room for 
manoeuvring. 
 
To conclude, Greece recovery is still far away and difficult to 
foreseen. Tax evasion is still estimated to be 34 per cent in 2017, 
which indicates difficulties to collect the budget and pay 
international loans. The Greek GDP had fell more than 26 per cent in 
the recent years and recession is still widespread. For sure, the 
problems in Greece are stemming from years of data hiding and 
manipulation, but a significant portion of the current situation might 
be the result of probably too fast Greece integration in the EU and 
certainly in the Eurozone. To uncover exact side of increased 
vulnerability and periphery economic imbalances due to integration 
might be a difficult task, but a needed exercise for a proper creation 
of the Union and cohesion achievement. 
 
 
6.5.2 Celtic Tiger – Ireland’ Fall and Rise 
 
Ireland has experienced one of the highest growth in the history of 
the country starting from 1995. The exceptional growth of “Celtic 
Tiger” has been facilitated by a low level of corporate tax, which has 
been attracting foreign direct investment since then. Bond funding 
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and banks borrowing have been increasing too – from 15 billion to 
110 billion between 2004 and 2008, mainly due to low ECB interest 
rates. The “triumvirate” of adoption of poor policies has been joined 
by a housing (real property) bubble, as in other crisis worst hit 
countries. 
 
The banking problem has been particular in Ireland. Six main Irish 
banks increased its borrowing from 16 billion euro in 2003 to almost 
100 billion by 2007, making it half of the Ireland’s GDP. The attention 
of the supervisors have been on the strong side of the banks rather 
than the weak one304. A high exposure to one source of risk (aka 
“credit concentration risk”) had been overlooked significantly, or as 
Eichengreen305 noted that lack of supervision had contributed to the 
excessive borrowing in the international money markets. 
 
The first signs of economic recession had been seen already in 2007, 
when revenues from taxes arrived approximately 5 per cent below 
the estimation. The hidden loans started to appear and Irish 
government proceeded to the unlimited guarantee of all debt owned 
by six main banks in 2008. As a result, the Irish budget had been 
significantly revised by the introduction of extensive cuts in social, 
health and education areas, which led to social unrest, protests and 
demonstrations in the country. 
 
Balancing a budget required a significant reduction of the deficit. The 
economic adjustment has been achieved by significant cuts in public 
sector, mainly by salaries reduction, and by decreasing social welfare 
                                                          
304 Karl Whelan, “Ireland’s Economic Crisis: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly”, 
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payments. In addition, the taxes have been raised and VAT was 
alleviated to 23 per cent. The economic contraction followed in the 
years and reached 15 per cent. On top of this, the unemployment has 
been significantly growing since the end of 2007, leaving more people 
on social benefits and forcing emigration. 
 
In the meantime the imminent collapse of financial institutions 
brought the 64 billio euro bank bailout. The deepening recession in 
the country, the bank bailout were the main reasons for the 
government’s request of the Troika’s assistance. As the measures for 
budget cuts have been in place already since 2008, the 85 billion euro 
3 year economic adjustment programme since the end of 2010 just 
calmed the international markets. 
 
The additional budget cuts continued, including the closure of the 
police stations and decrease in child benefits. Dissolution of the 
government as a result of Troika’s bailout, protests and change of the 
government marked additional effects in political landscape of 
Ireland. The unemployment was soaring at 15,1 per cent in 2012. As 
many scientists showed306, Irish recovery price has been put on the 
labour market and especially on the middle class tax payers. The 
internal adjustment worked and the Troika bailout has been exited in 
December 2013 after the liquidation of the banking problems. 
 
A slight recovery has been seen in Portugal since 2014 with 4,8 per 
cent GDP growth reaching 6,7 per cent in 2015 and decreasing 
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numbers of employment to 8,8 per cent by the same year. The 
government has been changed again, which is an important sign of 
political instability within a country, and the concerns about accuracy 
and reliability of the economic recovery figures remain, leaving the 
sustainability and of the path of economic revival an open question. 
However, it is important to note, that in all these years, Irish 
government succeeded to keep the relatively low 12,5 per cent 




6.5.3 Portugal’s Recovery Path 
 
Portugal followed the path of the countries, which faced difficulties 
after the banking sector problems. However, the bailout of two main 
banks would not have been such a big problem, if there has not been 
waves of speculation, high levels of risky credit and general 
mismanagement of structural and cohesion funds in addition to 
growing public sector costs over the past decades.  
 
Thus, Portuguese public debt has been created over some time. The 
summer of 2010 has been marked by pro-spending and recession 
revival policies, similar to other Eurozone countries. Money injection 
to the markets for economic stimuli might have yield its results, if not 
the appearance of two main banks’ losses. Already high national debt 
in comparison to GDP, sharply increased after the bailout of two 
main Portuguese banks, which had accumulated losses for years due 
to bad investment, embezzlement and accounting fraud. The 
combination of public and private interests in saving the banks had 




Some of the crisis path for Portugal have been already covered in the 
section 5.3, while analysing the EU’s response to crisis, however, the 
domestic impact and measures applied within the country are of 
interest here. It is important to note that starting in 2011 with the 
request of 78 billion bail-out 3 year economic adjustment programme, 
which has been equally split between IMG, EFSM and EFSF with 5,1 
per cent interest rates, Portugal finally paid off all the bailout debt in 
2016. 
 
Signed in May 2011, economic adjustment program307 had a 
significant effect on the Portuguese economy. 9,8 per cent GDP 
growth in 2010 has been slumping down yearly since then, and reach 
barely 3 per cent in 2013. The salaries have been frozen in public 
sector, and the higher ones have been cut by 14,3 per cent. Pensions 
cut, public sector workforce reduction and general policies for labour 
market flexibility have been also implemented. Government 
spending on health and education have been substantially reduced 
military budget included, several tax benefits abolished and value 
added tax increase for various products. 
 
In addition, Portuguese government abolished some bank holidays 
and prolonged working hours for private sector employees by 30 
minutes a day without extra pay. Bonuses have disappeared for 
people earning more than 1000 euro a month and for others were 
drastically reduced. On top of this, the government had postponed 
various investment projects, like two high-speed railways projects, 
while continuing widespread privatisation, which effects might be 
too early to estimate. 
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Being one of the most advanced and best performer in the region of 
Western Europe before the crisis, Portuguese economy was not 
without flaws. Tax hikes and salary cuts in addition to other austerity 
measures as in other Eurozone Members bought record levels of 
unemployment – almost 15 percent (2012). The ECB has been also 
providing additional support via Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMTs), which indirectly helped to sustain bonds’ reasonable yield 
level. 
 
However, as in majority of the countries, a difficult economic 
environment has brought changes in the political atmosphere. The 
elections in October 2015 had brought anti-austerity post-electoral 
left wing coalition of 51 per cent of the parliament member, which 
the President of Portugal refused to govern. As a result, the minority 
right wing coalition has been invited to form a government, 
nevertheless, not successfully, and bringing eventually the Socialist 
Party to form a government. In conclusion, harsh economy, excessive 
deficit procedure together with bailout economic adjustment 
programme have been a difficult experiment for Portugal both 
politically and economically. 
 
 
6.6 EU Economic Security Capacity 
 
In this chapter, the effects of the EU new economic governance 
instruments on the most important areas of states’ economic and 
social development of EU countries had been studied and presented. 
Initial EU economic governance was set after the creation of 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The creation of a 
single European currency provided benefits for participating 
members, but simultaneously demanded common monetary policies 
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and other constraints, since not all joining member states were ready 
in the same way for monetary convergence. New treaty also 
demanded general economic development convergence within the 
new currency zone, including economic government, which should 
have ensured such processes. EMU suffered from an architectural 
gap, which made it impossible for it to deal with coordination, fiscal 
and public borrowing policies, as well as wages and investment 
regulation. Some instruments of this governance were abandoned 
even before the crisis. 
 
The fathers of the Treaty expected that the real convergence of 
economies, like growth, productivity, competitiveness and 
unemployment, would happen automatically. It was presupposed 
that monetary union would have an integrative effect. European 
Central Bank (ECB) became a federal institution of the 
implementation of the common monetary policy. On the economic 
side of the EMU, the Article 121 TEU suggested a possible 
coordination of national economic policies. ‘No bail out’ clause was 
introduced to avoid moral hazard and force self-discipline, allowing 
neither the EU, nor the Eurozone to help a country in budget 
difficulties. The created asymmetry between a centralized monetary 
union and at best, coordinated economic union was observed already 
in 1995. As Philippe Pochet showed, all the main actors knew well 
what the social stakes of the EMU are since 1998308. Up until 2008, 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) were the only procedures and instruments representing 
EU economic governance309.  
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For this reason, the 2008 crisis severely hit the majority of European 
Union member states, though, in different ways. Sudden financial 
breakdowns, Eurozone crisis (sovereign debts) marked the post-crisis 
European Union. This revealed the shortcomings of the EMU, 
launched in 1992. Without economic convergence and prevailing 
deregulation past years of the EU paved the way for financial and 
economic disorder. The uncertainty of public finances was also 
revealed: public debts and deficits rose sharply in most of the 
member states. The nationalization of financial institutions was 
followed by the creation of rescue plans and support funds, making 
governments intervene, or resume intervention in the European 
economy in general.  
 
As evidence from the EU data show, the EU as an economic security 
community experienced positive results from integration and 
institutionalisation. Indeed, economic vulnerability increased over 
the time, however, most of the scholars argue that this is an 
inevitable phenomenon in the face of economic globalisation. It was 
noted also in the small states studies that smaller countries 
experienced various dependencies for centuries. It would be 
interesting to compare the performance of the EU members and 
outsiders over time, to see what the actual effects are in the case of 
increasing economic openness and vulnerability per se. 
 
The other subjections on resilience reveal the importance of the 
created European Economic and Monetary Union. All measures had 
a significant effect on the member states’ performance in both 
macroeconomic stability and flexibility areas. It is important to stress 
that after 1992 most of the EU countries managed to control their 
external debt, budget deficit and inflation measures. The 
development of the European economic security community also 
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fostered democratic values from freedom to property rights, fighting 
corruption and rule of law. The years in the EU positively correlates 
with the improvements in the human development and growing 
investment, including the one to research and development. 
 
Of course, 2008 crisis did not leave without a mark, and a slight 
recession is still visible and only some countries reached pre-crisis 
levels, but majority still has to work on reaching the previous 
performance levels. The ongoing patterns of crisis and exogenous 
shocks require sound policy and institutions, ensuring the patterns of 
future development.  
 
The analysis of three the most affected countries since 2008 – Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal have shown that the European Union support 
played a significant role in receiving the loans and calming the 
markets. In the case of Portugal and Ireland, which actually had to 
request for Troika’s intervention due to saving banks from 
insolvency, are performing much better after the intervention than 
the Greece, where even several interventions have not brought the 
expected results. 
 
Greek default probably could have happened even before the 
economic crisis swept across the globe. After the provision of loans 
and austerity measures, Greece still remains in a deep recession and 
its economic recovery is neither forecasted nor sustainable. As has 
been covered already in the chapter 5, indeed, there were more 
factors in the Greek crisis. Possible “Grexit” would have strongly 
affected the countries, like Germany, France and others. The solution 
“sold” for countries in difficulties only brought negative 





This solution is extremely important for the countries, which like 
Greece, are extremely exposed to the EU internal market. Majority of 
small states in the EU have highly open economies and get financial 
difficulties quicker and stronger. Their larger vulnerabilities have to 
be outweighed by more than structural and cohesion funds, which 
per se do not improve their vulnerability measures. Indeed, financial 
support contribute immensely to Member States flexibility, which 
might help in the face of crisis to absorb the shock with internal 
restructuration, and the created financial mechanisms can help in the 
macroeconomic stability side. However, there are no instruments 
created to improve MS vulnerability. 
 
Indeed, as it can be seen, vulnerability does not fluctuate as much as 
flexibility or macroeconomic stability, and in a way could be seen as a 
result of long term resilience performance within a country. 
Additionally, as much as it is associated with the physical capacity of 
the country, which in some cases cannot be affected with short term 
policies, the long term investments can pave the road for significant 
changes in several decades or centuries. 
 
The resilience performance in the analysed countries largely 
depended and the positive signs have been seen due to significant 
adjustments within labour markets across the MS. All the cases had 
proven that democracies face much more turmoil due to economic 
adversaries. Social unrests, protests and demonstrations did not 
change completely the implementation of austerity measures. The 
changes in the governments due to acceptance of rescue packages did 
not bring actual differences either, leaving the citizens puzzled about 
the whole idea of democratic elections, if the governments are forced 




These challenges have to be addressed hand in hand proceeding with 
strengthening and improving the EU as an economic security 
community. It has been shown elsewhere, but illiberal regimes 
cannot ensure conditions necessary for sustainable economic and 
human development in the country310. The tendency towards illiberal 
regimes, like in Hungary and Poland, cannot be seen as an example 
to follow, and such infectious trends should be handled with utmost 
care for the long term developments in the region and security 
community, as chapter 3 and 4 display. In addition, as Nogués and 
Quintanilla explore311, the domestic political institutions play a 
crucial role in the formation of cooperation frameworks. Last, but not 
least, to proceed for further upgrades to the economic security 
community, the states need to have similar economic and political 
institutions as they reinforce each other. 
 
The unclear Greece situation is an important window of opportunity 
to understand the limitations or even drawbacks of forming such 
security communities and to find the cure for appearing 
discrepancies for Member States. As researched by Mansfield and 
Solingen312, the economic arrangements cannot work between 
different development level units, and any kind of integration or 
regionalisation arrangement between economic adversaries would 
lead to negative security. 
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Current ongoing creation of banking and/or social union, and 
unclear United Kingdom’s opt out depict the problematique of multi-
speed, multi-layered European Union. Blurry prospects for the future 
integration constrain the development of the EU economic security 
community. Nevertheless, this is the exact moment when the benefits 
and drawbacks of the economic union should be clearly investigated 
and understood, facilitating the clear path of strengthening and 
improving economic security community. 
 
The EU provides the multiplication effect and ensures the positive 
outcomes and support to especially smaller member states. The 
created new crisis’ mechanisms empower the EU to intervene 
immediately into member states with financial liquidity problems. 
The strengthened system of macroeconomic stability and 
improvements in the regulation-flexibility together provide a 
promising institutional background for the development of stronger 
economic security capacity for both shock absorption and shock 









Economic security aspects, crucial for the countries’ existence, 
continue being on top of governments’ agenda. Even almost a decade 
after the worldwide financial turmoil, there are still many questions 
to answer and issues to solve. The European Union, as one of the 
most advanced economic security communities in the world is an 
interesting example to analyse security communities’ functioning, 
institutions, development and performance. 
 
The thesis is combined from various articles, tackling economic 
security. The chapter on Economic Security Mechanism provides the 
framework to understand and analyse economic security. Being a 
contested concept for several decades it has been referred 
extensively, but with minimal cross-referencing and conceptual 
development. This article stems to revive the discussion about what 
exactly does economic security mean and how it should be defined to 
be widely applicable and insightful. 
 
The created framework for analysis of economic security juxtaposes 
both economic vulnerability and economic resilience, as initially 
foreseen by Buzan and other authors in the field. However, the 
following conceptualisation look from a different angle to the 
creation of economic security capacity. Resilience, which is meant to 
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outweigh the “inevitable” vulnerabilities, employs both shock 
absorption and shock counteraction functions. The author argues, 
that they both are equally important for a state’s capacity to respond 
to exogenous shock, and their operationalization is crucial for having 
a high explanatory value of the model. 
 
Before actual analysis of economic security within the EU, chapter 3 
underpins the historical environment and circumstances in which the 
development of the economic security community to be took place. 
The initial stages and origins of institutional set up explain the 
exceptionality of the formation of the European cooperation 
framework. As this chapter shows, the particular circumstances 
contributed to the development of the community, and its progress 
was not based only on economic or political incentives. 
 
Chapter 4 dwells on the different theories and approaches explaining 
the processes, which happened in Europe since the end of Second 
World War. It oversees the exact path of the creation of cooperation 
network and the creation of a security community, which afterwards 
is analysed through the lenses of the security communities’ 
proponents. The chapter is concluded by the reasoning, why the 
created economic arrangements in Europe since their inception have 
been the European economic security community, which now works 
with a multiplication effect to its Member States. 
 
The exact evidence of the functioning of the EU as an economic 
security community, Chapter 5 extracts the particular institutions at 
work and elaborates on the specific upgrades the EU has pursued for 
handling economic crisis. Member States’ role cannot be under-
looked in both performance and the creation of new institutions with 
the community. The examination of national and European interests 
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try to partially explain the complicated relationship between the EU 
economic governance, its measures and their performance in 
different Member States.  
 
It defines how created discrepancies between economic and 
monetary integration within the EU impaired EU economic security 
capacity. The different considerations among the EU MS also explain 
the prolonged and not necessarily the best response to the crisis, 
leaving the EU in the crisis bubble for several years. Nevertheless, the 
financial crisis, seems, has provided an opportunity to revise 
mechanisms at work and create more European interest based the 
EU, with institutions, like the European Central Bank, which reflect, 
preserve and act according to the EU’s needs. 
 
The final chapter studies the actual European economic security 
capacity via the lenses of the framework created in the chapter 2. The 
analysis of Member States’ statistical data over several decades 
proves that vulnerability, indeed, increases, when countries decide to 
join cooperation frameworks like the EU. Economic openness playing 
a crucial role in MS’ exposure for exogenous shocks is for sure 
responsible for majority of the EU MS difficulties, when financial 
crisis hit in 2008, and is important to be analysed more in depth. 
 
On the other hand, the evaluation of economic security bring the 
evidence of both macroeconomic stability, and flexibility-regulation 
effects within the EU. The collective action towards strengthening a 
fiscal position had brought a significant visible effects in the union, 
even if just for short, and the flexibility-regulation institutions, as 
seen, have been performing even with the evident crisis effects in the 
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